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ABSTRACT
Domestic agricultural policy appears to have been formulated with 
little regard for the foreign trade objectives advocated by the United 
States since the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts. This 
study is an attepmt to analyze the effects that foreign trade and agri­
cultural policy decisions, often at cross purposes, have had on resource 
utilization by American agriculture.
Authoritative works in the fields of foreign trade policy and agri­
cultural policy were used as the sources for most basic ideas. Congres­
sional hearings, and government publications and statistics were used to 
supplement the works cited above in showing the effects of past policy 
decisions on various selected agricultural commodities and their produc­
tion. A short inquiry was made into the reasons for, and benefits 
accruing from trade between this nation and others. Import restrictions 
that tend to lessen movements of goods and services were examined to see 
what effect they had on the economy and upon the producers of agricul­
tural commodities. The use of resources in the productionof various 
commodities was examined in order to determine how the efficiency of 
their use was affected by the contraction or expansion of American im­
ports .
It was determined that agricultural policy should be more closely 
coordinated with foreign trade objectives to further international re­
lations . In addition, farm policy which is often incompatible with the 
best interests of international relations in many cases, is also incom­
patible with the best interests of American agriculture. It was estab­
lished that the "farm bloc" has often aided in the passage of legislation
which aids very few farmers and which may impose a burden on the entire 
economy. In addition it was discovered that much of the latest agricul­
tural legislation and policies have not been helpful in solving the real 
farm problem--excessive numbers of low income farmers. It was establish­
ed that attempts made to increase the level of farm income with price 
support programs often gave little if any help to low income farmers. 
Nevertheless, such programs have restricted normal exports and led to 
"dumping". In addition these price support programs have increased the 
need for import restrictions and have tended to slow up the normal pat­
tern of resource shifting.
It is concluded that a re-orientation of agricultural policy should 
be forthcoming. Resources should be aided in their shift to more ef­
ficient and better paying pursuits. Potential importers should be 
encouraged, not hampered. Agricultural producers unable to cope with 
imports should be aided in shifting resources to the production of 
other commodities or other industries. The program should presume that 
benefits accruing to the economy should not be paid by the producers 
feeling the brunt of competition from increased imports. For this reason 
the cost of re-orientation should be borne by society and the time 
needed to accomplish the shift should be long enough to permit a smooth 
period of transition. To assist in accomplishing this shift the econo­
my needs to be kept at full or near full employment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economic theorists and producers fcr export markets have generally 
advocated lessening of restrictions on the trade between nations. On 
the other hand, many producers confronted with Import competition have 
demanded protection in the form of tariffs and other trade restrictions 
and these demands have often been intensified during business reces­
sions. Economists have generally discredited the use of most protective 
restrictions by a nation that has developed to the position of an ad­
vanced creditor nation. International trade that does take place is 
normally assumed to follow along lines which are consistent with a 
more productive allocation of resources. A persistent confidence in 
that principle on the part of our policy makers was an important under­
lying factor in orienting American foreign trade policy, after 1730$ 
toward a lessening of trade barriers and a stimulation of irfc ernational 
trade.
By all odds, the most significant modification in either the theory 
or practice of tariff policy in the United States in the last 100 years 
was the passage, in 1934# of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Amendment 
to the Tariff Act of 1930. Largely as a result of the trade agree­
ments program which that new legislation made possible, the average 
ad valorem equivalents of the customs rates on imports of dutiable 
merchandise into the United States has fallen steadily - in round 
figures, from 53 per cent in 1930 to 12 per cent in 1955. The specif­
ic duties that many imports carry force the rates up, as a per cent 
of import values, when money prices are deflating. In 1932 at the 
height of the depression import rates reached a high of 59 per cent.
1
2Conversely, today continuation of inflationary pressures is lowering 
the rates as a per cent of import values.
Agriculture supplies a large, although declining, portion of total 
American exports and is receiving increasing competition in the world 
markets, and, where imports are permitted, also within the domestic 
markets. Relative and absolute losses of exports have caused spokes­
men for certain agricultural blocs to advocate export subsidies, while 
incroased import competition has been used as an argument for increas­
ed restrictions by other agricultural bloc spokesmen*
The goals of agricultural policy and foreign trade policy seem to 
be diametrically opposed— one in favor of more restrictions on trade, 
the other in favor of allowing greater freedom to trade.
Following a review of some pertinent principles in Chapter II, 
this study will turn from general trade theory and explore the ef­
fects that restrictions placed upon international trade by the Uhited 
States have had upon various segments of agriculture. The present 
plight of agriculture will be examined to see whether trade restriction 
concessions made in favor of agriculture, and those asked for by agri­
culture, are aiding agriculture. The effects of domestic agricultural 
policies will be examined to see what effect they have upon foreign 
trade policy. The domestic agrieulture and foreign trade policies will 
be examined to see how effective they are in their attempts at solv­
ing the low income farm problem; effects on the general economy will 
also be noted.
An analytical study of trade and farm policies would seem to be 
in order at this time because of the political importance attached to
3tho maintenance of a prosperous agriculture. and the need to improve 
international relatione in order to help forestall a decline in Ameri­
can prestige abroad,
'•lthin the last five years Congress has held several hearings to 
obtain information by which legislation could be formulated to aid in 
solving these problems. From April 9 to June 15, 1953 the Senate Com­
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry held public hearir^s on the effects 
of exports and imports, and specifically on the impact of agricultural 
exports and imports on farm price support programs. From February 25 
to June 2, 1955 a subcommittee of the same committee held hearings on 
the administration of Acta relating to the disposal of surplus agri­
cultural commodities. From Soptember 17 to December 13« 1956 a subcom­
mittee of the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings in the 
United States, Europe, and Asia on the administration and operation of 
existom and tariff laws and the trade agreements program.
During this same period of time, 1953-1957 academic interest was 
exhibited by articles pertaining to various aspects of these problems 
in such journals as The American Economic Heview and The Journal of 
Farm Economics. A comprehensive work was done on the subject by 
S. Payson Perry in 1908, C. Addison Hickman did research on the 
subject and published a book, Our Farm Program and Foreign Trade, in 
1949# D, Gale Johnson published his work, Trade and Agriculture, in 
1950, While many of the writers in tho field have given much thought 
to the effects of trade upon agriculture and society in general, they 
have given comparatively little attention to the effects of farm policy 
and restrictions on trade. Nor have they related these effects to the 
degrees of efficiency in the prodviction of the various agricultural
4commodities. Neither have the effects of trade restriction programs 
been closely correlated with the attempts to solve the farm income 
problem among tho different sized farmsteads.
Practically all proposals to solve the "farm problem" have been 
aimed at one and the same objective, that of maintaining satisfactory 
price levels in order to solve the low income problem. Our attempts 
along this lins have, of course, not yielded a satisfactory solution. 
Instead, it has been accused by many of actually intensifying the 
problem. The use of price support measures in an attempt to solve 
the farmers' income problem is untenable unless imports are restricted 
and exports are subsidized. Primarily for this reason a consideration 
of the effects of trade restrictions and domestic policy upon different 
segments of agriculture, the consumer, and the taxpayer will be followed 
by an examination of various alternative policies. The possible re­
sults of the programs based upon such policies will be contrasted and 
compared with the results of present policy. Throughout this explora­
tory effort, due attention will be given to the matter of differentiat­
ing policy recommendations along lines that are indicated by the varying 
needs of the several segments of our agricultural production.
CHAPTER IT
BASES FOR TRADE AND FACTOR RETURNS
Trade, when un-encumbered with state trading or dumping, may be - 
expected to take place when the proper combination of circumstances 
is in evidence, Item3 will normally be imported if they can be bought 
cheaper by the importer than similar items at home. Production of ex­
pert items may be expected when profits are greater than they would 
be if production factors were used to produce items to satisfy local 
demands alone. The prices, when free to do so, that will determine 
whether commodities are exported, produced for local use, or are im­
ported depend on the use of certain real productive factors, their 
location and their abundance. Freedom to exchange goods while in 
search of profit makes possible the efficient use of the real produc­
tive factors, or resources. Demand for factors used in the productive 
process depends upon the sale of tho product at a price which is high 
enough to give each factor a return which is at least equal to oppor­
tunity costs for that factor,
A nation is a logical exporter of a given commodity when its 
comparative costs are less in terms of total inputs than are the cost 
ratios of producing the same conanodity relative to different commodities 
in other areas. The reason that a nation may be capable of producing 
a certain commodity cheaper, relative to other producing nations, de­
pends on its combination of factors of production or its resource 
endowment.
Among the causos for differing productivity of land are geographic 
location, the elenvants contained in the soil, rainfall, return,
5
6and transport potential. Differences in labor productivity may be 
traced to several causes, among which are the quantity of labor, its 
health, education level, and manual dexterity. Capital productivity 
may, among other things, depend variously on circumstances associated 
with capital accumulation, government stability, institutionalized 
interest patterns, the demand for investments to export production, 
the national growth pattern, and government monetary and fiscal poli­
cies,
A nation, by producing commodities best fitted to its peculiar 
combination of the factors of production for domestic and export users, 
and by importing those things not especially adapted to production 
with its factor combination, is following "the law of comparative ad­
vantage." The remainder of this chapter consists of a discussion of 
the applicability of that law under various sets of circumstances and 
a review of factor returns as a determinant of the volume, nature, and 
direction of foreign trade.
Comparative Advantage
Society will be better off if it can increase the number of units 
of a given quality of output obtained without a corresponding increase 
in the effort needed to produce this increase. It would normally be 
imprudent to employ capital and labor in the production at home of the 
things that could be purchased cheaper from foreign countries, This 
fact is more likely to be overlooked in the case of & country whose 
foreign trade makes up only a small percentage of its total trade.
The foreign trade of the United States, while admittedly small as com­
pared to its domestic trade, is nevertheless vitally important to 
those dependent on its continued existence and growth. The impor­
tance of foreign trade to the American econoay is often not understood.
7In fact, many of the laws which have been enacted to restrict and 
regulate trade appear to be shortsighted•
The answer to the question, "Why do goods move into trade?" is 
to be found in an understanding of the principle of comparative advan­
tage, It is easy to observe the advantages to be gained where one good 
that is peculiarly adaptable to one person or rogion is traded for 
another goad that is the specialty of another place or person. What 
is difficult to see, however, is what causes trade to exist where one 
group of people or region appears to be better adapted to satisfy all 
its own wants than is another group or region.
To repeat, trade takes place because buyers, through trade, find 
a cheaper way of satisfying their wants. Prices cannot readily be com­
pared between nations, for each nation has its own monetary unit. 
However, price ratios within a nation can be compared as between a 
given commodity and other commodities. Whon the price ratio is more 
favorable for some specific item in another nation, that item becomes 
a profitable import. The relative ranking of commodities in each na­
tion's price schedule, assuming free markets, is a manifestation of 
comparative advantage, and the determinant of which goods will enter 
foreign trade if left free to do bo.
Alfred Marshall states the law of comparative advantage as follows s
"Countries whose advantages are distributed in 
unequal proportions among different industries, 
may generally carry on a trade profitable to 
both, even though one of them is absolutely the 
stronger all around,"^
^Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade (London: MacMillan and Co.,
1932), p. 18.
aDifferences of Endowment and Combinations of "Factors of Production11
The model of comparative advantage does not depend on differences 
in price as between one nation and another. And at the present time 
it is particularly difficult to make such price comparisons in the pre­
sence of multiple exchange rates, bilateral agreements, exclusions, and 
areas of preferential treatment. Much of the explanation of trade 
rests upon the fact that through trade wants are satisfied with less 
effort. Nations specialize in fields in which their aptitudes are 
greatest. Products move from areas of specialization to increase the 
satisfactions of producers in other specialized areas. Thus it is of­
ten possible and profitable for an area to forego the production of 
commodities not readily produced by existing factor combinations, and 
permit a shifting of resources to areas of high aptitude. Product 
movement is called International trade whenever goods happen to cross 
international political boundaries.
The comparative differences of costs of producing various goods 
within the several nations stem from differences of resource endowments. 
Broadlv speaking, resource endowments are land, labor, and capital, the 
factors of production. Ordinarily those factors which are abundant are 
relatively cheap, and the scarce factors are relatively expensive. In 
illustration, the Borough of Manhattan would have relatively low cost 
labor in relation to land costs when compared with Nye County, Nevada, 
although both labor and land may be absolutely higher in Manhattan.
The different commodities that man produces to satisfy his wants 
are made with varying combinations of the basic factors of production. 
Indeed, in many instances the same item may be produced in different 
circumstances with different factor proportions. The comparative costs
9of these factors of production under unlike conditions can make a 
vast difference in the cost of the same finished produst. Cotton 
which sells in a national market is profitably produced in California 
where labor and adequate farm land are scarce, yet in areas of the 
South where both labor and land are relatively abundant, cotton farm­
ing is unable to support a decent scale of living. The large size of 
the many California farms males them more conducive to capital dis­
placement of labor, whereas small size farm units common to certain 
areas in the South are dependent on man and mule, and are located on 
very poor soil.
Some commodities are preponderantly labor-using in their produc­
tion. i&amples are tobacco, sugar beets, and berries. Other crops 
are often largely land-using. These include timber, cattle, wheat, 
and similar agricultural crops. Capital-using products, on the other 
hand, include such items as com, sugar cane (in Hawaii and Louisiana), 
and so on.
The determining factor of comparative advantage for the different 
type goods an area produces is found in comparative costs. Were labor 
and capital completely mobile, costs might be much closer, and the de­
ciding factor would then be land. Labor and capital, however, tend to 
be immobile for various reasons.2 The comparative costs of certain 
goods within an area will be determined by the relative scarcity of the 
factors of production, and a least-cost combination of these factors. 
Only those goods which are able to command high returns to the factors
^Lawrence W. Towle, International Trade and Comnercial Policy 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948), pp. 5-9•
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of production should normally bo found in a nation's exports. Goods 
unable to command high returns to the productive factors are incapable 
of being produced efficiently with the factors availableThus it is 
the item which does not command high returns to tho productive factors 
that we normally expect to be imported. In some instances inadequate 
demand may preclude optimum factor usage and certain economies of size.
Advantages of Large Scale Production and Better Resource Utilization
The optimum output-input ratio is obtainable when tho efficient use 
of the factors of production has been maximized. The larger the area 
from which to obtain the least-cost combination, the more likely It is 
that factor combination usage can be maximized. The larger the market, 
the greater will be the possibility of increasing output enough to take 
advantage of certain economies which are often associated with large 
size. The United States as an economic unit with a minimum of internal 
restrictions on trade is an example of such conditions. With mass pro­
duction, capital-using production methods realize their fullest advantage. 
With a chronic manpower shortage relative to land and capital, the de­
veloping United States econony has been confronted with high labor costs, 
and has needed labor-saving production methods to reduce costs, fiffi-
Efficiency in production will be defined as having been obtained 
when the total costs of tta factors of production used in producing a 
given commodity cannot be decreased by use of a different factor com­
bination.
3©e Lorie Tarshis, International Trade and Finance (New York;
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 115-122,
'/hanover location is considered, transport costs must be included 
in the productive factor combination. Climate, soil difference, rain­
fall, and ethnic differences affect efficiency and must also be consider­
ed. Returns to the factors to be considered adequate, or high enough, 
should be as high as they would be from any other me.
11
cient use of capital to supplement labor was assisted by the relative 
freedom of goods and raw materials to move within the United States.'*4'
Europe is today emulating this advantage by attempting to form an 
economically integrated community in order to obtain a freedom of special­
ization similar to that which our several states have enjoyed since this 
5
country's birth. However, the traditionally restrictive trade policies 
in Europe are such that only the broad outlines of European free trade 
are now visible. Hard negotiations will be necessary before concrete 
results can be expected. It is believed that the benefits of a wider 
market in manufactured goods may prove to be the force that will remove 
many of the obstacles to this development. It should be further noted 
that Europe has not been confronted with labor shortages often asso­
ciated with the history of America’s industrial growth.
The need for labor saving devices in many American industries may 
be traced in some instances to the relative scarcity of manpower. A 
major justification for capital investments in agriculture is found in 
the fact that with wide expanses of land, relatively expensive labor 
cannot be profitably utilized without capital. Capital, on the other 
hand, cannot be efficiently used unless it is cheaper than labor. By
^Paul T. Ellsworth, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit­
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF 
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Rep­
resentatives, 84th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C., (1956) 
p. 125, See also 3ertil Ohlin Interregional and International Trade. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 170-182. Economies
of large-scale production is discussed on p. 172.
^The New York Times. May 26, 1957, ’’Europeans Unite in Customs 
Union:" Treaties signed in Italy bring six European nations together in 
a single market and customs union for the free circulation of goods. A 
common tariff is to be adopted and import quotas to be eliminated in a 
period of twelve years. Signatory nations, with a total of 160 million 
people, are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
West Germany.
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the process of substitution when labor costs more than capital, the 
machine or technology is used. Capital use fas varying degrees of 
effectiveness in different industries, and in different countries 
because of differing combinations of the factors of production. Be­
cause of different factor endowment, and therefore different cost 
ratios, nations with a high degree of capital development have as much 
need for trade among themselves as non-developed areas have for trad­
ing with developed ones.^
A frequent determinant of capital investments in large scale heavy 
industries is the nature of the industrial process in relation to 
natural resource location. Examples of the right combination for cap­
ital oriented development are the Ruhr area in Germany, and the Pitts­
burgh-Great Lakes area of the United States. On the other hand, no 
comparable economic justification is found for attempting large scale 
heavy industry in a country like Argentina with a lack of economically 
located raw materials needed in basic heavy industries dependent on 
iron. Such an industry in Argentina would, call for protection behind 
a tariff wall, and thus would place a burden on the products which the
nation's factor combinations are most efficient in producing, such as
7
wheat, wool, cattle, and like commodities.
Nati onal Survival and Vested Interests
A nation may wish to maintain domestic production of commodities 
that could be more cheaply acquired from foreign suppliers. For in­
stance, during a war for survival, cei'tain crucial commodities, if
^Towle, op. cit.. pp. 111-116.
^Wendell C. Gordon, The Economy of Latin America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 103-107.
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imported in entirety, could leave the nation vulnerable. This is the 
argument used for protection by nearly every industry that asks Congress 
for protective legislation. Even corsetiers have sought protection as 
needed for national survival. Spokesmen for wool and sugar have both 
claimed to represent strategic commodities needed for national survival. 
According to Lloyd, "The most generally recognized responsibility of a 
nation is the preparation of an adequate defense against possible foreign 
aggression." Even Adam Smith makes a case far protection if such is 
needed to maintain an industry vital for a ration’s defense.^ If pro­
tection for national defense is a valid argument, it can be used for 
almost any item used in. today's economy, since total wars might call 
for complete self-sufficiency. This, however, is an unattainable goal 
for any nation, even for the USSR or the USA.^ At the 1956 Tariff 
Hearings, Mason made a case against protection. He would have peace­
time acquisition and stockpiling of raw materials essential for national 
defense, with a possible exception of oil.
"For materials capable of stockpiling— and most strategic 
materials are— stockpiling in peacetime from low-cost 
sources, either domestic or foreign is much to be pre­
ferred to protection of domestic output, which means 
procurement from high-cost sources both in peace and 
war. The existence of an adequate stockpile, moreover, 
can make it unnecessary in war to divert scarce man­
power away from military service and into the war-time 
production of strategic materials. Oil represents a
^L. E. Lloyd, Tariffs (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1955),
p. 116.
^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Edited by Edwin Cannan; New 
York: The Modern Library, Random House, Inc., 1937), pp. 429-432.
■^Paul T. Ellsworth, The International Economy (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1950), pp. 334-385.
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rather special case that I shall return to pre­
sently, ... Most of these oil imports come from 
Venezuela which, in the event of war, must be 
judged a relatively safe source, ... ."H
To this it may be added that the stockpiling of petroleum products may
now be within the realm of feasibility. By way of illustration, the
Esso Standard Oil Company is now using salt dome storage in the Louisiana
swamps,
An industry which is vital for the nation's survival may demand the 
protection that tariff walls afford. Such protection may limit terri­
torial specialization which would cause each nation to attempt to become 
more nearly self-sufficient. An alternative to protective tariffs is 
the subsidization of "needed military goods production." The advantage 
in this procedure is the ability to scrutinize the costs of protection 
each time a budget is reviewed. The consumers will benefit and the tax 
will be placed in accordance with ability to pay in so far as such taxes
"I p
may be progressive. ^
Regardless of the bases for a nation*s protective policy its citi­
zens will not all be affected alike by trade restrictions; usually some 
wLll benefit and others will be hurt. If the individual who may be 
benefited by tariff protection is vocal enough, it is possible that we
Edward S. Mason, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF 
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Re­
presentatives, 84th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D, C., (1956), 
p. 122. The information presented to the subcommittee was a synthesis 
of Chapters 11 and 12 of Mason's book Economic Concentration and the 
Monopoly Problem. Harvard Economic Studies, (Cambridge; Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1957)* See especially pp. 250-252,
12Harry G. Brainard, International Economics and Public Policy 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), pp. 345-34^
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may have a tariff policy which is detrimental to the majority,,
"In some instances, tariff legislation has 
actually been the occasion for parliamentary 
corruption. More frequently, legislators 
have been willing to sacrifice the general 
interest in order to placate powerful busi­
ness interests among the constituencies, and 
thus ensure their own personal re-election 
to office. "13
Certain pressure has been maintained for tariffs by various groups 
since the earliest beginning of this nation.^ Most groups will admit 
that protection often decreases a nation’s standard of living, but they 
usually contend that other factors outweigh this temporary factor. Yet, 
once protection is given a lease on life, it seems never to die. The 
temporary need may end but protection itself seems endless. The chief 
driving force that has caused major trading nations to retain tariff 
walls is the self-interest of certain groups of producers. Although 
the general public, which does the consuming, suffers from protection, 
special interests profit. The individual who benefits by being protect­
ed receives concentrated returns which are of more interest to him than 
the losses of individual consumers who, while hurt, are only hurt a 
little. The consumer is rarely aware that he is being hurt while the 
benefactor is extremely cognizant of his benefits.^
Factor Returns and Foreign Trade 
Acceptance of the goal of expanded trade focuses attention on where
■^Towle, op. cit.. p. 327*
^■Howard R. Smith, "The Farmer and the Tariff: A Reappraisal,"
The Southern Economic Journal. XXI (October 1954)> 164.
4s early as 1848 the South, a free trade area, had its sugar interests 
seeking protection.
■^Towle, o£. cit., pp. 327-328.
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the benefits which are derived from trade shall accrue. In addition 
the question is raised who must shoulder the costs of changing exist­
ing pattersn of trade.
Mercantilist Thought
The goal of mercantilism was the maintenance of a favorable balance 
of trade; the "Mercantilists" overlooked the need for eventually balanc­
ing a nations balance of payments. Exports should be as valuable and 
numerous as possible while imports should be limited if competing with 
domestic production. Invisible items should be supplied by national 
enterprises whenever possible.^ Under mercantilism, products are pro­
duced from scarce natural resources, and their export is often subsi­
dized. Yet imports in many instances are restricted,
A reason often given to jmtify protection for domestic producers 
is the low level of foreign wages. This argument assumes that low wages 
necessarily mean low cost and therefore vie must protect home industry 
against imports from nations with lower wages than ours. Actually, 
cost is determined by all of the factors of production, and if the 
opportunity cost of labor in a given nation is high because of alter­
native uses in combination with capital, there is little justification 
for protecting a hand-intensive use of labor. Wages are generally low 
where productivity is low and productivity depends not on labor alone 
but on capital and land as well. Land, of course, includes such "quali­
tative" features as geographical location, productivity of the soil, 
and climatic conditions. It is a nation’s total output and the distri-
^P, G. Newman, The Development of Economic Thought (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 18-24,
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bution of that output that really determines wealth. If today’s 
"Mercantilists" are permitted to thwart the nation’s best resource 
utilization and are able to influecne an increase of exports with 
stricter limits on imports, two major damages are bound to result.
First, the American standard of living will be lower than it otherwise 
might be. Secondly, far less could be done to relieve the dollar short­
age situation which has become chronic in many of the major trading 
nations.
Productivity and Factor Returns
Productivity, which is the basis for the high American scale of 
living, will depend on proper use of resources if the scale of living 
is to continue its upward climb.
The worker with a machine pacing his work is less affected by de­
creasing efficiency than a man setting his own pace. Machine using jbbs 
are far less subject to productivity fluctuations than hand-intensive 
jobs.17
The reason for increased productivity, although measured in man- 
hours of output, is not that man has become twice as capable as he once 
was, but rather that man has implemented his limited efforts with dif­
ferent combinations of capital and land. Man, using a machine as the 
standard setter, is often able after a few hours training to make pro­
ducts of acceptable quality. But when the worker relies on skill rather 
than machines to set the standard of his production, the training period 
often runs into years, and quantity is definitely limited by the number
■^Philip Taft, Economics and Problems of Labor (Second Edition;
New York: Stockpole and Heck, Inc., 1949), pp. 303-305.
18
of trained personnel. It is therefore easier to increase output in 
a nation with a high propensity to use capital productive methods than 
in a nation oriented toward manual methods of production. Output in a 
nation dependent on mass use of manual labor is limited by the number 
of skilled workers and labor’s physical endurance.
Manpower-using industries within a nation that normally uses a pro­
duction combination heavy with capital investments is likely to cause 
relatively high prices for hand-intensive crops. When a nation attempts 
to maintain a labor-using industry, in the face of cheaper imports, pro­
tection is required. Competition for workers calls for wages high enough 
to be competitive with pay in the more productive industries. The fol­
lowing quotation is an illustration of this principle and its operation 
with refernece to a specific industry.
". . .there is a fallacy in saying we are com­
peting with cheap foreign labor. Really, what 
we are doing is competing with the efficiency 
of the automotive industry. . .”1#
More important still in a consideration of agricultural production 
is the fact that barriers to imports of cheaper hand-intensive commod­
ities cause the price to be higher, and commonly reduces consumption. 
Effort that is used to produce a labor-intensive crop in a highly in­
dustrialized nation is a waste of resources if that commodity can be 
imported cheaper, as the manpower so used could be. used more effective­
ly elsewhere.
The returns to the factors of production tend to be determined by
18C. H. Percy, President, Bell-& Howell .Company, A Statement in the 
hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, WORLD-WIDE COMPETITION 
SPURS TRADE. Reprinted by Committee for National Trade Policy; House of 
Representatives, Washington, D. C., ( 1 9 5 5 p. 13*
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the scarcity of each factor and the productivity of the combined fac­
tors in relation to the demand for the different commodities. The 
amount of capital available from professional investors for investment 
in any industry depends on profit expectations. The cheapest goods are 
those which can be efficiently produced, that is, goods using a country's 
factor combination that makes use of large amounts of the cheapest fac­
tor. The net result will then be the largest return possible to those 
utilized factors.The bargaining power of the various factors of 
production, as well as their scarcity and productivity, helps to deter­
mine the returns to each individual factor.
The return for one factor can temporarily become out of balance, 
such as when labor demands pay increases that are not in line with in­
creases in productivity. As soon, however, as management is able to 
readjust the factors to a new least-cost combination, balance will 
again be obtained. Lack of import restrictions would no doubt speed 
up such a readjustment, or prevent in the first place any one factor 
from obtaining a temporary share much greater than its proportional 
contribution to productivity. As soon as domestic price is raised to 
cover increases above productivity to one factor, imports may be ex­
pected to increase competition.
Trade. Prices and Factors of Production
Both in a domestic market and in the world market, prices tend 
to reflect the cost of production. The greater the amount of com­
petition and the longer the time period considered, the nearer will 
prices approach cost. If the factors of production were mobile, costs
19Ellsworth, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF 
LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, pp. 124-125.
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would be the same in all countries. Because the factors are not free 
to move at will, the costs, reflected in differing ratios of prices 
among the several commodities within different nations, dictate inter­
national movements.
Complete protection for a commodity, the production of which de­
mands a factor of production combination relying heavily upon a scarce, 
high-cost factor, would result in a high price relative to other com­
modities within the country. Production of the protected commodity for 
local consumption will depend upon the willingness of consumers to pay 
a price high enough to divert that scarce factor away from other pur­
suits. The "tulip mania" in Holland was to some extent at least a result 
of a country's willingness to use a scarce factor, land. The price 
of bulbs was high enough to support the fad. Similarly, if Alaska were 
to offer complete protection for hot-house bananas and the demand for 
bananas was intense enough, some one would go into production.
The nation producing a protected commodity which requires large 
quantities of scarce, high-cost production factors not only cause that 
commodity to be scarcer and higher priced than it need be, but also 
causes the prices of all other goods dependent on the same scarce fac­
tor to be higher. When one industry uses a share of a given factor, it 
competes with all other industries using the same factor; the greater 
the competition for a limited supply, the higher the prices. This not 
only makes the general price level higher for local consumers, but also, 
by readjusting the relative price differences within a nation, makes the 
nation a poorer market in which foreign nations may buy.
Reduction of imports into a nation that imposes restrictions will 
allow less foreign exchange for would-be purchasers of that nation's
21
exports. A nation that is discriminated against by trade restrictions 
might have a great desire for some good high on the efficiency list of 
the nation that imposes restrictions. However, the nation which is 
discriminated against, with less chance to obtain needed foreign ex­
change may be forced to discontinue purchases from the discriminating 
nation.
The two-fold reduction of natural advantage by protection of an 
industry which is economically unable to compete can be seen to hurt 
not only the protecting country but also the excluded trading country. 
That country must turn to its own facilities to obtain substitutes for 
the goods that it wished to import. This will probably cause a redirec­
tion of factors within its econoigy, with resulting higher prices. Both 
nations have suffered by the exclusion, not only the protected nation, 
but the excluded one as well. Both have higher general price levels; 
both have less in total products.
Chief Trading Nations and Wage Differences
One reason that factors of production do not have the same cost in 
all countries is the lack of factor mobility. Land, which includes the 
soil and climate, is incapable of relocation. Holland in extending 
dikes, and other nations with drainage and irrigation projects attempt 
to alter land use, bub only by a small amount. The productivity and 
scarcity, in relation to the other productive factors, determine the 
distribution to land.
Capital and labor tend to seek greater returns. A movement by 
one of them affects the productive power of the other. The movements 
of both factors tend to give them a uniform value producing power.
Labor and capital both tend to gravitate to a place where there is a
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shortage. This is so because the law of supply and demand dictate
higher value to a good which is demanded but is in short supply. The
entrepreneur is the adjuster of the factors of labor and capital, and
the adjustment is final when the wages and interest are determined by
20the productivity of labor and capital.
While capital and labor returns may tend to equalize, a cursory
glance at contrasting wages in different areas creates doubt as to the
equalization. In 1954, a comparison of daily agricultural wages showed
the United States at $5*30, while Ceylon had agricultural wages of 2.5
Rupees for male employees. The Rupee was worth less than 30 cents in
exchange for dollars; hence, the Ceylonese farm hand was making less
21than one-seventh as much as his American counterpart. If there is 
a tendency for wages and interest to equate there must be some expla­
nation for these differences. First, labor is unable to move between 
nations because of exclusions, quotas, different cultures, and a general 
inertia which tends to hold one to his native country. This reluctance 
to move results from such factors as limited finances, family ties, re­
ligious ties, cultural background, immigration regulation and a lack of 
information as to opportunity elsewhere. For tbs above reasons, labor 
is not mobile between nations or within nations. And in addition to 
international and intranational immobility there is inter-industry im­
mobility.
^J. B. Clark, The Distribution of Wealth (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 193&), Ch. 19.
^"ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1955 (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Labor Office, 1955), Table 19, pp. 234-235.
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"... we can divide labor, somewhat arbitrarily, 
into four major groups: (l) technical and
managerial labor, (2J skilled labor, (3) semi­
skilled labor, (4) unskilled labor. Members 
of each group compete directly with one another,
but only to a limited extent with those of the
next higher or lower group, and scarcely at all 
with those at a greater distance on the scale.
And while there is some movement from one group 
to another, it is slow and gradual ... ."22
It can be seen that labor is not capable of quick adjustment, but
what keeps capital from quickly adjusting between countries and indus­
tries? Presently, the threat of nationalization, tax differentials,
restrictions on removal of profits from a nation, and instability of 
governments are prominent deterrents to international investments. 
Furthermore, where such investments are made there is often a demand for 
exceedingly high returns to offset the risks involved. Another obstacle 
is found in the fact that, once capital has been invested in a heavy 
capital-using industry of a specialty nature, such investment is ex­
tremely difficult to be reoriented into a pursuit which has come to 
offer the investor a greater opportunity for profit.
Capital may be accumulated by reallocation of resources by an au­
thoritarian government, by credit expansion, and by savings within an
economy ,2-^ If these methods fail to produce tto9 needed capital bases
for desired productivity, capital must be imported. Interest rates may 
be used as the drawing motive for imports of capital. If the risks are 
high, the payment to capital must be high. A nation with a high level 
of real income is in a far better position to offer the temptingly high 
interest rate and to increase its capital than one with a low level of
9 9
Ellsworth, The International Economy, p. 173* 
23Ibid., pp. 182-163.
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Income. It is to be remembered, moreover, that the need of a nation 
for capital is frequently rendered all the more urgent by the fact of 
its dependence on capital for making its labor more efficient.
With greater freedom of trade, capital will be more nearly free 
to go where it is most needed. Labor, if unable to cross borders, at 
least will be able to increase efficiency with imports of capital. Com­
parative advantage, determined by factor resource combinations, depends 
upon the exchange of goods to increase the welfare of those living in 
different areas. However, the effects of trade restrictions, or lack 
of them, on one segment of an economy, such as agriculture, may be 
quite different from their effects on what is known as the general 
welfare aspects of a nation's life. Frequent reference to this point 
will be included in the chapters which follow.
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CHAPTER III
EFFECTS OF TRADE REGULATION ON 
AGRICULTURE IN GENERAL
The United States, an importer of agricultural goods, is also 
a major exporter of such commodities. A study of the effects of re­
strictive trade regulations on agriculture introduces two problems:
(l) the effects on United States exports of agricultural commodities; 
and (2) the effects on the output of import-competing crops. An 
objective of many farmers is less restrictions on imports of all but 
farm commodities. The reason, of course, is the possibility of low­
er prices for the things farmers must buy. For example, southern 
cotton farmers have historically opposed tariff restrictions. In 
1908, S, Payson Perry, a Republican farmer who became a Democrat 
because of the Republican stand on the tariff question, took this 
position in a book, The Tariff and the Farmer Yet farmer advocacy 
of less restraint on imports has by no means been unanimous. Some 
farm groups have attempted to maintain trade restrictions because, 
for them it was beneficial to do so. The sugar producers, both beet 
and cane, have long been advocates of protection.
The tariff is a tax levied by nations on imports or exports for 
revenue or to restrict trade. In the United States such a tax may 
be used only on imports. In any country this tax is a powerful means 
for implementing a commercial policy. While the tariff is by far the
^S. Payson Perry, The Tariff and the Farmer (Worcester, Massachu­
setts: F. S. Blanchard and Co., 1908), p. 7*
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best known tool for restricting trade between nations, it is by no 
means the only tool. Other tools and devices have been developed 
and used to help domestic producers who desire protection, Another 
device for directly restricting trade is the import quota. The im­
port quota, whether opei’ated on a first-come-first-served basis or 
by negotiation between trading nations, can be even more restrictive 
than tariffs. An import licensing program may also be effective in 
eliminating many imports. Once the quota is filled, or no more 
import licenses are issued, imports are completely excluded. For­
eign exchange controls may be operated in such a way as to be highly 
discriminatory against specific imports. Price controls on imports 
are still another tool which may have a restrictive effect on imports.'1
Several forms of indirect trade restrictions sometimes prove to 
be just as frustrating to international traders as do the more direct 
forms mentioned above. The most exasperating of such indirect restric­
tions are found in connection with the administration of the United 
States tariff laws. The tariff classifications of goods are often 
very complex. A special source of difficulty and. uncertainty is that 
many goods are comprised of different materials, having different duty 
rates, and there must be a decision as to which is the component of 
chief value that will determine the classification. The uncertainty 
of not knowing sometimes what rate will be applied discourages impor­
tation. Valuation is also difficult to determine in many instances, 
with some items being valued at wholesale in the exporting country,
“Tor a more elaborate treatment of the various means of restricting 
imports, see Brainard, ojd. cit.. Ch. 17.
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and in other instances the value set is the retail price.
The quarantine and sanitary regulations have been used quite 
often to bar agricultural imports. The exclusion of all meat and 
cattle from a nation which has evidence of hoof and mouth disease is 
a well known example. Provisions covering this situation were in­
cluded in the 1930 Tariff Act. "Buy at home" slogans and campaigns, 
when coupled with required marks of origin, can also deter imports. 
Limitations placed on government purchases from domestic sources, 
where such purchases are of major significance often have a limit­
ing effect on the quantity of imports.
The fact that some restrictions do not take the form of subsidies 
to producing groups must not be overlooked. While trade restrictions 
are generally an attempt to subsidize a favored group, restrictions, 
such as thos imposed against exports headed fcr a communist-dominated 
market, may be purely an international political tool. Use of such 
a tool may prove economically detrimental to the entire nation*s econ­
omy and not help any special group.
Varying Effects of Tariff Regulation 
and Other Restrictions
The various tools that are available to our protectionist-minded 
legislators are effective in excluding or reducing import competition. 
The use of.these tools, however, has had differing effects upon the 
separate segments of our econony, and this has led to a continual 
struggle between groups who are in favor of tariffs and those who are 
opposed. Farmers, while basically against the principle of protection, 
Nevertheless in many instances insist upon being protected. Much of
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the West has long insisted upon moderate protection although they 
would receive little benefit from a policy of overall protection,,
The importance of wool and sugar in the makeup of the West’s economy
has been a major factor in the moderate protectionism characteristic
of the area.
With many American crops dependent on foreign markets for a 
large portion of their sales we can expect a sentiment on the part 
of their producers in favor of less trade restrictions. Yet there 
has been an imbalance of trade in competitive agricultural commodi­
ties of nearly half a billion dollars per year in favor of importing 
nations.^ The fact that many of our commodities are competing with 
foreign imports leads us to expect the producers of these products 
to favor protection. Thus agriculture has certain blocs in favor of, 
and other blocs opposed to trade restrictions.
Level of Factor Employment in Export and in Import-Competing Commodities
Historically exports of cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice have 
ranged between 25 per cent and 50 per cent of the entire crop.5 Because
^Howard R. Smith, ojc, cit.. pp. 162-168.
^Homer L. Brinkley, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit­
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953), p. 168. 
See also, Trenton, "The Farmer's Stake in our Foreign Economic Policy", 
those produced domestically in insufficient volume, and those with vol­
ume claimed to be sufficient. The total of both catagories make up 
less than 10 per cent of domestic agricultural production if those com­
modities under price support levels which are above the world market 
price are excluded.
5
"Foreign Agricultural Situation." Foreign Agricultural Service. 
USDA (Washington, D. C., October 1953;, p . l67
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the volume of employment of the factors of production depends on out­
put changes in amounts of exports will be felt by farmers producing 
these exports. Before 1940, cotton accounted for one-half or more 
of the total agricultural exports of the United States. Since then 
its percentage of the export market for agricultural commodities has 
fallen to around 30 per cent. The total number of bales exported had
dropped from S.8 million before 1914 to 5.3 million in the late thir- 
/
ties. Regardless of the quality and reputation of American farm 
products their sales have been declining in the world markets. Un­
less the American farmer and American industry are willing to allow 
an increase of imports, the level of exports will, in the absence of 
some sort of an export support program, probably continue to decline.^ 
The encouragement of some imports which might compete with do­
mestic producers would seem to be the answer to the problem of 
increasing exports. Should cotton, or any other commodity, bear the 
brunt of import competition? Which commodity should be encouraged 
as an export? On broadly theoretical grounds the level of factor em­
ployment and efficient use of these scarce factors should determine 
which crops, as well as which industrial goods, will enter foreign 
markets and which crops and goods must stand on their own against com­
peting imports. If markets were free to determine prices there would 
eventually be in the market only those commodities which could com­
pete with foreign products. At the present time, however, with import 
restrictions, with most would-be purchasing countries suffering short-
^Marketing. The Yearbook of Agricul+”T’° USDA (United States Govern­
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., , p. 7&.
?Ibid.. p. 85.
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ages of dollar exchange, and with artificially maintained domestic 
price levels there is very apt to be less than maximum use of pro­
ductive facilities. Would-be export commodity production factors 
must be retired, shifted to other industries cr maintained in the 
present pursuit by relying on government purchases and dumping.
If we are to maximize the productive capabilities of our land, 
labor, and capital, and thus maximize the benefits of comparative 
advantage, there should be a shifting of such factors from the less 
productive crops to the more productive ones and to non-agricultural 
pursuits. The ffects of the immobility of the factors of production 
would be partially remedied by the movement of goods created by these 
factors. When export crops are reduced the whole agricultural economy 
feels the effect. Land, once used for export crop production becomes 
competitive with land used for domestic market production when the 
exporter who loses his foreign mariet begins competing for a home 
market.^
Foreign investments in production facilities of imported com­
modities have sometimes served as an outlet for export capital from 
the United States. Often, however, such commodities may be excluded 
in order to benefit a group of domestic producers who otherwise could 
not meet competition. American investors with an abundance of capital 
resources relative to labor and .certain types of land will often seek
g
This idea seems to be generally accepted among economists and 
was presented as general information to a recent Senate Committee by 
the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs, Department of State, 
Harold F. Linder, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington^ D. C., (1953), p. 48.
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more profitable investment opportunities in a different area. By 
way of illustration, much of the sugar production in Cuba has been 
financed by United States investors. There has been a tariff, often 
nominal, and a quota limitation on imports into the United States.^ 
In addition to being an outlet for two-thirds of a billion dollars 
of American investment, Cuba is also a heavy importer of American- 
produced goods and services.^ Cuba imports around $100,000,000 
worth of agricultural goods a year from the United States.^ With­
out the limitation on shipments of sugar into the United States,
which has aided in the return of around $350,000,000 to Cuban agri-
12culture each year since 1950, it is possible that Cuba would be 
an even better market for American investment, industrial goods, 
services, and agricultural commodities. Table I shows the foreign 
trade in agricultural commodities that has taken place between Cuba 
and the United States from 1945 to 1955.
9
Factors Limiting United States Investment Abroad. Part I, Survey 
of Factors in Foreign Countries, United States Department of Commerce 
(Washington, D. C., 1953), pp. 30-31.
■^The major achievement of the United States sugar legislation 
has been to strengthen the purchasing power of Cuba, the Phillipines 
and other foreign sugar suppliers. The price however, averaged about 
1.8 cents above the world price between 1953 and 1956. World shortages 
in 1951 and 1957 caused the world price to go above domestic price with 
the 1948-1957 average domestic price about one cent above the world 
price. Foreign Trade Policy. "Compendium of papers on United States 
Foreign Trade Policy." Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy, Committee 
on Ways and Means, (Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing 
Office, 1957), PP. 689-691.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA,
(Washington, D. C., 1956), p. "l"6."
12Ibid.. p. 25.
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TABLE I
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CUBA AND IMPORTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES FROM CUBA 
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1945-49 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Exports 119.0 128.4 159.0 154.0 143.3 133.2 107.6
Imports 341.4 376.6 303.5 390.4 377.9 377.9 N.A.
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA,
Table 20, p. 16, and Table 27, p. 25.
Specialization means that factors most abundant become more 
efficiently used in all trading nations, for specialization facili­
tates mass production and mass narksts. Trade and specialization 
of this sort will tend to lead to a stable equilibrium between trad­
ing nations. Farm commodities that are produced under increasing 
costs caused by excessive use of scarce factors will shift factors 
until all are used at the same margin of efficiency. At this 
equilibrium level the cost of crop production that had been un­
wisely extended will have become cheaper.^ Crops that had been 
less than fully developed because of lack of export markets will 
also become cheaper because the factor combination has become more 
efficient.
Inefficient and Efficient Producers
Increasing productivity, a measurement of increasing efficiency,
■^Brainard, o£. cit.. pp. 146-147.
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may be determined by changing ratios of inputs to outputs. One way 
of determining the effects of trade restrictions on efficiency is to 
compare factor costs of various crops and see how such costs have 
changed. All costs have risen since before World War II, but input 
costs have increased at different rates. To have the same factor- 
cost ratio per commodity now as twenty years ago, the productivity 
of each crop would need to have undergone a gain equal to any in­
creasing cost of input applicable to the crop in question but not 
to others. Such an equalization, however, is practically impossible, 
for the realtive costs of producing crops have changed in the last 
few years, and there have been changes in the ratio of inputs per 
crop to offset the differing input costs.
Although wage rates for farm labor have more than quadrupled 
since 1935-1939, and many other input costs have mare tton doubled, 
costs of production have generally not registered comparable in­
creases. The ability to increase the ratio of units of output to 
input used in order to offset increasing costs is mere noticeable 
in some commodities than in others. The use of machinery has done 
much to account for this. In some instances, labor costs increased 
at about twice the rate of machine costs, and consequently machinery 
replaced labor. The use of fertilizer increased to such an extent 
as to offset land costs which, in turn, increased faster than the 
cost of fertilizer.^
The shifting of the factors of production as the cost ratio changes
Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956. Agricultural Marketing Service 
USDA (Washington, D. C., November 1954), pp. 18, 62.
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is far easier in the production of some crops than others. Since 
trade itself normally tends to reflect increases or decreases in 
efficiency of production, it is to be expected that commodities 
in the production of which the factor ratios do not adjust in such 
a way as to offset increasing costs of a particular factor are los­
ing their place in the pattern of exports. Imports would be expected 
to increase to compete with such commodities on the home market. 
However, what actually transpires in such cases maybe illustrated 
by reference to several of our major crops.
Wheat production in the Plains States has had one of the great­
est increases of productivity among our agricultural commodities. In 
spite of this, since 1948 the United States has lost nearly three- 
fourths of its market for wheat exports. Cotton farming, which in 
some areas still makes mass uneconomic use of resources has lest only 
about one-fourth of its export market during the same period of time. 
Tobacco farming in the tobacco-livestock farm area of Kentucky has 
seen very little increase in productivity and has actually lost re­
lative to wheat farming. Nevertheless, tobacco exports have increased 
by 12 per cent since 1948.^ Table II shows some of the relative 
changes in farm production per unit of input that took place between 
the 1930ts and 1956.
^Ibid., Table 12, p. 62, and Table 98, p. 84.
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TABLE II
COMMERCIAL FARMS PRODUCTION PER UNIT OF INPUT 
INDEX NUMBERS BASED ON 1930-1939 = 100
Location and Type of Farm Production per Unit of Input
Northern Plains Spring Wheat 
(wheat, small grains, livestock)
187
Kentucky Tobacco
(Tobacco, Livestock)
124
Southern Piedmont Cotton 99
Mississippi Delta 129
Blackland, Texas
(cotton farming)
97
SOURCE: Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956. Table 12, p. 62.
Using 1947-1949 as the base year, one is able to compare some of 
the differing rates of changing efficiency among farm commodities. 
Manpower in all farm work had declined to 83 per cent while farm out­
put had increased to 123 per cent by 1953. The number of tractors had 
increased from 2,735*000 in 1947 to 4*400,000 in 1953- The number of 
trucks on farm had increased during the same period from 1,700,000 to 
2,550,000;-combines from 465*000 to 918,000; corn pickers from 236,000 
to 615*000; and the number of farms using milking machines has in­
creased from 525*000 to 715*000. During this period the tobacco pro­
duction per man-hour had only increased to 103 per cent of 1947-1949 
levels. Feed grains had increased to 158 per cent, food grains to 
132 per cent, oil crops to 158 per cent, sugar production to 139 per
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cent, cotton to 129 per cent, meat animals to 105 per cent, fruit 
and nuts to 103 per cent, and vegetables to 110 per cent,^ Table III 
shows the general decrease in man-hours of labor required for pro­
duction of various farm commodities between 1943 and 1953.
TABLE III
INDEX NUMBERS OF MAN-HOURS OF LABOR USED FOR FARM WORK 
BY GROUPS OF ENTERPRISES 
(1947-49 = 100)
Commodity 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Meat Animals 93 100 103 108 109 109
Tobacco 94 96 97 109 108 99
Fruit & Nuts 99 98 98 100 96 93
Vegetables 101 97 95 91 39 91
Cotton 103 107 65 93 89 89
Sugar Crops 96 87 96 74 74 77
Food Grains 100 93 73 74 76 73
Feed Grains 105 93 85 74 68 64
Oil Crops 104 81 77 72 64 64
SOURCE: Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency, PERB Series,
USDA, Table 9, p. 28.
Using such efficiency increases as have just been noted as a 
criteria for improving a crop's ability to enter the world market, one
16Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency. Production Economics 
Research Branch Publications, PERB Series, USDA (Washington, D. C., 
1954), pp. 28-31, 36.
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might expect to find certain increases and certain decreases in 
the foreign trade make-up of the above crops. Oil exports, feed 
grains, sugar, food grains, and cotton should be going more into 
exports or at least meeting less import competition. Tobacco, meat 
animals, fruits and nuts, and vegetables should have declining ex­
ports or an increase of import competition. Actually, however, 
these expectations have not always been realized. Exports of apples, 
pears, prunes, and oranges have declined in the world market. Rice 
exports have increased. On the other hand, the amount of tobacco 
exported has not decreased but seems to be gaining, even though it
is relatively less efficiently produced now than wheat, which has 
17lest some ground. ' Although wheat was losing ground in relation 
to tobacco exports, it is far more, efficiently produced now than 
formerly if man-hour output is a criterion of efficiency.
The lack of any apparent pattern of correlation between ef­
ficiency based on the man-hour criterion and foreign trade of 
agricultural products is hard to explain. Worldwide trade im­
balances accompanied by foreign exchange shortages, trade restric­
tions, and various support programs undoubtedly lead to less than 
maximum efficiency in the use of production factors. In addition, 
one cannot safely isolate agricultural products, but must consider 
them as only a portion of the total of the products of the nationTs 
economy. Then too, the elasticity of demand for exports from the 
nation may well mean that certain exports, although they are effi-
17Ezra Taft Benson, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit­
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D . C., (1953), p. 41.
cient users of the ration’s factors, are overlooked in favor of 
other exports that the importing nation is unable to obtain from 
any other supplier.
Domestic Sales and Prices: Bxport-Import Sales and Prices
Except for trade barriers and the cost of shipping, the prices 
of goods in all countries would be approximately the same. Prices 
have a tendency to become uniform within the nearly barrierless 
marketing area of the United States. The price for cattle through­
out the country is set at the terminal markets by the action of 
sellers and buyers. Other markets vary somewhat as supply and.demand 
shift, but basically the prices are determined by trading at the 
terminal markets. Any area that has prices which appear out of line 
quickly undergoes an adjustment. For example, if for some reason 
Baton Rouge’s supply of butcher calves was short enough that prices 
were forced up by demand, there would be a diversion of carcass meat 
from other areas to the Baton Rouge area and the price would return 
to normal,
Whenever a local market must pay more for its cattle than at the 
central market, and if that amount is above the cost of transportation, 
then livestock will be purchased where the price is lower. The de­
creased amount of bqying at the area of high price will cause a decline 
ISin the price. This is the picture of a market price being set and 
maintained under the conditions of a free play of supply and demand. 
This is the type model most often presented to explain market price 
phenomena. Yet within the United States there has not always been a
•^Marketing, The Yearbook of Agriculture, 2E* P*
39
complete freedom for supply and demand to determine price. If 
competition had been permitted, the domestic prices could and pro­
bably would have been determined as the model would indicate. Instead, 
conditions came to be such that, in 1948, the Department of Justice 
filed suit against Armour, Swift, Cudahy, and Wilson in an attempt 
to break up these four firms into fourteen independent firms in order 
to restore competition in the meat industry."^ This suit suggests 
that an element of monopsony may be present in certain areas of agri­
cultural marketing.
Commodities entering foreign trade would, if restrictions were 
elimated, be sold and priced more nearly like the model of a domestic 
trade transaction. The only difference would be a larger marl®ting 
area* the world, instead of a smaller national area. With the increase 
in the size of the market the cost structure would change. More cost 
would be allocated for storage and transportation but less for pro­
duction. Overall prices would tend to be lower. On purely economic 
grounds, the question of whether a nation should or should not trade 
does not differ from the question of whether each county of each state 
in the United States should trade. The need for trade will exist as 
long as costs of production including transportation are not equal.
A Plethora of examples could be cited in which domestic prices 
are generally higher than world market prices because of protection.
In such cases scarce factors such as land, labor and capital are in­
vested in ventures which are perpetuated by import restrictions.
^Harry L. Purdy, Martin L. Lindahl, William A. Carter, Corporate 
Concentration and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950),
p. 555.
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Similarly, many American export items have remained in the 
world market because the government has subsidized them in various 
ways. If one is to export, one must be paid. To be paid means, 
eventually, to receive goods or services. In many cases, however, 
the American exporter has been paid by taxes collected from Ameri­
cans. Exports of many agricultural commodities as well as other 
goods and services have often depended upon government grants or 
government guaranties of private loans. Exporters have organized 
well enough to see to that. Harris, in a recent Congressional 
hearing, stated that the United States government subsidized ex­
porters to the extent of $125 billion in the last thirty to forty 
years. The methods used were through government aid, assistance, 
loans, purchases of gold, and so forth. Harris says this has per­
mitted foreign consumers to use $125 billion worth of United States
20exports that they did not pay far with imports.
Many of the policies and practices of our government affecting 
the demand for an prices paid for some of our export commodities have 
hindered the best resource allocation. Lend-Lease and other activities 
during and following World War II have no doubt diverted scarce factors 
into the production of crops that are no longer capable of competing
20Seymor E. Harris, A Statement in the hearings before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND 
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. 
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington) D. C., (1956), 
pp. 5&-59j hereinafter cited Harris, Statement in Congressional Hearings, 
This information presented to the committee was taken from his book 
International and Interregional Economics (New York: McGraw Hill Book
Co., Inc., 195777 PP« 324-337* Harris contends that attempts to over­
come this continued imbalance of payments should not be entirely directed 
to use of tariff policy with the burden placed on import-competing 
industries e
for world markets. Should these resources remain in the production 
of commodities for a vanishing market? World market prices say ’no* 
but domestic policy often says ’yes.1 Assuming that world market 
prices should determine our policy, the question arises, should the 
displacement of production factors be swift, slow, or never. Many 
domestic producer interests say never ; some free traders, who think 
like Charles Taft and Howard S. Piquet, say as soon as economically, 
possible; and Harris in his defense of protection for the New England 
textile industry says very slowly. Another fact which cannot be over­
looked is that world prices are often not free to reflect degrees of 
efficiency. In many cases national policy sets prices as well as 
quantities in the various producing countries.
Secondary Employment
The protests against imports and the demand for protection come 
not only from those producing a commodity which has to be protected, 
but also from those serving the needs of such producers. This atti­
tude is far from being new. The towns and merchantmen that were 
dependent upon the indigo farmer and rice planter in colonial times 
were in favor of a protected market for those products. Loudest and 
most insistent in approval of restrictions are the voices of those 
who stand to gain most by them. These include not only the actual 
producers of protected commodities but also those who serve those pro­
ducers; profit also accrues to banks, storekeepers, newspapers, trans­
portation agencies, and the labor force of all such organizations as 
provide ancillary services for a protected industry.
Once capital is invested and labor trained to produce a given 
crop, a sudden shift away from this crop is not looked upon favorably
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by either the producer cr his ancillaries. The lily growers of the 
northwest as well as those who were secondarily dependent on bulb 
sales were hard pressed when bulb imports were resumed after the end 
of World War II. Land values had skyrocketed. The area in and 
around Corbett, Oregon had never before seen such a boom. The pop­
ulace, to a man, was against a return to imports. The same held 
true for the residents around Beaverton, Oregon when imports of 
filberts again began to reach the American market. The almond 
growing area in San Luis Obispo County, California was equally up­
set when almonds from the Middle East again reached the American 
market.
When the production of a commodity becomes a part of the pattern 
of an economy there will be repercussions if production ceases. Re­
gardless of how the end of production comes, some vested interest are 
bound to be hurt. This has been noted in the' shifts from cotton pro­
duction in areas of the South, lumber production in Maine and Wisconsin, 
fish-wheel salmon fishing on the Columbia River, and production of 
numerous other commodities that have been discontinued in various parts 
of the nation. This may be called a process of equilibration within 
a dynamic economy or of equilibrium economics in a developing economy.
Harris, in his study of the New England textile industry, con­
cludes that an adjustment necessitated by changing economic conditions 
requires a long period of time. The change is probably inevitable; 
textile investment and labor will seek other outlets, but the change, 
if sudden, will make adjustments difficult. If tariffs and import re­
strictions can allow an industry to make a gradual adjustment over a 
twenty-year period the adjustment will be easier to make than one
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attempted in a short period of time. In addition Harris points out
that in the case of New England a large area is suffering the pains
of readjustment and for this reason the adjustment is harder to make
21
than in a small area.
There may be centers of prolonged unemployment brought about by 
readjustment of production factors such as in New England. These cen­
ters cause depressed conditions. Payrolls are down or non-existent. 
Services dependent upon a larger and more active labor force are no 
longer needed. Tax receipts are down. Schools, government activity, 
and transporation facilities are farced to curtail or discontinue ser­
vices. Such elements in the picture of an industrial area often lead 
to demands for protection by those dependent on a certain commodity 
being produced.
Domestic Policy and Foreign Trade
One of the major farm problems of today arises from the over­
production of some farm products. Too many of the productive factors 
are being used to produce these products. Farm incomes would be lower
than that which is considered a fair return if prices were allowed to
22fluctuate in order to clear the narket. Donestic farm policy is de­
signed to increase the incomes of those dependent upon agricultural 
production, yet our foreign trade policy is designed to expand multi­
lateral trade. Are these two goals compatible? It is probable that 
serious differences will tend to exist as long as farm policy is main­
ly occupied with price support matters and trade policy primarily
PIHarris, Statement in Congressional Hearings, pp. 77-51.
■^CED, Economic Policy for American Agriculture. (New York: 
Committee for Economic Development. 195^0. p. k*
concerned with increasing world-wide trade.
The farmer's side of the foreign trade-donestic policy problem 
is presented by John A. Baker of the National Farmers' Union, as 
follows:
"I do not believe that United States farms which 
produce for export or which produce commodities 
that must compete with imports should be asked 
to bear the full cost, respecting this production, 
of an intelligent United States foreign policy.
I accord the same right and privilege to other 
domestic raw material and industrial producers.
The benefits of better international economic co­
operation accrue to all the people and the tempo­
rary costs involved should be borne by all the
people,"23
Professor Thorp presents the trade side of the picture thus:
"Since 1950, our gross national product has 
increased #105 billions. Our total of #391 
billion for 1955 compares with #361 billion 
in 1954. The total number employed in the 
labor force has increased to new peaks.
Within these totals there have been major 
changes in products, processes, and plant 
location. For the most part these changes 
have been responsible for our growth. And 
within this total picture of a dynamic econo­
my, I find it difficult to feel that we need 
to give special attention to minor adjustments 
which might result from continuing the gradual 
liberalization of our trade policy."24
John A. Baker, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., fl953), p. 41*
24
Willard A. Thorp, A Statement in the hearings before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND 
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. 
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington, C. C., (1956), 
pp. 88-89*
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Quotas. Tariffs and Price Supports
Such widely different policy voices as have just been referred 
to gain greater concreteness and pointed meaning when emphasis is 
given to the implements which are used for putting a policy into ef­
fect. Prominent among these implements are quotas, tariffs, and 
price supports. Import quotas may be absolute, simply restricting 
the amount imported during a specific period; or there may be tariff 
quotas, which allow certain quantities to enter free of tariff, or 
at a favorable rate, and the remainder at the regular tariff rate.
The quota, as a restrictive measure against imports, is especially 
acceptable to farm groups as an adjunct of domestic farm price policy. 
Since quotas on imports tend to limit supply, their use is perhaps 
the easiest method of maintaining domestic prices above world prices. 
Combining absolute import quotas with donestic production quotas is 
an assured method of supply control.
Well aware of the effectiveness of this combination of quotas 
the sugar industry pressured Congress to such an extent that both quo­
tas were incorporated into the sugar acts. The Sugar Act of 1943 has 
been referred to as a "legal monopoly," yet it was accepted even though 
it appears to contradict the liberal trade policies which the United 
States has urged upon foreign countries. Many of the countries ad­
versely affected by the quotas of this 1943 sugar act are in the Western
21?Hemisphere where dollar balances are short. J
Import quotas when used either separately or with tariffs are use­
ful in the successful administration of agricultural price support
25C . Addison Hickman, Our Farm Program and Foreign Trade (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 19497, pp. 53-61.
programs. Without limitation of imports on a crop which is receiving 
support above the world price the supporting government would, in 
effect, be supporting the entire world production. The problems of 
supporting a domestic crop without limiting output would be greatly- 
aggravated by the large number of producers involved in operating 
a plan on a global basis. Again, the assurance of government pur­
chases supplementing consumer demand at a given support level has 
brought forth bumper crops. Government purchase and storage of 
commodities has also brought about marketing quotas. Thus if a 
supported crop which is import-competing needs domestic marketing 
quotas to equate supply to demand at the supported level, it follows 
that import quotas are also necessary. The authors of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act were aware of the need for import restrictions and to 
meet this need enacted Section 22 of that Act in 1935. This Section 
provides for the use of quotas or fees on imports that may tend to
interfere with or render ineffective any price support or marketing 
26program. .
American agriculture, with a few exceptions such as sugar and 
wool growers, was not much concerned with foreign competition until 
World War I. Agricultural tariff protection on a large scale began 
with the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, and the Fordney-McCumber Act 
of 1922. It was later buttressed by the Hawley- Smoot Act of 1930.
One of the objects of these acts was to aid farm price recovery fol­
lowing the collapse after World War 1.^ The United States, however,
Benson, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
2^Hickman, op. cit.. p. 55.
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has such a makeup of agricultural imports and exports that a tariff 
has little protective value for mcst crops. The total volume of ex­
ports from the United States is around 3 per cent of total production.
Of this small portion of products that are exported, agricultural pro­
ducts make up a large part. This is especially true of such crops as 
cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice which seek foreign markets in the 
amount of approximately 40 per cent of the entire output. Tobacco, 
fresh fruit, soybeans, and lard, have depended upon foreign markets 
to provide their profit margin. While only 3 per cent of the total
United States production is exported, about 20 per cent of all ex-
■2ftports are agricultural in nature. ° The South according to Efferson 
exports nearly 20 per cent of its agricultural output. Nearly 60 
million acres of crop land in the United States are required in rais­
ing our agricultural exports, and the income from exports of agricultural 
goods supports around 18 million Americans.^
Of the total United States imports, about onehalf are agricultural 
products, including tropical fruit, tea, coffee, cacao, and rubber.
These crops have no competing production in the United States; conse­
quently a tariff on them would not help any domestic producers. On 
the other hand, cotton, wheat, tobacco, rice, and the other crops which
J. Norman Efferson, Southern Agriculture and World Trade. Mimeo­
graphed Circular No. 159, Department of Agricultural Economics, College 
of Agriculture, Louisiana State University, 1954, pp. 12-13. Data from 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957. shows exports to 
average close to 4 per cent since 1929. Foreign Agricultural Trade, 
Statistical Handbook, USDA, p. 1, gives agricultural exports as per 
cent of total exports at above 20 per cent for all but a few years, 
mainly during war periods.
^Efferson, og. cit., p. 2.
-^ Ibid., p. 2.
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make up the bulk of our exports cannot be protected by tariffs. Re­
gardless of any tariff "help," export commodities must sell for the 
going price on the world market. An import tariff on export commodities 
gives no price or income assistance as far as the export shares of 
such crops are concerned. Such a tariff may exclude competing imports 
from the domestic market, but unless the domestic price is artificially 
pegged, domestic production will drive the price down to that of the 
world market unless the cost structure precludes so low a price, in 
which case exports will cease.
Our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 has been followed 
with tariff reductions which, in the main, have been applied to pro­
ducts that have never been subject to import competition. The commodities 
that actually make up a large part of the import competition with do­
mestic producers have been protected more by quota restrictions.^
The Agricultural Act of 1948 took some steps toward reducing the 
cross purposes of farm policy and foreign trade policy. The re-exami­
nation of parity rates on different commodities resulted in an attempt
to reduce over-valuation of some crops that appeared to maintain chronic 
3?surpluses.-'* The depression legislation of the Roosevelt era was pri­
marily directed toward raising prices. To do so the agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 was passed with a sliding support scale ranging 
from 52 to 75 per cent of parity on certain basic crops. This support 
level was deemed adequate to restore farm incomes to the proper relation­
ship with other income groups. The war needs, which necessitated a
■^Hickman, ojo. cit., pp. 55-57. 
^ Ibid.. p. 68.
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change in objective from adequate income to that of stimulating pro­
duction, resulted in an increase of the parity rate to 85 per cent 
and later to 90 per cent. These latter ratios were maintained after 
hostilities ceased. It was not until 1954 that Congress allowed this 
stimulus to production to be lowered.-^ The program of high parity 
prices supported by the government has shown that attractive price 
levels lead to over-supply at the demand schedule for those prices.
If the producers are to continue selling their produce at the arti­
ficially high price, one of two things can happen. Either the govern­
ment must biy the supply that the-consumers do not want at that price, 
or else production must be restricted.
Under present domestic policy, price supports are mandatory for
O  I
basic cropso "Basic" crops are: corn, cotton, wheat, rice, tobacco,
and peanuts. Certain non-basic commodities also have mandatory sup­
ports. These commodities include wool, mohair, tung nuts, honey, milk, 
and butterfat. Other crops are supported at the discretion of the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The supports are maintained by loans, pur­
chase agreements, and outright purchases of all but wool and mohair, 
which are supported by incentive payments.^ 5
The minimum price support level of basic crops since World War II, 
contingent on the producers accepting marketing controls, was 90 per
-^Marketing. The Yearbook of Agriculture, oj). cit., p. 400.
-^"Basic crops" appear to have become basic, to some extent, 
because enough political pressure was brought to bear on that classi­
fication. When this was done the so-called "basic" crops appeared 
to receive preferential treatment at the expense of other agricultural 
crops. How rice and peanubs ever became tagged as basic crops pro­
bably remains a mystery, even to those who produce them.
-^Farm Policy Dictionary, Let’s Agree on Terms Used in Making Agri­
cultural Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Agricultural Extension Service, The
Ohio State University, 1956), pp. 4-5•
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cent of parity until 1954 when it was made “flexible," ranging from 
75 per cent ot 90 per cent of parity. If marketing controls are not 
voted, the cooperators in the support program are entitled to 50 per 
cent of parity s u p p o r t s , A  price support policy of 85 per cent 
and 90 per cent of parity was considered to be necessary in order to 
have a "stimulating" effect on production. But under today’s much 
changed conditions, it can easily be seen why supports of many crops 
at high levels require marketing quotas. And with domestic marketing 
quotas it is necessary to limit imports of supported commodities,
Decline of Exports of Agricultural Goods. Some Consequences
The foreign trade of the United States has shown a steady de­
cline of agricultural products in the percentage structure of total 
American exports. This trend was reversed temporarily after World 
War I and again after World War II. The dollar value of agricultural 
exports showed a growth trend, though somewhat erratic at time s, from 
1865 until 1920. Following World War I, agricultural exports were 
stabilized somewhat until the depression, at which time foreign trade 
in general collapsed. About one-third as much dollar value of exports 
of agricultural goods was recorded during the depression period and 
before World War II as during the 1920’s. During World War II the 
export of agricultural goods increased in value but not nearly as 
rapidly as non-agricultural goods. Following that war such exports 
remained high and even increased on a percentage basis until the Korean 
War started. Since the Korean conflict agricultural goods have under-
36Ibid.. p. 5.
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gone a dollar value as well as percentage decline in the United States 
export pattern^  Table IV shews the pattern of exports for several 
selected years.
TABLE IV 
UNITED STATES EXPORTS*
Year
Total Exports 
Million Dollars
Agricultural Exports 
Million Dollars
Agricultural Exports 
as a Percentage of 
Total
1922 3,887 1,798
Per Cent 
46
1931 1,908 752 39
1939 3,744 738 20
1946 12,725 3,610 28
1953 15,226 2,936 21
■^Selections were made from USDA publication Foreign Agricultural Trade. 
with an attempt to show representative years'.-^
The increase of imports following World War II was accounted for 
largely by commodities not produced at all in the United States and by 
commodities which we are unable to produce in sufficient quantities to
37Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, 0£. cit.. 
Table I, p. 1.
-^ Ibid.. Table I, p. 1. At the present time, 1955-1958 agricultur­
al exports are, in terms of current dollars, at an all time high. Even 
with constant dollars todays exports are above most post war years. A 
large portion of these exports are nmde up of U. S. attempts to dump 
past accumulated "surpluses." Since 1954 government export programs 
have been stepped so that 40 per cent of agricultural exports are under 
some form of government program. See Section III "Factors Supporting 
High Exports," The Problem of Maintaining High Level Agricultural Ex­
ports . USDA. (Washington: Foreign Agricultural Service, 1957)•
52
meet consumer demand. The loss in export markets following the Korean 
conflict came ahout as a result of an economic conditions that can be 
expected to follow the end of an era during which exports were stimu­
lated in order to feed and clothe our allies and the occupied territories. 
As these nations again became able to feed and clothe themselves, their 
need of economic aid, including foodstuffs and fibers, declined. This 
was matched by a decline in export crop production which released hun­
dreds of thousands of acres from export production and permitted 
production of import-competing crops. With the shift away from some
export crops, more commodities were thrown on the domestic market to
*
be taken by consumers at lower prices or, in some instances, taken 
by the government under support programs.
Acreage restrictions were relied upon to reduce the build-up of 
"surpluses'' in some supported crops. Thus wheat exports during the 
period 1950-1955 decreased by more than one-half. From 1948 to 1955, 
the Economic Cooperation Administration purchased nearly $2 billion 
worth of wheat for export shipment.This aid helped stimulate wheat 
production, and when it was reduced it left a vacuum in the demand for 
United States wheat. During the same period, 1948 to 1955, the E. C. A. 
purchased over $2 billion worth of cotton, $398 million worth of corn,
$35 million worth of rice, $453 million worth of fats and oils, along 
with many more millions spent on fruits, milk, cheese, wool, and
•^Edwin D. White, Deputy Director, Office of Food and Agriculture, 
Foreign Operations Administration, A Statement in the hearings before 
a subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL 
OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES. United States Senate, 84th Congress, Wash­
ington, D. C., (1955)* pp. 288-289. This information was collected by 
the Department of Agriculture as previously requested by the subcommittee 
to be presented by Mir. White at the hearings.
tobacco.^ In addition to such E. C. A. activities there were numerous 
other acts and programs which stimulated production for export by grant­
ing aid to allies and occupied areas during and after World War II and 
the war in Korea.
Wheat, as an example of war-stimulated production, increased in 
quantity of output by some 50 per cent from 1939 to 1946. Wheat acre­
age increased from 57 million acres average 1935-1939 to 71 million 
acres average 1945-1949. The exports of wheat largely financed by 
United States taxpayers was, in 1943, five times that of late 1930’s.^ 
This wartime stimulation encouraged the transfer of productive factors 
into wheat growing. Some observers contend that It is the government's 
responsibility to see that successful peacetime adjustments are made. 
Recognition, so they insist, should be given to the need of readjust­
ment rather than a continuation of attempts to mairitain exports of an 
emergency level.
As important as is the agricultural share of exports, it is steadi­
ly declining. A two-way trade offers a workable solution for maintaining 
exports of American commodities in world trade channels. Unless Ameri­
can consumers and industries are willing to increase imports to a level 
that will approximate exports, American sales in the world market will 
continue to decline.^ The alternative to increasing imports seems to 
be a continued support program with production quotas. Some of the 
programs that have been considered in order to reduce our ’insold agri­
cultural products are the soil bank program, increased consumption,
4°Ibid., p. 290.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit., 
Section III, Commodities, passum.
42Marketing. The Yearbook of Agriculture, o£. cit., p. 35.
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the Brannan Plan, gifts to needy nations, forward pricing, two-price 
plans and export subsidies. These programs will next be briefly re­
viewed .
The Soil Bank
The soil bank plan is a means of paying farmers for shifting soil, 
ill-suited for production, into soil-building and land-conserving crops. 
By this program, productive factors used for crops that had been stimu­
lated into export patterns by war needs, and which are not well-suited 
for the production of domestic or import-competing crops, are to be 
diverted from production. With such diversion, the exportable sur­
pluses would be reduced and uneconomic competition for domestic 
markets could be avoided. The domestic markets would be spared the 
depressing effects of increasing supply diverted from producers of 
crops for which the export market has been lost.
There are two suggestions for administering the soil bank. Land 
could be diverted from production and permitted to go to grass for 
perhaps three to ten years in order to restore fertility. Payment for 
such idleness could be by cash or in "surplus" commodities. This sug­
gestion would, in effect, provide an acreage reserve similar to the 
government’s moth-balling of naval vessels which are held on a stand­
by basis until needed. The alternative to the creation of this stand-by 
productive capacity is the permanent diversion of less productive land 
into forestry preserves, forage, or water sheds.43
The Yazoo-Little Tallahatchie flood prevention project is an ex­
ample of what can be done in a conservation program coupled with the
^Farm Policy Dictionary, o£. cit,, p. 16,
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reduction of "surpluses" of an export commodity. Excess cotton 
production was one of the major causes of this region’s deterioration. 
Cotton farming along with over-grazing and poor logging procedures 
had, by the early 1940’s, reduced incomes in the Yazoo Watershed to 
less than #500 per family for some 36,000 farm families. The pres­
sure on this land was high, with 112 persons per square mile. In 
1936 The United States Corps of Engineers began flood control work, 
and in 1946 the flood prevention project was aimed at soil conser­
vation. Almost one-fourth of the cropland in the area is now being 
properly managed with the application of conservation measures. Land 
has been reforested and taken out of single-crop production and ro­
tation is being practiced on 225*000 acres, A strong trend has de­
veloped for cattle raising and grassland farming. Much soil-building 
lespedeza and kudzu forage is now the basis of this shift from cotton 
to diversification.^
Increased Consumption
The efforts on the part of the producers and the government to 
increase consumption have been attempts to reduce "surpluses" and thus 
offset the loss of export markets as well as decreased domestic sales 
of farm commodities. One plan has been to divert farm products into 
domestic relief channels. Three methods have been used to divert com­
modities to low income groups: the food stamp program, the school lunch
program, and relief milk distribution. Compensatory payments have been
^Water. The Yearbook of Agriculture, USDA (Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 199-205*
56
suggested as a means of increasing consumption by lowering the price 
to consumers and thus boosting consumption.^
The Brannan Plan
The Brannan Plan would use the moving average of the first ten 
of the last twelve years to calculate parity. Price supports for 
storable commodities would be at 100 per cent of parity and the plan 
would make use of production controls, marketing quotas and subsidies. 
Non-storable commodities would receive production payments high enough 
to maintain an income level corresponding to that received on storable 
commodities. Payments would depend upon compliance with production 
and marketing control regulations. A base income level was proposed 
above which the farmer would receive no support payments.^ Under this 
plan the government could sell the supported commodities at the market 
price. This would have solved the problem of storing "surpluses" and 
would have given the consumers lower prices. The cost, while possibly 
less for the economy than the cost of a price support program, would 
undoubtedly channel more money through the government's hands. Direct 
payments by the government, while no more of a burden to society than 
the higher prices and storage costs of a price support program, are more 
obvious.
Forward Pricing
Those favoring price policy revision claim that this method of 
support will interfere less with foreign trade than long-term price
^Farm Policy Dictionary, ojd .  cit., pp. 12-13.
46Ibid., pp. 17-13.
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supports. Prices would be announced far enough in advance for farmers 
to make intelligent production plans. These prices would remain stable 
long enough to permit the completion of at least one crop harvest. Such 
prices would be calculated in a manner that would keep supply in line 
with forecast demand.^ Forward prices, if used as a tool to discourage 
production of crops that have excess supply on hand, could re-direct 
resources from one crop to another. However, this plan would probably 
not direct resources away from agriculture and maintain satisfactory 
farm income levels any better than other support methods, without mak­
ing use of marketing quotas or production controls.
Export Subsidies
A problem of how to clear the domestic market arises whenever the 
domestic price of a commodity which is normally exported becomes higher 
than the world market price. First, the export market will be supplied 
by foreign, producers who are, in effect, being induced to produce more 
than they normally would. Second, without import quotas foreign pro­
ducers will sell their produce in the United States market. If the 
domestic market were free to react to supply and demand pressures this 
problem could not arise. Thus, whenever a support program on an ex­
port-oriented commodity raises the domestic price above the world market 
price there is pressure on the government to sell the quantity of the 
commodity which begins to pile up in storage wherever and for whatever 
it can be sold.
Essentially, export subsidization amounts to nothing more than 
dumping. If the domestic price is above the price in the world market,
^Hickman, o£. cit.. p. 69.
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it is necessary to sell abroad at a lower price than in the protect­
ed home market. In effect, a two-price system is established whenever 
export commodities are subsidized. As commendable as it nay be to 
dispose of accumulated commodities, that is, commodities which have 
accumulated because of a decreasing volume of exports and price 
support programs, the possible effects of such disposal by dump­
ing should be studied before a dumping program is begun.
Jesness in the Congressional hearings in 1956 on customs and 
tariff laws emphasizes that as long as we restrict the sort of im­
porting which we class as dumping by foreign nations, it is under­
standable that foreign nations might disapprove of United States 
dumping. Nations generally have methods of counteracting dumping 
when such an action appears to be advisable. The United States, under 
the Anti-dumping Act of 1922, may auply countervailing duties to off­
set any advantage gained in its markets by export subsidies on the 
part of other nations seeking to invade the United States market.
Not only the nations receiving the "dumped” commodity, but other ex­
porters of the same commodity, will view such actions as unfair 
competition. Jesness also suggested to the Congressional committee 
the lack of economic wisdom in giving others the benefit of lower 
prices at the same time that American consumers must pay higher prices 
as well as carry the cost of such a program through higher taxes.^
^ 0. B. Jesness, A Statement in the hearings before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND 
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. 
House of Representatives, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956), 
pp. 535-537.
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Mexico and Canada have been uneasy over United States programs 
for selling increased amounts of cotton and wheat by reducing prices 
on government owned supplies. Denmark has been disturbed over the 
possibility of attempts to unload United States dairy stocks on for­
eign markets. The United States is not the one to determine what 
constitutes dumping; instead the determing factors are the reactions 
of other countries, their interpretation of United States action, 
and the effects of such action on them.
"Surplus" wheat has posed an acute problem, with a two-year 
supply for food needs in the United States on hand by 1955. During 
the six years preceding 1955 an export subsidy averaging about 60 
cents a bushel had been in effect. Without this subsidy little wheat 
would have been exported, and even with the subsidy the United States 
share of world exports of wheat has been declining, while non-dollar
L G
countries have been increasing thexr exports.
It appears that price support programs have created a necessity 
for a two-price policy or "dumping" in order to sell many of the United 
States export-oriented commodities in the world market. For example, 
with price supports on cotton, the domestic price is higher than the 
world market price. With the government buying cotton and storing it, 
quotas must be imposed to keep other nations from exporting cotton 
into the United States. However, the United States has no control 
over other cotton-producing nations when it comes to selling cotton 
to cotton-consuming nations which normally buy from the United States. 
With the support prices running between 10 and 20 per cent above the
^CED, Economic Policy for American Agriculture, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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world market, there is an added incentive for other nations to in­
crease output and undersell United States producers,5® Mexico and 
Brazil both increased their cotton production under the protection 
of the United States support program. Some observers maintain that 
the program has been in effect so long now that there is no way of 
determining whether export price reflects efficiency, and thus forces 
inefficient foreign producers to shift resources away from cotton
production, or if this price simply reflects the dumping power of
51the United States treasury,
Mr, Schwenger points out that the use of export subsidies is 
not a tool which only one nation can use. In fact, the nature of some 
commodities entering the world market may force retaliatory export 
subsidies by nations which are hurt, or fancy they are hurt, by others. 
Certain Latin American nation^ have used multiple exchange rates as 
a means of subsidizing exports. For example, wool shipped to America 
for dollar exchange may get more local currency than wool shipped to 
a soft currency nation such as France. In some instances a subsidy 
of this sort amounts to as much as 40 per cent of the commodity’s 
price, Greece has established export subsidies for tobacco, Israel 
for citrus fruits, France for cereals, fish, dairy products, and pork.
50Ibid., p. 8.
^Lawrence Witt, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF 
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, House of 
Representatives, &4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956), p. 544.
See also Charles P. Kindleberger, THE TERMS OF TRADE A EUROPEAN CASE 
STUDY, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press
of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1954), pp. 83-85*
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According to Schwenger,
"... export subsidization runs the risk, if 
there is a surplus situation, of becoming 
competitive between different export countries.
This can drive the export price to low levels 
and create international friction. For coun­
tries depending heavily on exports of a few 
commodities, it can lead to serious economic 
difficulty.
After the experience of the prewar period, 
it may be a deterrent to the extensive use of 
export subsidies."52
Subsidizing exports is not compatible with an expanding multi­
lateral trade, a policy that the Department of Commerce and the State 
Department are attempting to carry out. If a subsidized commodity 
is withheld from world trade, no direct harm is done to other coun­
tries. However, export subsidies, as well as protective tariffs, 
tend to allocate scarce factors of production to crops that often 
have no economic justification for their cultivation in an economy.
In addition, friendly trading nations may suffer injury. American ad­
vocates of export subsidies call such programs "stop-gap" measures. 
Regardless of their label they are a necessary part of any support 
program dealing with export commodities. In fact, such plans have 
been expanding rather than contracting.53
52
Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before 
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS, United States Senate, S3rd Congress, Washington, D. C., 
(1953),-PP« 263-264. The possibility of retaliation when a nation 
resorts to export subsidization is cited in any foreign trade text.
The use of such a commercial warfare weapon if it provokes retaliation 
may gain no advantage for the instigating nation. Agricultural Handbook 
No. 132, Agricultural Policies of Foreign Governments, USDA (Washington, 
D. C., Foreign Agricultural Service, 1957), p. 2 states that export sub­
sidies, though important are decreasing.
53^Hickman, ojd, cit., pp. 50-52.
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Regulation and the Farmer
Traditionally, American farmers have been free traders. An 
exception has been the sugar producers and wool growers who had de­
manded and received protection long before World War I. The protection 
movement for agriculture began on a much brcada? scale in 1921 and was 
strengthened in 1930. These tariff measures were ineffective remedies
as most agricultural commodities receiving protection from imports were 
5 Lexport oriented.As a result, renewed emphasis was given to these 
questions. Who needs the tariff? Who needs export subsidies? If 
they are needed, what are their effects on the individual farmer? Who 
makes farm policy, the farmer or the Farm Bloc?
The Farm Bloc according to Black consists of a group of Congress­
men, mostly from rural states, who represent farm organization leaders 
and lobbyists with ideas sufficiently alike that they tend to strive 
for a common end. It is apparent that the legislative and administrative 
policy which this bloc supports nay not always represent the interests 
of the farm people. Often the cotton trade stands to benefit more by 
proposed measures than the cotton farmers. The leaders and management 
often stand to gain more, both in the shcrt and long run, from the 
measures they advocate than do the farmers on the land.^
There are wide income differences in agricultural production. 
Although agricultural income averages less than non-agricultural income 
there are many farm operators with quite satisfactory levels of living
54Ibid.. p. 55.
'’'’John D, Black, Parity. Parity. Parity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, 1942), pp. 10- 
12.
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by any standard. Some two or three million farners have wages com­
parable to those of industrial workers, and 2 or 3 per cent of the 
farmers, those who produce about one-fourth of the farm marketings 
have very satisfactory incomes. At the other extreme are the farmers 
who are poor and who account for the very evident poverty in some 
rural areas. About one-third of the farm families tove low produc­
tivity and low income. Ultimately., inadequate use or misuse of 
resources accounts for low productivity. The -underemployed farmers 
tend to drag down the average income level. 6^
li/hat effect does farm policy and trade policy have on the Ameri­
can famer? The Farm Bloc, as has already been suggested, will, in 
its attempts to transform policy into legislation, largely reflect 
the interests of organized groups and lobbyists. Will this make the 
plight of all farmers better? Again, is national farm policy directed 
toward the best economic use of scarce resources? A crucial point 
affecting that larger question is that the problem of low farm income 
will not be solved until more people leave agriculture and until farms 
are reorganized in such a way as to raise their producing and earning 
capacity. ^  Without reorganization and better utilization of under­
employed resources any regulation designed to aid "farmers" is apt to 
benefit a few a great deal and the majority very little. An ever­
present danger is that with the Farm Bloc making and imposing farm 
policy and being capable of affecting foreign trade policy, it is pro­
bable that any concessions made by "farmers" will have very little
^Harold G. Halcraw, Agricultural Policy of the United States 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), pp. 14&-150.
5?Ibid.. pp. 360-361.
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effect on the higher income group of farmers and those influencing the 
"Farm Bloc," while the brunt of any such concession will be felt by.the 
farmers with the smaller incomes.
Farm Size and Production of Exports
In all that is said about farming, the problems of farmers, and 
price support aid to farmers, one seldom finds any mention of who is 
a farmer or what constitutes a farm. The 1950 and the 1954 Censuses 
of Agriculture counted as a farming unit three acres or more which 
produced agricultural products worth #150 or more. These products, 
accounting to that definition, could be either for home use or for 
sale. A "farm" of less than three acres must have produced for sale 
agricultural products in the amount of #150 or mere. Land under the 
control of one person was considered as one farm. Land worked by a 
tenant or sharecropper was considered as a separate farm,5^
Under the census classification, a retired doctor living in a 
city apartment would be a farmer if he sold #150 worth of mushrooms 
that he raised in his basement. Or a country squire with ten sons 
in the FFA, by leasing three acres to each son to raise a show steer, 
would be responsible for eleven farm statistics, if each son could 
sell his steer for #150 or more, provided of course, the squire had 
enough land left over to produce #150 income for himself. As con­
trasted to the above mentioned "farms," the King Ranch in Texas which 
takes half a day to cross, carries no more weight, as far as number of
^1950 United States Census of Agriculture. "Farms and Land in 
Farms," General Report, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1952), II, Ch. I, p. 5.
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farms is concerned, than any one of the scores of "farm" operations 
embraced under the Census definition.
Agricultural support programs generally use averages of farm 
data as the basis for determining income needs. Average farm income 
would include Price x Quantity divided by number of farms. P. x Q. = 
a sum which, when divided by the number of "farms" gives the "farm 
income." Undoubtedly some farmers need help, but there should be 
cognizance of the differences in farms and what the "help" will ac­
complish for each of the different classes of farms.
The Census Bureau divides farms into two major groups: "com­
mercial" and "other farms."
"The ’commercial farms' were classified into 
six groups, classes I through V on the basis 
of value of farm products sold and class VI 
on the basis of value of farm products sold, 
off-farm work (less than 100 days) by the 
operator, or the relationship of the income 
of the farm operator and members of his family 
from non-farm sources to the value of farm 
products sold. "Other farms" were classified 
as part-time, residential, and abnormal farms.
"Abnormal farms" are institutional units such as prison farms, 
school farms, experimental farms, and cooperative farms.
^1950 United States Census of Agriculture, "Economic Classes 
of Farms," United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952),
II, Ch. XII, pp. 1109-1110.
60Ibid., p. 1110.
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Following is the census classification of 1950:
COMMERCIAL FARMS
Class of Number of Value of Farm
Farm Farms Products Sold
I 103,231 $25,000 or more
II 381,151 10,000 to $24,000
III 721,211 5,000 to 9,999
IV 882,302 2,500 to 4,999
V 901,316 1,200 to 2,499
VI 717,201 250*to 1,199
•^Provided the farm operator worked off the farm less than 100 days, and 
provided the income of the farm operator and members of his family re­
ceived from non-farm sources was less than the value of all farm products 
sold.
OTHER FARMS
Part-time farms are farms with sales between $250 and $1,199 with 
more than 100 days employment off the farm or greater income from non­
farm employment.
Residential farms include all farms, except abnormal farms, with 
sales bringing less than $250.61
The term "large Farm" applies if the farm sells farm products
62valued at $70,000 or more in a year.
Commercial farms in the 1950 Census totaled 3,706,412. Other farms 
totaled 1,672,838. In 1940 there were 5,379,250 farms, but classes I,
II and III farms made up only about 22 per cent of the total number of
6l1950 United States Census of Agriculture. "Farm Labor and Farm 
Expenditures," United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1952), VII, Ch. IV, pp. xxx-xxxi.
62Ibid., p. xxxii.
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farms, yet produced over 70 per cent of the value of agricultural crops 
sold. Class I farms made up less than 2 per cent of all farms, yet 
they produced 22 per cent of all agricultural crops sold. Other farms 
accounted for around 30 per cent of all farms but produced less than 
3 per cent of the farm sales. In fact, 78 per cent of all farmers 
were able to produce less than 30 per cent of farm commodities sold, ^
Farm commodities are generally sold by grades. Cotton, wheat, 
wool, rice, and other supported commodities are classed according to 
specifications and supports are based on these classifications. Thus, 
cotton of comparable grade from a large farm will sell in the market 
for exactly the same price as cotton from a class VI commercial farm. 
With nearly 78 per cent of American farmers operating class IV, V, VI, 
and non-commercial farms, it can easily be seen that support prices, 
import quotas or any other programs based on price level manipulation 
will fail if the goal of the program is to increase the incomes of all 
farms to an acceptable level. There are instances where a program of 
500 per cent of parit?/" would not appreciably help certain ’’farmers,1
When the price support programs were instituted the idea was to 
increase the living standards of the farmer comparable to that of other 
groups in the economy; in other words, to see that a just share of the 
distribution of the nation!s income was obtained by the farmers. The 
use of import quotas, price supports, export subsidies and other pro­
grams have all been aimed at the same goal of increasing prices. By 
increasing prices, 70 per cent of the benefits in 1950 were paid to 
22 per cent of the farmers and about one-fourth of the benefits to 
around 2 per cent of the farmers. About 44 per cent of the commercial
^Calculated from data in the 1950 United States Census of Agri­
culture, "Economic Classes of Farms."
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farmers received about 90 per cent of the benefits,^ Thus, the 
farmers with incomes over $25,000 would receive nearly one-fourth 
of the price support benefits while farmers with incomes over $5,000 
would receive about 70 per cent of the benefits from any support 
programs. It would appear that the farmers who are helped most by 
support programs are the farmers who least need help. Farmers who 
most need help are those who get the smallest benefit. In fact, it 
Is possible that the program initiated to help the farmer actually 
harms the class V and VI farmer instead of helping him.
A large farm with much capital equipment and a good credit rating 
has a great deal more flexibility than a small subsistence-type farm. 
Thus when a 10,000-acre mechanized corporate farm has acreage re­
strictions imposed on its cotton crop, it is relatively easy to shift 
the lost acreage to some other crop. When a 20-acre farm which is 
producing cotton has its acreage reduced at the same ratio as the cor­
porate farm there is not much choice for the proprietor. He might 
put In corn to feed his mule but he could buy more corn by selling 
the cotton he could have raised; so for him a 10 per cent above market 
support might mean a major loss of income because of the inflexibility 
that attaches to acreage restriction in his case. Lacking the flexi­
bility that the larger farmer has, he may leave the farm to seek 
employment in town or may look for additional part-time work to sup­
plement his income if he stays on the farm.
Regulations and the Exodus from the "Farm”
The farm-to-city movement is a phenomenon which has been develop­
ing in the United States for many years. The once predominantly rural
^Ibid. "Economic Classes of Farms," Passim.
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population is now four-fifths urban. Among the reasons for this move­
ment are the higher birth rate in rural areas and the increasing 
efficiency and technology in farming. Any movement which entails 
change is due to be resisted by these who are, as individuals, ad­
versely affected. The cotton producers today are not pleased when 
they see rayon and nylon being used almost exclusively in tire car­
casses, or new highly water-resistant washable rayon coming onto the 
market. The dairy farmer was very vocal in his distaste for other 
edible fats which, it was discovered, could be used in making passable 
substitutes for ice cream and butter.
One of the greatest difficulties in easing restrictions on imports 
is the resistance of certain groups which are already import-competing. 
Among these groups are some important branches of agriculture charac­
terized by slow growth and few alternative opportunities for a quick 
shift of resources. Returns in these pursuits are low as compared 
with returns in expanding export industries.
On the one hand factor returns would probably increase if emphasis 
were shifted from protecting import-competing commodities to assisting 
potential purchasers of United States produce to obtain the foreign ex­
change which could stimulate the export of more efficient crops. ' Yet 
it is widely believed that the displacement from presently protected 
inefficient producers must not be more rapid than the displaced re­
sources can be absorbed elsewhere. The problem, then, is to absorb 
excessive employment of misused resources. This, of course, is an 
ever-present task even before any attempt is nade to increase imports. 
Moreover, it is probable that increasing imports would lower the al­
ready low incomes and increased exports would raise the already high
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incomes.
Basically, profits and income levels have been the major deter­
mining factors in the shift from farm to city. With the increased 
efficiency in the use of land, labor, and capital in agriculture, 
fewer inputs have given increased outputs. The fewer resources used 
in producing more agricultural commodities, the more resources there 
are available to produce the non-agricultural goods that are associ­
ated with a high standard of living. With greater efficiency in 
production and excess capacity, production has grown faster than de­
mand, and the incomes derived from farming have tended to remain lower 
than incomes from other sources. This is a manifestation of equili­
bration in a competitive economic system, or the dynamics of economics. 
One hundred and fifty years of exodus from the farm has largely been 
the outgrowth of increasing efficiency in agriculture.
Although there are now fewer small-size (20 to 99 acres) farms 
than in 1920, there are more by far under 10 acres, and about the same 
number in the 10- to 19-acre bracket. These smaller farms are primar­
ily a dace to live rather than a source of income. The farms in the 
100- to 259-acre bracket have also decreased, but not nearly as notice­
ably as the smaller sized farms. Farms between 260 and 499 acres had 
changed little in numbers between 1920 and 1945. The farms in the 500- 
to 999-acre group have increased somewhat, about 16 per cent between 
1920 and 1945. The large farms of over 1,000 acres have increased 
more rapidly in number than any other bracket, with nearly 70 per cent 
more in 1945 than 5n 1920.^5
^^Sherman B. Johnson, Changes in American Farming. "Miscellaneous 
Publication No. 707." USDA (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, 1949), p. 53. The trends in farm size changes have continued 
since Johnson made his study and evidence points to their further con­
tinuation.
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The ever-commitment of resources to agricultural pursuits has
tended to correct itself throughout the dynamic growth of the American
economy. Various states have from time to time attempted to protect
special interest groups, but on the whole and in the long run analysis,
economic forces in the United States have tended to allocate resources
to their most productive uses. It is possible, of course, that the
protective measures which were introduced in the 1930's may tend to
slow down this process of equilibration. On the international scene,
agricultural policies that have distorted trade show that one nation
alone is unable or unwilling to cope with world-wide problems. Policy
has often tended to shelter certain groups from the effects of world 
66market forces. This sheltering of special interest groups may slow 
the general trend toward a more productive allocation of resources and 
may thus divert the movement from marginal and sub-marginal farms or 
from low income import-competing commodities to the production of 
more efficient export crops.
Agriculture still engages about twice as many farmers as needed. 
This surplus must be kept moving into other lines of production or 
the farmers will simply be dividing the farm returns among more pro­
ducers, Some students of the subject urge that, rather than flat 
payments to farmers or payments proportional to sales, an essential 
part of any price or income policy should be a program of general im­
provement in education, both general and technical, to prepare farm 
children to move out of agriculture and compete on equal terms with
^Robert B. Schwenger, "World Agricultural Policies and the Expan­
sion of Trade," Journal of Farm Economics. XXVII (February 1945), 86-87*
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non-rural workers.^
Farm Income Levels and Foreign Trade 
Mention has already been made of the marled differences in the 
incomss of individual farmers. The greatly increased demands for farm 
products during the war years, which made farm incomss very profitable 
for millions, was unable to provide more than a marginal, -and in some 
cases, sub-marginal existence for millions of other farmers.^
To the extent that the efficiency of factor use manifests itself 
in factor returns, agricultural exports are more efficiently produced 
than are import-competing crops. Unweighted average hourly earnings 
in export agricultural crop production was #1.25 in 1947 as compared 
with hourly returns of $1.23 for import-competing crops. Weighted by 
man-hours, leading export commodities returned $1,269 as against $.999 
for import-competing crops in 1947. The spread was greater in 1952 
when the weighted per man-hour returns were $1,671 for export agri­
cultural crops as against $1.01& for producers of import-competing 
commodities. These figures were determined by weighting the returns 
according to the importance of the different commodities in the make­
up of this country's exports and its imports of commodities which 
compete with domestically-produced commodities. The greater the im­
portance of exports the higher the man-hour returns, and the greater
^Geoffrey Shepherd, "A Rational System of Agricultural Price 
and Income Controls," Readings on Agricultural Policy (Philadelphia: 
The Blakiston Company, 1949), pp. 1o2-163.
^Hickman, op. cit., p. 36.
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69the amount of competition from imports, the lower the returns. 7
In view of the contrast between farm income levels and the great­
er return to export commodities than to import-competing commodities, 
it would seem unwi.se to attempt to exclude cheaper imports. An easing 
of import restrictions, which could make dollar exchange available to 
other nations, would allow a more rapid shift of resources to agri­
cultural export, as well as to industrial export goods production.
This would lead to even higher returns to American productive factors 
and give foreign nations much less need for grants and "loans" with 
which to pay for the American goods they desire.
The practice of supporting import-competing commodities which 
make high demands on scarce factors, thus protecting them against 
imports, perpetuates inefficiency. In addition, by excluding for­
eign imports, less foreign demand will be manifested for efficiently 
produced exports. These effects are obvious, but another less com­
monly recognized effect is equally as wasteful of scarce productive 
factors. Supporting a crop at such a level that production is stim­
ulated at above the world price may prevent United States production 
from entering the world market. This result prevails in connection 
with the production of wheat and cotton and possibly other commodities. 
The effect of a supported price which stimulates production often 
leads to sales to the government of a large portion of a crop. Farms 
which could have sold their crop profitably at a lower price will see 
economic rent and expectations of continued rent force their land
^Irving B. Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Review of Economics 
and Statistics. XXXVIII (February 1956), 27-30.
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values up to such a height that they can no longer sell in the lower 
priced world market.^
With all farms producing for a nationally supported price, dif­
ficulty arises when world prices fluctuate. When the world price goes 
up, all is well; domestic producers sell on the world market at above 
support price. However, when the world price drops below support 
levels, producers sell to the government.
The United States has an advantage in world trade where ma­
chinery improves the productivity of labor to a high enough degree.
The problem in trade policy is to reconcile the national interest 
with the interest of particular groups. When the production of crops 
is reduced because of the I 03S of this foreign market, the unused 
factors will begin competing with factors producing other commodities 
and thus aid in driving incomes down in these fields.
The bulk of the population of China, India, Mexico, and marp/ 
other nations are dependent upon agricultural production for a meager 
existence. The se nations all have low productivity, much manpower 
used and little mechanization. This would seem to be the goal that 
protection, for crops not adaptable to mechanization, is aiming for 
in the United States. Only by making the utmost use of technological 
and scientific improvements as swiftly as possible can American agri­
culture hope to remain competiti 3 in the world market. An agriculture
"^Richard T. Ely, and George S. Wehrwein, Land Economics (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1940) pp. 121-133. Ely and Wehrwein point out 
that land receives its value from capitalization of the returns from 
the land. For this reason when land is sold at a high price because 
price supports have permitted high economic rent to be capitalized, 
the new owner is no longer able to sell at less than the level of the 
support price.
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which contributes its part to a dynamically growing American econony 
must continue to adopt new technology as fast as do industry, market­
ing, and ancillary pursuits. Otherwise, it will retard the nation's 
economic progress.
71Capital-Intensive Crops
Agriculture which is efficient and which returns a high income 
level to its producers aids in maintaining a high national income 
and a prosperous nation. This is also true of any other basic pro­
ductive group in the economy. However, a nation cannot be prosperous 
if agriculture is so inefficient that it uses all the productive fac­
tors of the economy to feed and clothe the populace. If a nation is 
not efficient in agricultural production, it must remain at a re­
latively low level of living or import foods and fibers to free 
workers for other pursuits.
For at least thirty years the frontiers of the United States 
have been closed. No longer is it possible to add to extensive pro­
duction in order to increase agricultural output. Only by improvements 
in a technology which decreases relative inputs to outputs will Ameri­
can agriculture be capable of increasing productivity at the same rate 
as increasing efficiency in industrial production. Only if something 
like a balanced ratio is maintained as between the efficiency of agri­
culture and the efficiency of industry, will agriculture contribute 
its due proportion to the American standard of living.
ay the term "capital-intensive crops" is meant commodities that 
lend themselves to production with maximum use of machinery, fertilizers, 
improved seed stock, and with relatively very little manpower necessary 
in their cultivation.
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Some avenues toward an improved agriculture are of course more 
promising than others. Land and climatic conditions are relatively 
unchangeable, except for such secondary influences as swamp drainage, 
added humus, fertilization, and irrigation. The greatest potential 
for increased productivity of agriculture is attainable through the 
substitution of capital for labor. This is true because, as com­
pared vrith most other nations, the United States has excessive 
capital and a shortage of labor. If comparative advantages are to 
be obtained, a nation can produce more cheaply those products which 
make the greatest use of the abundant factors and the least use of 
the scarce factors.
The commodities which lend themselves well to a substitution 
of capital for labor and those which are unsuitable for production 
elsewhere because of climatic or other natural conditions are the 
ones which should be exported. The crops which are unable to be­
come "capital intensive" will become more incapable of entering the 
export market as industry continues to become more efficient. If 
the ratio of manpower to capital usage fails to keep abreast of the 
industrial revolution which is now in process, then the cost com­
petition for manpower in the industrial processes will tend to 
cause agricultural prices to become so high that agricultural pro­
ducts will not be able to enter the export market. In fact, with 
the exceptions of bulky low-value commodities and perishable goods, 
the trading partners of the United States will tend to export more 
and more agricultural commodities to the United States unless the 
"agricultural revolution" keeps apace with the trend toward auto­
mation in industry.
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The technology of agriculture tends in general to advance as 
rapidly as other sectors of the economy. About 80 per cent of farm 
extension effort is directed toward technological improvements in pro­
duction. Some observers contend that it is necessary that more than 
20 per cent of the total effort be applied to farm planning and re­
search into the economics of production. Because of projected national 
growth, the United States will need all the agricultural productivity 
possible in another generation. Technological development, so it is 
maintained, is at the point where all that is needed in order to have 
incomes in most of the low income areas of the United States is to 
practice the new technologies on farms of sufficient acreage.^
Hand-Intensive C r o p s 3^
There are certain commodities which will probably never be 
significant in the international trade between distant areas. In 
point of production method, these may be either hand-intensive or 
capital-intensive, and generally they do not significantly influence 
either import or export patterns. One of the reasons for this is 
the low value and large bulk quality of some commodities, which tends 
to increase transportation costs above the profitability point of 
shipping. Another factor is the perishability of some commodities. 
Fresh meat shipments, for example, were impossible for hundreds of 
years other than by actually shipping the live animal.
John D. Black, "Agriculture in the Nation’s Economy," The 
American Economic Review, XLVI (March 1956), 40-41*
73By "hand-intensive crops" is meant tho6 e crops which, because 
cf their nature, require in their production a great deal of hand labor 
which cannot be done by machine processes.
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The commodities in the United States which tend to be hand­
intensive and which can be produced elsewhere and shipped to the 
United States will be subjected to more and more import competition. 
Yet again, there will be a continual increase in the malallocation 
of productive factors if special interest groups remain strong enough 
to compel the entire population to pay higher and higher prices as 
the production of these commodities becomes more and more inefficient 
relative to other segments of the economy. The production of such 
commodities will continue to become more inefficient unless capital 
is able to replace labor as fast as it does in other industries.
Some of the commodities which require a large amount of hand 
labor for which machines cannot as yet be substituted and which thus 
could be classed as hand-intensive are: tobacco, certain fresh fruits
and vegetables, cotton under some conditions, hops, wool, poultry, 
and beet sugar. If the advantages of highly productive land (soil, 
climate, rainfall, and location) are not great enough to offset the 
use of the large number of farm workers that cannot be replaced by 
capital, production is to a large extent dependent upon protection.
Any commodity which consistently depends upon support for its exist- 
once is a drag on the rest of the economy. Therefore in the dynamic 
economy of the United States, if there is to be a continued maximum 
rate in increasing the standard of living, hand-intensive crops need­
ing protection should be losing productive factors to production of 
capital-intensive goods and commodities.
It is true that land values are high on much land that produces 
hand-intensive, protected commodities. If this land were diverted to 
the production of other products it would lose much of its value.
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Such a shift would also result in a sizable loss to the owner at the 
time of changing from, say, sugar cane to dairy pasturage in Louisiana. 
But how did the land obtain its value? It was mainly through the 
capitalization of the income of a crop, opportunity cost of other 
crops, or alternative non-agricultural uses. In the example of sugar 
land values, import quotas instigated by lobby campaigns of vested 
interests gave the land its value in the first place. The same is 
true of any other protected crop. In sum, the protection afforded to 
an inefficient labor utilizing crop will keep the land values high.
If the protection were to cease, the land would be diverted to the 
commodity which had the next highest opportunity cost, and without 
protection it would be a crop better suited to the factor proportions 
that are available.
In preparation for an examination of the effects that restrictive 
trade regulation have on various hand-intensive and capital-intensive 
commodities, this chapter was designed to indicate some of the effects 
on agriculture in general. The conditions under which factor employ­
ment nay not be maximized and inefficient production may be perpetuated 
have been noted. Likewise, the ways in which a domestic program may 
interfere with import and export practice, and the effects of trade 
regulation on ancillaries of primary producers have been noted. In 
addition, an examination was made of the regulatory tools and such 
other matters as the decline in the importance of agricultural exports, 
the size of farms and the historical movement from the farm to urban 
locations.
The remaining chapters will include an examination of the effect 
supports and regulations have on factor usage in production of export
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commodities and import-competing commodities. These observations 
will be made while examining crops classified as capital-intensive 
and hand-intensive.
CHAPTER IV
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE CROPS AND RESTRICTIONS
The term "restrictions" as used here means regulations dealing 
with either domestic or foreign trade, which may adversely affect 
quantities of imports of exports* Capital-intensive crops will be 
dealt with mainly in this chapter and hand-intensive crops in Chapter 
V. Some of the crops covered are both hand-intensive and capital- 
intensive and will therefore be discussed in both chapters.
In order to determine the effect that fluctuations of international 
movements of capital-intensive commodities have on the nation’s re­
sources, leading export industries will be examined. The growth of
efficiency of resource use in various crops, as well as the correlation
v
between export levels and trade restrictions will be noted.
Leading Export Industries
The work done by Professor Kravis in his article on "Wages and 
Foreign Trade" and also his statement in the Congressional hearings in 
September 1956 will be used as a basis for the selection of leading ex­
port- and import-competing agricultural industries discussed in the 
chapter. Others will be used as the occasion arises. Table V in this 
chapter is Table 8 in the article on "Wages and Foreign Trade;" it is 
known as Table 7 in the Congressional hearings statement.
While accepting the work done by Kravis as a basis to work from, 
it must be realized that hourly returns were obtained from the di­
vision of man-hours of labor into the net income realized by the 
industry. This, of course, would incorporate any high or low prices
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TABLE V
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT IN FOREIGN 
TRADE; 1947 HOURLY EARNINGS; 1947 AND 
1952 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
Exports and Imports in Millions of Dollars
1-0 Industry Estimated Exports of lead- Imports of lead-
Returns per ing Export Indus- ing Import-com-
Hour tries^ peting Industries^
1947 1952 1947 1952
4 Livestock & 
Products^- $ 0.58 220 314
5 Food Grains 3.17 441 855 2 72
6 Feed Grains 
and Hay .57 215 339 4 85
7 Cotton .80 1,365 864 44 35
8 Tobacco .82 100 95 (5) 61'
9 Oil Bearing 
Crops 1.65 41 81 139 56
10-11 Vegetables & 
Fruits 1.10 155 139 102 111
12 Tree Nuts .91 (6) (6) 32 38
Total, above industries 2,316 2,373 543 772
^Estimated hourly returns were obtained by dividing man-hours of 
labor used in farm work into realized net income of farm operators plus 
expenditures for hired labor.
^All industries with exports of $50 million or more either in 
1947 or 1952.
^All industries with competitive imports of $30 million or more 
(foreign value) either in 1947 or 1952.
^Excludes meat and dairy animals and their products.
^Negligible.
^Exports below $50 million; industry therefore not included as 
leading exporter.
SOURCES: Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," p. 27.
, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommittee of 
the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CUSTOMS
83
AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM,, House of Representatives, 
blith Congress, Washington, D. C., (1996)
into man-hour returns. Thus, any prices that may have been unduly de­
pressed or supported unrealistically at the time this work was accomplished, 
would inject this same note of artificiality into the findings.
Man-hour Returns of Leading Export Crops
The man-hour estimates and the man-hours actually spent in the pro­
duction of commodities, at best, give only a rough approximation of 
average efficiency of labor use for a given commodity. Average figures 
are shown in estimated returns per hour in Kravis’ table. This table 
is based on total production figures and total manpower figures and is 
therefore not representative of any one area. Cotton may return much 
more per man-hour in one area than in another. This is true for all of 
the commodities entering foreign trade. Some producers are sub-marginal, 
some marginal, and others may be profitable but will tend to become high 
cost producers as land values appreciate*
Kravis finds that the export commodities when weighted show an av­
erage hourly return of $1.269 in 19U7 and $1,671 in 1992. His figures 
for import-competing average hourly returns are much lower, being only 
$.999 in V9bl and $1,018 in 1992.2 This is somewhat misleading, however, 
because the efficient as well as the inefficient producers are taken into 
account. There is no way of determining which cotton is produced effi­
ciently and which inefficiently. The same is true for tobacco, wheat, oil,
^"Although The Bureau of Labor Statistics made an extensive study in 
19li-7 and again in 1992 concerning industrial efficiency, no such study was 
made for agricultural industries until Kravis, using raw data from the U.S. 
D.A., completed the above work for leading export and import commodities.
2
Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Taboe 9, p. 30.
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vegetables, fruits or nuts. What can be determined, nevertheless, is 
how rapidly an industry sub.slifi/ites capital for manpower, if the sub 
stitution is possible. When the substitution is rapid and the farms
which have not been able to make the substitution tend to have a re­
latively low level of living as compared with those which have shifted, 
then it is evident that capital returns are higher and capital-intensive 
production more efficient. If this were not true there would be no ef­
fective inclination to substitute capital for labor.
Industries unable to substitute capital for labor in order to re­
main efficient relative to other industries can expect to be eliminated 
from production in a dynamic industrializing economy. Capital will nor­
mally be substituted for labor when it is cheaper in the long run to 
make the substitution. With the increasing demand for labor from north­
ern industrial centers, with industries shifting to the South and West
to follow the mariets, as a result of increasing labor mobility, and 
with minimum wage laws, labor is becoming increasingly more costly 
throughout the nation.
Production of wheat, a major export commodity, very early lent .it­
self to methods designed to save relatively scarce manpower. By 1847 
the reaper was being used commercially. Manpower was a scare factor in 
the West where wheat was adaptable to the extensive use of rich prairie 
lands. With few men, horses and machines were used. Large machines and 
large units of power in the production of wheat was established long be­
fore the internal combustion engine was adapted to field work. As soon 
as the internal combustion engined tractor became practical it was draft­
ed into use with other improvements in mass production following, begin­
ning around 1920 tractors soon made horsepower obsolete in the job of
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plowing large wheat ranches. As the tractor improved, the number of 
horses and mules declined. The combine, using gasoline power, became 
a smaller, more manageable tool to the farmer, and manpower needs were 
further reduced by the one-man combine, now a standard tool of many 
grain producers. The use of machines thus led to the high man-hour re­
turns which Kravis revealed in his research into productivity. The 
early use of machines prior to support programs may have eliminated many 
sub-marginal wheat producers and dictated capital intensification for 
all producers.
Mechanization in the production of corn was slower than in the pro­
duction of wheat because of problems not encountered in wheat and small 
grains. High-yielding hybrid corn and wartime shortages combined to 
give the requisite impetus to greater mechanization. By 1946, 70 per 
cent of the corn production was harvested-mechanically in the corn belt. 
This and the use of the corn planter, with mechanical disking and husk­
ing, have almost completely mechanized corn production.^
The cattle industry, dependent upon forage, received the boost to­
ward capital substitution for labor as early as 1890 when mowing machines 
came into use. The windrow pickup hay baler of 1932, the silage of 
green fodder in trench silos, windrow ensilage cutters, together with 
the truck, hay fork, and tractor, considerably reduced the manpower re­
's
A. P. Brodell, Machine and Hand Methods in Crop Production (Wash­
ington, D . C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural
Marketing Service, 1940) pp. 1-3.
^A. P. Brodell and J. A. Ewing, Use of Tractor Power. Animal Power 
and Hand Methods in Crop Production (Washington, D, C,: Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, FM-69 Mimeographed, July 1948), pp. 12, 21.
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quirements of the cattle industry.
The work of Louis J. Ducoff for the Department of Agriculture shows 
variations of productivity in 1939 from total production value at #82 
per man equivalent on the smallest value category of farms to #2,850 on 
the largest. In other words, productivity on the largest farms ranged 
to as high as thirty-five times that of the smallest farms. The great­
er productivity on the larger farms was associated with better re­
sources and larger capital outlays per worker. Employment of hired 
labor on the larger, better equipped farms produced on the average
a greater output per hired worker than the average worker’s output on
£
farms manned entirely by family labor.
The implication of Ducoff's findings is that the larger the pro­
ducing unit, the more efficient the operation. This may not necessarily 
be true, especially in periods of falling prices. Yet, the trend to­
ward mechanization has been evident for some time, as has the knowledge 
that the large mechanized farm is generally more efficient. The more 
efficient the production possibilities, the greater■should be the chance 
of a commodity retaining its place in the make-up of exports. That is 
to say, if efficiency allows the cost relationship to decrease faster for 
one commodity, that commodity should become a better buy for foreigners. 
With wheat this is probably true, yet wheat has been losing foreign mar­
kets faster than tobacco, which is hand-intensive and usually produced 
on very small tracts.
^James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Bcononw (Chapel 
Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 98-99.
^Louis J. Ducoff, Wages of Agricultural Workers in the United States, 
Technical Bulletin No. 895, USDA (Washington, D. C., 1945), pp. 11-12.
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Table VI shows the average hours of labor used per unit of pro­
duction for wheat and tobacco and several other major export commodities. 
The table shows that the most rapid increase in productivity of the
TABLE VI
AVERAGE HOURS OF LABOR USED PER UNIT OF 
PRODUCTION ON SELECTED EXPORT COMMODITIES
Crop 1910-14 1925-29 1935-39 1940-44 1945-48
Wheat 100 bu 106 74 67 43 34
Rice 100 bu 154 87 64 64 56
Tobacco 100 lbs 44 48 47 44 43
Soybeans 100 bu 128 64 58 52
Cotton Bale 277 268 210 190 182
Hours of labor are computed for the acreage harvested.
SOURCE: Johnsonj Changes in American Farming. USDA, Table 11, p. 70.^
export commodities listed for the period 1910-1948 was in the produc­
tion of rice and wheat, both major export commodities. Soybean
production, which did not begin on a large scale until after World War 
I, was only half as efficient in the period 1925-1929 as in 1935-1939. 
However, it has shown continuing increases in productivity. Cotton 
production, on the other hand, was only slightly mere productive in
^See also The Economic Almanac 1958, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co. 1958), p. 58. Although Johnson's work was the last comprehensive 
work on hours of labor used, the' yearly figures of the Agricultural 
Research Service, USDA, as compiled in the Economic Almanac in table 
form, show that the decreasing use of manpower is continuing. The 
trends shown in Johnson's work continue with the exception of tobacco 
which in 1955 had a considerably higher per man-hour output.
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1925-1929 than it was in 1910-1914, but has since become more effi­
cient. Mechanical improvements now make cotton production almost as 
adaptable to machine production as wheat. The production of tobacco, 
one crop which has retained its export market, was no more efficient in 
1948 than it was in 1910.
The efficiency of wheat production varies widely, with costs much 
higher in some areas than in others. Wheat could be produced for 70 to 
80 cents a bushel in some areas of Kansas in 1953 and 1954* while costs 
in Illinois were between $1.50 and $1.65 a bushel. Yet the price sup­
port of 90 per cent of parity paid by the government was at the rate 
of $2.24 a bushel. At the same time, the government was selling the 
wheat it purchased to foreign countries for $1.65 a bushel under the 
terms of the International Wheat Agreement which vras first negotiated 
in 1949.8
The Wheat Agreement was an attempt on the part of several wheat- 
exporting nations and forty-one importing nations to assure a quota 
from each exporter between a minimum and maximum set of prices. The 
extension of the agreement in 1953 for three more years established a 
quota for the United Spates of 209 million bushels at a minimum price
Q
of $1.80 a bushel. The support level will, of course, be the market 
price for wheat in the United States as long as supply outstrips demand,
^Walter L. Randolph, Vice President American Farm Bureau Federation, 
A Statement in the hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES - COTTON. United States 
Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C,, [1955)* pp. 149-151.
^Brainard, op. cit., pp. 483-485. See also Stephen Enke, and 
Virgil Salera, International Economics, Third Edition (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957) pp. 443-453.
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while the export price will be.the wheat agreement minimum price. The 
equitable price sought by the producing countries of the wheat agreement 
may be based upon wrong assumptions. True, in the world-wide depression 
of the 1930’s, when wheat prices fell all prices fell. There was little 
or no alternative use for resources going into wheat production. How­
ever, times were different following World War II, and an attempt to 
retain stable marketing quotas and prices at the so-called equitable 
level may have caused a slow-up of the readjustment from war stimulated 
demand to normal demand patterns. The equitable level is considered to 
be that level which produces returns equal to returns from alternative 
employment..
The wheat agreement and other plans for stimulating exports of com­
modities with high output per man have the support of the Grange. Lloyd 
C. Halverson a Grange economist calls attention to the point that the 
high standard of American living is due to that high output, and that 
our policy makers must think in terms of full employment of the Ameri­
can people in these industries which have the highest output per man 
and therefore the greatest advantage in the world marlet. This spokes­
man also urges that the producers of export crops should not be required 
to give up their normal share of the world market merely because they 
have the benefit of a domestic program which raises the price above the 
competitive level and artificially stimulates production abroad. Instead, 
a freer hand should be given to many of our producers who can produce at
^Enke, and Salera, International Economics, pp. 452-453.
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competitive world prices and still have some addition to income,^"
The impact of war demands and high prices for wheat under an ad­
mittedly stimulating support level has had an effect on the pricing of 
wheat land. Farmers buying land and equipment to expand production at 
a given price level need to continue receiving the same level of income 
in order to obtain a satisfactory return on their investment. When a 
wartime demand returns to normal there is apt to be a call for continued 
aid in maintaining exports at the wartime level. Without some kind of 
aid many wheat farmers would face disaster. That they should receive 
some help in readjusting is not qxiestioned. What is questionable, how­
ever, is whether a program should be used which will forever continue 
the disequilibrium.
The situation with respect to rice is somewhat different from that 
of wheat. Rice is produced mainly in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and 
California. Production in Louisiana and Texas is least efficient in 
terms of per-acre output, but alternative uses of land in these states 
are few (mainly grazing), so that land is cheaper than in Arkansas and 
California.^
Louisiana rice producers could show earnings of only 28 cents for 
each hour of labor used in the raising of rice in 1945. The rental 
arrangement for land is 20 per cent of the crop, which amounted to 
$13.73 per acre in 1945.^  It appears that land use is the productive
■'•-'-Lloyd C. Halverson, A Statement in the hearings before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND 
OPERATION OF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. 
House of Representatives, S4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1956), 
pp. 1562-1563.
12
J. Norman Efferson, The Production and Marketing of Rice (New 
Orleans: The Rice Journal, 1952), p. 455.
13Ibid.. p. 469.
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factor which causes rice producers to show less than a fair return on 
their operation. For example, by capitalising the returns for rent at 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent the land would have been valued at 
between $137 and $274 an acre in 1945. This land had only grazing as an 
alternative. The rent pattern, then, has capitalized the land values 
so high that even efficient use of capital and labor results in a loss. 
The farmers who are sharecropping the land may not be making a fair in­
come, but a return of $13.73 an acre on land with few alternative uses 
appears to be a windfall for owners. Any export subsidy program under 
an institutional rental program of the sort described by Efferson, where 
a large portion of output is by sharecroppers paying 20 per cent of the 
crop in the form of rent, will continue to inflate land values. This 
would seem to encourage the perpetuation of the status of sharecroppers 
as landless farmers and make absentee landowners more and more vocal 
for export subsidies.
Land which sold for $6 an acre in Arkansas before being planted to
rice is now valued at $150 an acre,^ This same land would be valued at
about $9 an acre if it had appreciated at the average rate of change for
15all agricultural land. ' On the other hand, costs of preparing for rice 
culture would never have been undertaken without assurance of an income 
which would justify them.
^■"Old-Style Paddy Gone With the Wind,” The New York Times, Tuesday, 
July 9, 1957, pp. 39, 44- It should be net ed that such a source as this 
may be mere journalistic than factual in as much as costs of preparation 
for paddy culture are not considered.
15Average values of farm land per acre from Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1940, 1955, passim.
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Cotton, like wheat, is a commodity which can be produced by many 
operators at costs competitive with world prices. The support program 
helps the inefficient cotton producer very little but .gives windfall 
gains to low-cost producers. The price subsidy adds significant amounts 
to the incomes of producers whose costs are substantially below market 
prices. The high cost producer however, is not aided to any great extent. 
In fact, farms producing cotton declined by 20 per cent since the advent 
of controls.^
A support program not only fails to help the inefficient producer 
significantly, but it also subsidizes production in areas abroad that 
cannot match the efficiency of many of our efficient producers. And 
once American exports have been lost to foreign producers, a two-price 
system may lead to counter subsidies for exports by these foreign pro­
ducers. Subsidies will not indicate which country is the most efficient 
producer. Instead, it will lead to objections by foreign producers who 
claim such actions violate the rules of the Food and Agricultural Organ­
ization, or the objectives of Gatt. Moreover, it is very probable that 
under a two-price system tax resources vrill need to be depended upon in 
order to cover the difference between the two prices: the support price
and the dumping price.
The cotton revolution which has seen the substitution of machines 
for men and a shift from production on small acreages in the South to 
large acreages in the West has also witnessed a shift in protectionist 
sentiments in cotton-producing states. With the shift of textile manu-
Murry R. Benedict, and Oscar C, Stine, The American Commodity 
Programs (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 195^0, p. 45*
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facturing to the South, the erstwhile free trade arguments of the cotton- 
producing states changed to exhortations for protection of the textile 
industry. The more the economy of southern states becomes dependent on 
textile income and the more ingrained the idea of government support 
price purchases of cotton, the stronger will be the feeling for protec­
tion.
The cotton support program, in addition to stimulating foreign 
cotton production, also acts as a stimulant to the rayon industry which 
has been producing fibers cheaper than cotton since 1943. With greater 
foreign competition, with more competition from rayon, and with high 
stimulating price supports there has been a growing need to limit cotton 
production. The crop control program, with its aim toward a limiting 
of acreage and the rewarding of efficiency, has encouraged a shift to 
the cities. This shift was facilitated in large part by a general im­
provement in economic conditions sufficient to permit the absorption of 
underemployed farm labor from the cotton areas. The introduction of 
farm machinery specifically tailored to produce and harvest cotton has 
resulted in a reduction of costs. The areas which mechanized most ra­
pidly displaced labor and consolidated land ownership. This, in turn, 
widened the differences in farm income and increased the disadvantage of 
the smaller farms lacking the necessary funds to expand.^  The slowness 
of the south to adjust to mechanical substitutes for labor was partially 
due to the abundance of cheap labor and the small-size cotton farms. 
Table VII shows the per cent of mechanization in cotton culture in vari­
ous areas in 1939 and 1946, with tractor power used in four categories
17Gilbert G. Fite, "Recent Progress in the Mechanization of Cotton 
Production in the United States," Agricultural History. No. 1, XXIV 
(January 1950), 26-28.
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of operation serving as a sort of multiple index of the extent of 
mechanization,
TABLE VII
USE OF TRACTOR POWER PREPARATORY TO 
COTTON HARVEST; PERCENTAGE OF 
OPERATION DONE BY TRACTOR
State Group Land Harrowing Planting Cultivating
Breaking 
1939 1946
1939 1946 1939 1946 1939 1946
Southeast 10 33 8 29 2 13 2 11
Midsouth 16 42 13 37 4 16 6 18
Southwest 48 84 40 81 42 78 40 82
Far West SI 94 67 89 64 81 69 , 37
SOURCE: Bradell, and Ewing.
The mechanization of cotton production, that is, use of the me­
chanical harvester with tractor preparation, also came first in the Far 
West. California in 1949 had 13 per cent of its cotton mechanically- 
harvested and 67 per cent in 1955, while the Southeast harvested only 
2 per cent in 1955.^
With the substitution of machines for men and mules, man-hours per 
bale have been cut from 155 hours to approximately 132 hours per bale 
with present equipment. With increased use of mechanical pickers, and 
when an assured weed control is developed, it is expected that labor re-
^United States Agricultural Marketing Service (formerly United States 
Production and Marketing Administration), Charges for Ginning Cotton,
Costs of Selected Services Incident to Marketing, and Related Infor­
mat ion~TWashington: USDA) Annual Report 1949 and 1955*
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quirements will be reduced to 10 or 12 man-hours per bale With this de­
creasing use of labor as a result of mechanization, there should be a 
lowering of relative costs of growing cotton which should lead to a low­
ering of supports if a ten-year running average with flexible support 
levels is used to determine support prices. It is argued by some that 
such cost reductions will be substantial enough so that cotton produc­
tion can again recapture markers taken by foreign producers and sub­
stitutes. This low cost production may be seen at work on many of the 
more efficient farmsteads that produce under a cost schedule that would 
prove profitable at world prices.
If those advocating adjustment to the forces of a free market are 
correct in their thesis that technological advancements will cut costs 
to a competitive level, there is still the question of how foreign buy­
ers will be able to pay for American cotton.
Oils, fats, and oilseeds have been both imported and exported in 
large quantities by the United States. Our country has steadily in­
creased its share in the world export market. From a 2 per cent share
(1935 to 1939 average) United States exports have increased to 26 per 
20cent in 1954. A part of this increase is a result of the introduction 
of soybean culture in the United States. Soybeans are easily adapted 
to American farming techniques, and their production has increased
19From information furnished by The United States Department of 
Agriculture Neg. 47993-4, Bureau of Agricultural Economics as dupli­
cated by Street, ££. cit., p. 170.
^^Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, ojo. cit.,
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rapidly in recent years. The technique of tractor soil preparation and
the utilization of mechanical planters, rotary hoes, weeders, and a
combine for harvesting have made possible the record development of the
21soybean industry in the United States. With the use of modern methods 
the United States has been able to enter the world soybean market, and 
in a period of about twenty years has become the supplier of around 45 
per cent of the world output. The United States and China together pro­
duce about 90 per cent of the world total.
The peanut, another of the oil-producing crops, is also adapted to 
mechanical planting and cultivation. The peanuts are harvested by a 
tractor pulling a digging plow, after harvesting, the peanuts are al­
lowed to dry for a few hours. After the vines are dry a tractor with 
a windrow shaker shakes the vines and pods free of soil. In some areas 
the peanuts are stacked, while in others they are dried in windrows.
The latter method is much cheaper and requires less hand labor. Pea­
nuts are mechanically picked from the hay. After harvesting, hogs are
allowed to clean the fields, putting on a pound of pork for each 2 1/2
22to 3 pounds of peanuts they pick up.
Lard is a by-product of pork production. With the shift away from
the domestic use of lard to the use of shortening, lard must be shipped
abroad to areas where shortening has not yet become competitive with 
lard. Through selective breeding, hog raisers now utilize techniques
KLare S. Markley, Soybeans and Soybean Products (New York: In­
terscience Publishers, Inc., 1950), I, 28, 34-35, 42, 44*
G. Sturkil, and J. T. Williamson, The Peanut, "Cultural Prac­
tices," A Symposium, Chapter 5 (Washington, D. C.: The National
Association, 1951), PP* 196-208.
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which minimize fat production, but much lard is still produced.
The shift in demand from soap to detergents has had some effect 
on both imports and exports of fats and oils. The exports of inedible 
fats from the United States are the lowest priced fats of this type 
available and undoubtedly will maintain a place in world markets unless 
synthetic detergents become more widely used abroad.^
American production of fats and oils varies in degree of mechani­
zation. The estimated returns per hour shown by Kravis place oil bear­
ing crops second in productiveness of United States agricultural export 
commodities. However, there is a wide variation in efficiency because 
of location and use of capital and labor. Among ths major oils and 
fats are butter, lard, and the oils derived from cottonseed, peanuts, 
soybeans, olives, coconuts, palm, tung, whale, and fish.
The Unit ed States was a net importer of fats before World War II. 
Since the war, exports have risen above imports. The value of imports
of vegetable oils, fats, and oilseeds in 1954 was $142,213,000 as com-
2L.
pared with exports valued at $301,000,000, The increase in exports 
was a result of the new production of soybeans together with increases 
in the production of peanuts, lard, and cottonseed oil. Nearly all the 
major export oils and fats are suited to a high degree of mechanization.
Comparative Wages in Export Crop Production
In dealing with wage levels, as with all other farm comparisons,
^Paul E. Quintus, Head, Fats and Oils Division, Foreign Agri­
cultural Service, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 
United States Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C (1953"), p. 798.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, op. cit., 
pp. 3, 23.
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the data compiled by the United States Department of Agriculture are in 
terms of averages. Wage rates tend to be higher in the North and West 
and lowest in the South, In 1943 wages for farm labor in California and 
the Pacific Coast area were about three and one half tines as high as 
in the East South Central area.*^ Cotton was one of the major crops ex­
ported from both areas. In Arizona $2.70 a hundred pounds was paid for
26picking while in South Carolina the rate was $1.25.
Although Kravis has shown some differences in hourly earnings be­
tween import-competing and export commodities, there is a close relation­
ship between wages for comparable jobs in an area regardless of which 
commodity the workers are producing. The wage rates may tend to remain 
lower in some pursuits, but labor does have some mobility. If industry 
moves into a basically agricultural area with a low wage scale, there 
will be demands for wage increases. This is well illustrated by wages 
paid for picking cotton. During World War II when industries made in­
creased use of southern areas for producing industrial products, cotton 
pickers in the plantation areas of Arkansas and Mississippi were paid
more than after the war. Cotton prices were higher following the war
27but war stimulated industrial production had diminished.’' The com­
petition between agriculture and industry for labor has resulted in a 
steady migration from some states to others, as well as from farms to 
the city.
Although wage rates have increased faster in the South than through-
^Ducoff, ojQ. cit., Table 14, p. 32.
26Ibid., Table 15, p. 34.
2^J. Lewis Henderson, "In the Cotton Delta," Survey Graphic.
XXXVI, No. 1 (January 1947), p. 51.
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out the entire nation, the South still has the lowest wages. Among 
the cotton-producing states, California and Arizona have had the high­
est wage scales. The South in 1943* while using nearly half of the 
hired farm labor, paid wages averaging not much over half the rates paid 
in the remainder of the country,"^ The nature of the labor force in the 
South, largely unskilled, may be one of the reasons that wage scales 
have not advanced as rapidly in the South as in other areas.
Cotton, rice, and tobacco are commodities generally produced in 
the low-paying area, whereas the small grains are a product, for the 
most part, of the Midwest and West where wages are generally higher. 
Similarly in the case of fruit, high-wage California alone produces 45 
per cent of the nation’s fruit. The location of the production of com­
modities may be a more important factor in determining wage scales than 
the fact that the commodity is exported, or is an import-competing one. 
Thus if a commodity is produced in an area of greater labor shortage, the 
pressure to substitute capital for labor is likely to be greater than 
it is in an area where abundant labor at low wages is available.
The rate of pay per hour or per day has less effect on ability of 
a product to compete with imports or to obtain export markets than does 
the efficient use of manpower and capital in its production. Wages tend 
to vary with location and according to the degree of competition for 
workers. Table VIII shows that the geographic distribution of wage rates 
is such that agricultural wages in some areas are more than twice as 
much as in others. Yet the same crop is often produced in both areas.
The relative changes in the indexes of wage rates as between areas have
23Ducoff, Wages of Agricultural Labor in the United States, 
pp. 13, 32-34.
TABLE VIII
INDEX OF WAGE RATES; ANNUAL FARM WAGE RATES; WAGE RATS PER. MONTH WITHOUT 
BOARD FOR 1910 AND 1953 (1910-1914 =100)
New
England
Middle
Atlantic
East
North
Central
West
North
Central
South
Atlantic
East
South
Central
West
South
Central
Mountain
States
Pacific
States
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
1910 95 96 96 97 95 100 98 99 99
1915 106 104 104 105 100 96 101 102 102
1920 224. 235 225 238 243 230 246 214 228
1925 200 203 171 152 183 158 154 142 173
1930 203 195 156 145 157 141 139 143 174
1935 137 113 92 85 101 91 92 95 113
1940 152 140 126 106 124 107 108 112 136
1941 175 173 161 143 137 119 126 148 167
1942* 233 216 196 185 171 158 175 I84 241
1943 282 265 245 247 ' 218 201 234 245 328
1944 314 302 279 290 259 263 285 291 372
1945 344 331 30S 326 296 265 324 321 401
1946 367 367 340 342 838 295 344 336 418
1948 415 422 405 400 381 341 395 386 447
1950 440 435 443 454 484 399 455 420 424
1951 496 485 501 504 546 453 507 464 463
1952 524 513 534 536 572 471 538 494 488
1953 542 530 549 546 589 470 533 494 497
1954 543 529 544 538 582 A56 527 484 494
1955** 564 538 554 541 592 471 542 501 504
1910 $ 35.90 $ 32.27 $ 31.88 $ 36.28 $ 19.75 $ 20.28 $ 23.83 $ 44.87 $ 47.21
1953 $204.33 1187.87 $180.99 $204.04 $122.16 $ 95.28 $129.57 $224.89 $236.95
■K'Data for 1910 through 1942 taken from Farm Wage Rates, Farm Employment. and Related Data, Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, USDA (Washington, D. C., 1943).
*-*Date for 1943 through 1955 taken from Tables of Farm Wage Rates, Agricultural Statistics, USDA 
(Washington, D. C., 1945-1956).
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not been very noticeable. The areas that were high paying have remained 
so, and the areas that were low are still low. The East South Central 
area appears to have lost some ground as have also the Mountain States 
and the Pacific States. The South Atlantic area has advanced relative 
to other areas but still remains second lowest in wage rates.
The increasing demand for labor, while not greatly changing the 
agricultural wage scale by areas, has, however, narrowed the gap be­
tween wages for agricultural and industrial jobs. The wages of all 
private industries increased by 323 per cent between 1939 and 1956.
Manufacturing wages increased by 336 per cent while agricultural wages
2°increased by 427 per cent. ' In order far farm products to remain at 
the same ratio in the demand schedule of foreign buyers as manufactured 
items, it would appear that the substitution of capital for labor in the 
production of farm crops must be rapid enough to offset the faster in­
crease in farm wages than in manufacturing wages. In other words, the 
productivity of farm output should be increasing more rapidly than in­
dustry, or else the demand for agricultural exports may be expected to 
decrease relative to industrial exports. The lack of such an increase 
in agricultural productivity as would be necessary to make United States 
agricultural goods relatively less attractive to foreign buyers than 
other industrial goods could be a strong force leading to demands for ex­
port subsidies and dumping.
An argument often advanced by agricultural interests in favor of 
subsidizing exports is the need for protection against cheap foreign 
labor. Mr. Brinkley, Executive Vice President of the National Council
^The Economic Almanac 195&, p* 291.
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of Farmer Cooperatives, maintains that "we have cost burdens on pro­
ducers in this country that producers in other countries do not have,
30such as our high wage structure. . This is true, but we also
have the greatest efficiency in production, which tends to offset high 
wages. What should probably be pointed out is that whenever the nature 
of a crop's production precludes mechanization we are incapable of sub­
stituting capital for labor in order to increase efficiency of output, 
and this burdens us with higher relative wage costs than the costs met 
by foreign producers of the same crop, if they have a greater relative 
supply of labor. Where this situtaion exists labor should be assisted 
in moving to an area where it can be productive, rather than rely upon 
an attempt to protect it against imports made with the use of cheap for­
eign labor.
Any attempt to protect inefficiently produced domestic crops and 
dump them abroad at the discretion of the treasury rather than to let 
them depend on their competitive merits is likely to aggravate the mal- 
allocation of manpower. Wages for such wasted effort are more apt to 
be determined by the going wage scale of the area than by the produc­
tivity of such labor. In consequence, the ability of the economy to 
readjust its productive factors would be hampered, and this is in con­
flict with the objectives of increased standards of living and effi­
ciency.
Import-Competing Industries
In addition to exports of capital-intensive farm commodities that 
are efficient enough that many producers can compete in world trade,
30
Brinkley, ojj. cit.. p. 3&9.
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there are capital-intensive crops produced in the United States only 
because they receive protection. Among such crops are sugar and some 
food grains which are imported and which provide competition for do­
mestic producers.
Machine-Intensive Crops and Competition
Sugar production can be classed both as capital-intensive (as in 
the case of cane sugar) and hand-intensive (as in the case of beet sugar 
production). Although a great deal has been accomplished in the elimi­
nation of hand labor from beet growing, labor demands are still high. 
This labor demand is found in an area where there is a labor shortage. 
Since the introduction of mechanical harvesting methods in the beet 
fields, the use of 29.5 man-hours per acre has been cut to 5.4- Never­
theless, 28 man-hours per acre are still required for chopping and 
81thinning. During the period of time when labor needs in beet pro­
duction declined from 57.5 to 33.4 man-hours, there has been an increase 
in alternative jobs for labor in the beet producing areas, making labor 
even harder to obtain.
Sugar from cans is produced in Louisiana and Florida in relatively 
small quantities compared, with total demand. After adding the domestic 
supply of beet su^r to domestic cane sugar and imports from United 
States territories, there is need for more to satisfy the demand. The 
Sugar Acts of 1937 and 1948 provided import quotas which allocated spe­
cific quantities to certain producing nations. This method was far more 
effective than a tariff alone, because domestic quotas plus import quo­
tas limit the quantity in such a manner that whatever price is desired
Sugar Beet Mechanization,1 Agricultural Situation. USDA (Wash­
ington, D. C., May 1952), pp. 9-10, 16.
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may be obtained, because of the inelastic nature of the demand for 
sugar. Dr. Piquet states that ending the quota on imports would bring 
United States sugar prices in line with world prices and increase im­
ports substantially, perhaps as much as 100 per cent, Since the quota 
mentioned above allows the United States producers about half of the
domestic market, its abandonment would in effect eliminate domestic pro- 
12duction.
The import-competition of food grains is minor in scope compared 
with exports of such grains, and much of this importation is from Canada, 
which generally is as efficient in grain production techniques as is the 
United States. In addition, the Canadian economy is more closely tied 
to our economy than it is to the British Commonwealth in which Canada 
maintains a dominion status. Imports of wheat from Canada into the 
United States meet quota restrictions, but that country exports to us 
such other grains as barley, oats, and rye, selling them for less than 
the United States support price. Only the tariff rates on these grains 
keep the imports as low as they are,33 The higher price on wheat has 
discouraged production of rye in the United States since World War II, 
and Canada has increased her sales because of this void.3^ This prompt 
gap-filling process is typical of what transpires as the result of close­
ly tied economies.
Inefficiency in Capital-Intensive Production
The production of a given commodity on land unsuited for production 
of that commodity on a. competitive basis with imports, would appear to
^Howard S. Piquet, Aid, Trade and the Tariff (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1953), pp. 63, 196-198.
33Ibid., pp. 22B, 233-235.
3^Ibid., p. 233.
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be an uneconomic use of resources. Nevertheless, import quotas, tariffs, 
and price supports, may permit production at a price above the world price. 
The domestic sugar cane industry depends on protection as capital use has 
been unable to fully offset climatic disadvantages.
The importation of grain, one of the most efficiently produced of 
American agricultural exports, may appear to contradict the law of com­
parative advantage. In such an instance one might be inclined to agree 
that import restrictions are justifiable. But does an industry which on 
the whole is efficient necessarily have all efficient producers? Will 
export subsidies and import restrictions maximize resource utilization?
If some imports can compete with marginal producers, the law of compara­
tive advantage would indicate that these imports should come in and force 
domestic producers to be more efficient in the use of resources. That is, 
marginal producers should not be protected.
Exports and Restrictions on Trade
In Chapter III, for introductory purposes, the major legislation on 
imports was briefly mentioned. It seems appropriate at this point to 
determine what effect this legislation and other trade regulations have 
had on the exportation of agricultural commodities. Such is the task 
of this section. Following a discussion of the historic pattern of 
agricultural exports, the effects of trade restrictions will be differ­
entiated according to their application to capital-intensive as opposed 
to hand-intensive crops. The history of American Tariffs is summarized 
in Figure I which lists the major acts and shows the levels of tax as a 
percentage of dutiable imports. This figure will also be used as a basis 
for comparing quantities of export commodities with tariff rate levels.
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This will be done to show the effects of import restrictions on exports 
of various commodities which require differing proportions of the basic 
factors of production.
Historic Pattern of Agricultural Exports
The effects of tariff and other trade regulation on the various in­
dividual commodities are vrorth examining in order to ascertain which of 
the productive factors is most affected by restrictions on trade. Wheat, 
rice, cotton, oils, and tobacco will now be considered for this purpose. 
Wheat, the leading export among the food grains, has long been de­
pendent upon an export marlset for a very considerable percentage of its 
total production. From the Civil War until World War I, exports of. 
wheat were generally between 12 per.cent and 36 per cent of production. 
The average percentage of production exported between these wars was 
24.9 per cent. Exports increased to 43 per cent in 1920, then steadily 
fell off to less than 1 per cent during the depression. World War II 
increased exports to 12 per cent of total output. It was not until 1945, 
after rehabilitation of the war-torn countires had begun, that exports 
again amounted to a large per cent of output. The percentages ranged 
from 34 per cent to 38 per cent from 1945 to 1949* when they fell to 27 
per cent. The Korean conflict again revived exports to 35 per cent in
1950 and 48 per cent in 1951* Details are shown in Table IX. Since
1951 exports of wheat have returned to normal, if the average for the 
1868-1917 period can be considered normal. If the period 1922 to 1939 
is considered normal, today's exports are about three times as large as 
would be expected. Total production expanded from around 250,000,000 
bushels a year in the 1870*s to around 800,000,000 bushels in the years 
after World War I, Since 1944* production has been around a billion
TABLE IX
Wheat^ Rice
EXPORTS
,1 Cotton^- Tobacco"*"
Unmanufactured
Exports
1,000
bushels
Exports as 
percent of 
production
Exports
1,000
bags
Imports
1,000
bags
Exports as 
percent of 
production
Exports
1,000
bales
Exports as 
percent of 
production
Exports
1,000
pounds
Exports as 
percent of 
production
1866 12,647 6.4 1,324 51.2
1870 52,547 20.5 2,894 66.4
1880 188,308 37.5 4,409 66.6
1890 109,01? 24.3 5,859 67.7
1900 220,653 36.8 6,800 67.1
1910 70,119 11.4 487 3,382 4 8,027 69.1 399,030 34.9
1920 369,538 43.8 7,142 1,568 31 5,973 44.5 563,958 37.4
1930 111,996 12.6 4,552 575 23 7,133 51.2 633,531 38.4
1935 4,415 .7 1,369 947 8 6,267 58.9 473,187 36.3
1940 33,848 4.2 5,651 334 23 1,174 9.3 189,075 12.9
1945 390,588 34.4 11,469 127 37 3,678 40.8 595,523 29.9
1950 366,145 35.9 13,167 787 34 4,280 42.7 523,605 25.8
1954- 274,289 27.8 14,385 64 22 3,585 26.2 515,195 23.0
1955, 260,000 27.8
1956^ 451,000 45.2
^Yearbook of Agriculture 1935 and Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Yearbook 1956.
2
Bales 500 pounds each.
3
^The Economic Almanac 1955. P • 45.
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35bushels a year.
Rice, although historically unimportant in foreign trade in the 
western hemisphere, is a small grain that has become increasingly im­
portant in the export pattern of the United States since World War II. 
Before World War II, North America produced only about 1 per cent of 
the rice entering world trade. After World War II, Asia, a pre-war ex­
port area, had become an importer. The United States, which had become 
a net exporter in 1919 in the period after World War I, began to expand 
output tremendously after World War II. By 1948 exports had tripled 
those of 1940, and when Korea became dependent on United States imports, 
exports were five tine s that of 1940.^^ The stimulation of the rice 
exports of the United States, over the years, appears to have occurred 
after wars as a result of the United States being committed to aid Allies 
rather than from any ability to compete economically in the long run with 
other rice-producing areas. Cuba, a heavy user of rice, depended upon 
United States production when World War II cut off her sources of supply. 
Korea and Japan both became heavy importers of rice from the United 
States when China ceased to supply Japan and the civil war curtailed 
Korean production. In 1954 Korea, discontinued imports of rice and again 
became self-sufficient. Whether or not the high degree of mechanisation 
has made American rice production efficient enough to compete in world 
markets cannot yet be answered as the bulk of our exports have been under 
government programs.
35^ The percentages of domestic production figures are from the Year­
book of Agriculture 1935. Statistics of Grains, USDA (Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1935), Table 1, p. 349; Foreign 
Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit., Table 
and The Economic Almanac 12£8, op. cit.. p. 46.
3 F^oreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, og. cit., 
Table 56, p. 45, and Efferson, The Production and Marks ting of Rice, pp. 
39—465 also see Table 4, p. Ill*
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The United States has been a major exporter of cotton ever since 
the introduction of the cotton gin permitted the economical separation 
of seeds from the fiber. As soon as the Civil War ended, the South 
again depended upon exports for disposal of the largest part of its 
cotton crop. As shown in Table IX, cotton exports increased steadily 
from 1866 until 1898. From-1899 until 1911 exports were about the same, 
1911' was a banner year with 11 million bales exported. After 1911 cot­
ton exports gradually decreased until 1917, when just over 4 million 
bales were exported. Between World War I and World War II exports gen­
erally varied between 3 and 9 million bales a year. Representative of 
the post-war years is the period 1948-1951, during which exports were 
less than 4 million bales per year.^^ This post-war period of relative­
ly small exports was when most of mechanization of cotton production took 
place. It was also the period of high price support levels.
Vegetable oils also appear to have been a decreasing export commodi­
ty from 1910 until 1934. Lard, on the other hand, had increasing demands 
in foreign markets from 1910 until 1923-1924, followed by a steadily de­
clining market until after World War I I . Since World War II oils and 
fats have occupied an increasingly important place in the export pattern 
of American agricultural commodities, as is shown in Table X. The de­
velopment of mechanized soybean culture in the United States and the use 
of detergents probably accounted for some of the recent increase in ex­
ports .
-^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, ojc. cit..
Table 231, p. 199, and Yearbook of Agriculture 1935. op. cit., Table 
113, pp. 425-426. Table 98, p. 146 shows,cotton exports and exports 
as a percentage of production for selected years.
38
Yearbook of Agriculture 1935. op. cit., Table 447, p. 636, and 
Table 452, p. &6l.
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TABLE X
FATS, OILSEEDS, AND OILS; 
UNITED STATES EXPORTS, 1,000 TONS
Commodity
1935-36 1945-49
Averages 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Edible
Vegetable Oils 41 174 352 454 293 287 638
Industrial Oils 1 15 47 46 28 46 317
Animal Fats 97 312 520 629 709 842 854
Marine Oils 1 a 36 25 23 54 71
Total
United States 140 509 957 1,154 1,053 1,229 1,880
Per Cent of 
World Total 2 13 15 IS IS 19 26
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA (Wash­
ington, D . C ., 1956), Table 219, p. 179.
Exports of tobacco, the major export crop still lacking a high de­
gree of mechanization, have consistently been smaller percentagewise 
since the depression of the 1930’s than before; but since 1945 those ex­
ports have been of about the same absolute size as before the depression* 
Domestic use, however, has nearly doubled since the depression, notvdth- 
standing the recent cancer scare.
Correlation of Exports with Restrictions on Imports
Perry has demonstrated in his work the effects of tariffs on exports 
of agricultural products. The volume of exports grew at a lesser rate 
or actually declined every time protective tariffs were in force.
Perry shows clearly the detrimental effects of import tariffs on 
agricultural exports, and traces this relationship from the beginning
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of the nation until 1908, 7 Since the publication of his book other, 
even more effective measures have been devised for limiting imports.
These were mentioned in Chapter III, Mainly, they include import quotas, 
import licensing, exchange controls, and price controls.
According to Johnson much of the recent restrictive legislation may
be attributed to attempts to protect agriculture,
"Over the last fifteen years various sections of and 
amendments to agricultural legislation have contained 
provisions for the control of and use of export sub­
sidies or dumping, import quotas and import fees, and 
and compensating import and processing taxes have been 
added as a part of the Internal Revenue Code to provide 
additional protection for certain agricultural products, 
principally fats and oils. , . .Import quotas have been 
applied in the case of cotton, wheat, and sugar. "40
Using the level of tariffs and plotting the percentage level of tar­
iffs to value of exports as a base, it is interesting to note the con­
trast in these fluctuations when compared with fluctuations of exports 
of various commodities. Figure H  shows the fluctuations in wheat ex­
ports. During the period when the West was growing rapidly, exports did 
not increase as rapidly as output, and the tariff rate was high and of 
a protective nature until the time of Wilson’s administration. With 
the lowering of the tariff under that administration, exports of wheat 
tripled. Then after the Republican high tariff and other restrictive 
measures were instituted to protect American industry and agriculture, 
exports fell to only a small fraction of their former levels. By World 
War II the United States had practically withdrawn from the world mar­
ket although tariffs had been lowered. Since World War II most exports
^Perry, 0£. cit., pp. 9-48.
40D. Gale Johnson, "Reconciling Agricultural and Foreign Trade Poli­
cies," The Journal of Political Economy. LV (December 1947)> PP» 567-568.
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have been subsidized and large quantities sent to the Allies and oc­
cupied territories that were attempting to rehabilitate. So the rapid 
increase is therefore not to be attributed entirely to the lowering of 
tariff rates. This is evident in an examination of the fluctuations 
affecting several individual commodities.
Figure III compares the fluctuations of cotton export quantities 
with the tariff rates. There was a steady rate of growth from the Civil 
War until after 1900. Cotton exports fell off rapidly when war started 
in Europe in 1914, but had almost regained pre-war levels when the de­
pression occurred and the high tariff levels of 1930 were instituted.
The depression probably was the major factor in the subsequent decline, 
but the high tariff of 1930 was enacted at the same time cotton exports 
were declining rapidly. Since World War II cotton exports, although 
subsidized by the government, have never been as important as during any 
other period since the turn of the century.
Figure IV shows the fluctuations in tobacco exports. Since 1890, 
decreasing tariffs appear to correlate with increases in tobacco ex­
ports and vice versa. This commodity, as noted earlier, has an in­
elastic demand and the fluctuations are not as violent as in the case of 
wheat or cotton.
Relying on the findings of Mr. Perry and the three commodity com­
parisons shown here, it seems safe to conclude that import restrictions 
generally mean fewer exports of domestic farm commodities. Conversely, 
lower rates seem to stimulate exports of these commodities.
Shifts from Production of Efficiently-Produced Export Crops to Other 
Commodities.
When an export crop that is well suited to the combination of pro­
ductive factors in a given locale loses much of its foreign market,
FIGURE III 
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alternative crops must be produced and domestic consumption stimulated, 
or land must be retired from cultivation. The commodity that normally 
goes into the export market under competitive conditions is usually the 
one that makes the best use of productive factors. And in some instances 
small farms specializing in an export commodity and having little or no 
flexibility are apt to be hurt much more than larger concerns with a 
greater degree of flexibility.
If we must use mechanized production methods in agriculture to re­
main efficient, and the trend from mule to tractor would indicate that 
this is so in the following must accompany increasing mechanization:
(l) enlargement of the acreage base of the farm operation; (2) an in­
crease in the technology of production methods on existing acreages; or
(3) a decrease in the amount of labor used in similar farming processes.^ 
The loss of exports would have the effect of cutting total acreage and 
increasing the amount of labor on the same acreage on those farms which 
are too small to produce alternative commodities. Farms large enough to 
shift production would, of course, still be less efficient when the new 
commodity is not as well adapted to the productive factors as the lost 
export crop. In addition, the producers for domestic markets would face 
increased competition and depressed prices when the export producer shifts 
to domestic commodities.
Except for the present, with policy now aimed at liquidating sur­
pluses, agricultural exports have been declining for a number of years
^ •Family Farms in a Changing Economy. (Washington, Agricultural 
Research Service, March 1957)/p. 57.
^Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit., 
Table 1, p. 1. And The Economic Almanac 1958. p. 48. The use of current 
dollars fail3 to show a decline. It is only when constant dollars are 
used that a value decrease is evident.
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that agriculture, generally, may not remain a 
labor-intensive occupation."^ 3
The advantages which American exports enjoy are, in Humphrey's 
opinion, generally due to a high degree of capital utilization. Thus, 
the expectations for future trade are for a decrease in agricultural 
exports or an increase in imports which are not adaptable to machine 
cultivation. Conversely, if the United States is to remain a major 
exporter of agricultural commodities, the crops most likely to make 
up these exports, in the long run, would be those capable of using 
capital with a great deal of efficiency. The short-run pattern may 
be different as long as there remains a great deal of under-employ­
ment in cotton, tobacco, and other export crops. It is possible, of 
course, that price supports will not remain an unalterable bar to even­
tual use of equilibrium forces to allocate resources and increase 
efficiency.
Capital-Intensive Crops and Exports
Wheat production, as has already been noted, has been particular­
ly adpated to conditions found in America and historically has been a 
major item of export. Because America has had relatively high cost la­
bor, capital has been substituted whenever possible. England, unable 
to use extensive farming methods was unable to compete and repealed the 
Corn Laws in 1846 in order to import from America, and other areas that 
produced wheat cheaper, '-‘/heat production continues to adopt capital 
using production methods and wheat is a major export item.
JO
Don D. Humphrey, "Forces of Disequilibrium and World Disorder," 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (Washington, D. C., 
December 1953)* pp. 553-554*
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Another significant shift in the pattern of our trade was mani­
fested by the beef export industry* which flourished in the United 
States as long as the frontiers were open to extensive use of range 
lands. The United States had a comparative advantage over all other 
producers until the advent of refrigeration. The reason for this ad­
vantage was that the major importing nation, England, was too far from 
any other basic producing area. As the population of the United States 
grew, as homesteaders blocked the open i,western rangeland, and with the 
advent of refrigerated shipments of meat, the United States lost its 
advantage. By 1908' Argentina was supplying 64 per cent of England’s 
beef imports.^ By 1913 the United States became a net importer of
beef products and has remained so except during periods when war stimu-
45lation temporarily increased exports.  ^ In the case of beef exports, 
the use of capital (refrigeration) by competitors forced a reduction in 
the amount of American exports.
Cotton exports had grown steadily until just prior to World liar I. 
Then world conditions and possibly foreign resistance to the high tariff 
levels of the United States caused exports to be reduced. After the war,
jt
cotton exports almost reached their former level before increasing tariffs 
and price support programs plus general world disequilibrium again caused 
a reduction of exports. During this unstable period between wars mechan­
ical advancements began to affect cotton culture.
^International Institute of Agriculture, International Trade in 
Meat (Rome, Italy: Villa Umberto I, 1936), pp. 21-22.
^Lynn Ramsey Edminster, The Cattle Industry and the Tariff (New 
York: J. J. Little and Ives Company, 1926), p. 48. During World War
II the United States was temporarily a net exporter of beef products. 
Today certain of the beef products are exported while others are im­
ported.
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An absolute decline in exports of agricultural products is to be expect­
ed when the stimulus of war and rehabilitation ceases* This, of course, 
will inevitably increase the competitive pressure on the commodities not 
dependent upon exports for a market or call for a program of dumping.
It would seem that as much as possible of the war-stimulated export mar­
ket should be maintained, if possible, by reducing barriers against im­
ports rather than by the use of dumping.
The domestic agricultural support programs, by their continuation 
of. "floors”, are a major factor in the decline of exports. These 
government "floor" prices, which have been shown to be above the cost 
of production of many producers, exclude exports on a competitive basis 
and lead to dumping when an attempt is belatedly made to recapture a 
lost export market.
The Shifting Pattern of 
United States Agricultural Exports
Humphrey points out some major influences on the general pattern
of our agricultural exports as follows:
"As a general rule, America's comparative advan­
tage lies increasingly in capital-intensive 
industries which are, also, the growth indus­
tries, ... To the extent that imports create 
additional agricultural exports, these can gen­
erally be provided by existing underemployed 
resources in tobacco, cotton and certain other 
export crops. Moreover, agricultural exports are 
already distended by foreign aid and American con­
sumers will not buy much more food and fiber simply 
because aid is reduced. The long term trend, as 
indicated by the decline of agricultural exports 
relative to total exports, seems to be in the 
direction of reducing our comparative advantage in 
agriculture, generally. It is possible that this 
trend has been interrupted by mechanization and
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The mechanization of cotton production has developed since support 
programs have become a factor in the pricing of cotton. As long as the 
administered price level channels cotton into government warehouses rath­
er than into foreign trade at world prices, there will be little oppor­
tunity to determine whether efficient production, of itself, will be able 
to recapture lost export markets. As it is, exports of cotton are just 
as likely to be from a high-cost operation as from a low-cost one. As 
long as supports and quotas determine price and acreage in cultivation, 
there will be little chance for efficiency in cotton production to de­
termine the export pattern. The factor that is more likely to determine 
export levels is the output of competing nations at prices below United 
States support levels or the dumping policy that is used in order to re­
duce the "surplus" of American cotton. In addition to foreign cotton 
competition, the competition of synthetic fibers and paper must be con­
sidered in predicting future export patterns.^ The ability of poten­
tial import nations to obtain necessary foreign exchange to pay for 
American cotton may also be a major factor affecting the quantity of 
cotton exports.
Hand-Intensive Crops and Exports
As was shown above, the production of cotton is both hand- and 
capital-intensive. That is, some farms make maximum use of mechanical 
implements to reduce hand labor, while others still follow age-old 
production methods of man and mule. In any event, different factor 
combinations are used to produce a homogenous product. The lesser ef­
ficiency of hand-intensive culture might be said to be indicated alone
^Benedict, op. cit., pp. 33y 43-45
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by the rapid change from men to capital in the past few years. The 
picking of cotton was entirely by hand until 1926, when the cotton 
stripper began to take the place of human pickers. It was not until 
1948 that successful use was made of cotton picking machines. Never­
theless, cotton was successfully holding its share of the export market 
before mechanization started.
Since the advent of mechanical harvesting and cultivation, cotton 
has been losing its place in world markets. As mentioned above, sup­
port programs have not helped American cotton hold its place In the 
world market. Synthetic fibers have begun to compete for its customers. 
Industry moved to the South in ever increasing magnitude during and after 
World War II and this increased mobility affected the demand for harvest 
hands in such a way as to force labor costs up in the areas that have 
long been dependent on cheap hand labor in the production of cotton.
Tobacco farming, as contrasted to cotton production, is one field 
of agricultural endeavor which has not yet been able to make use of any 
appreciable substitution of capital for labor. In fact, most tobacco 
farms are so small that it would be uneconomic to attempt mechanization. 
The average size of tobacco plots is about 2 acres for each farm unit.^,':, 
On such small plots the necessary capital investment far a tractor 
would not pay for its saving in labor. The farms producing tobacco 
usually are small, 15 to 30 acres, and they depend on general farming 
as well as on the small tobacco plot which is the chief source of cash.
^J. E. Thigpen, Director, Tobacco Branch, Production and Marketing 
Administration, USDA, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee 
on Forestry and Agriculture, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 
United States Senate, £3rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953)> p. 81S.
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Larger farm units would be more suitable for mechanization* but the 
large amount of hand labor required to produce a crop of tobacco limits 
the size of tobacco plots and limits the time that can be spared to till 
the other crops. Largely by reason of the nature of the work of tending 
and harvesting tobacco* the tractor could not be utilized at the peak 
season of labor use. Tractor use would there foie not materially reduce 
labor costs* but it would certainly increase capital investment, an 
investment which would not pay for itself by means of a reduction of 
other eosts.^
American production of tobacco is making no appreciable headway 
toward mechanization as contrasted with production changes in most ex­
port industries. But the major reason for the limitation on our for­
eign sales of tobacco is the lack of dollars on the part of foreign 
buyers rather than a decline in our comparative advantage with respect 
to that crop. Comparisons with foreign produced tobaccos are difficult 
because of differences in the types of tobacco raised. Experience has 
established the fact that* where, there is available foreign exchange*
American tobacco will very frequently be purchased in preference to 
49other tobacco. 7 The pattern for exports would thus seem to depend on 
the purchasing ability of consuming countries. American tobacco pro­
ducers are heavy users of hand labor* yet the efficiency with which 
that labor is used appears to be enhanced by reason of the comparative­
ly high quality of the tobacco produced. Tobacco, in fact seems to be
^Street* 0£. cit.. pp. 230-231.
49J. C. Lanier, A Statement in the hearings before the Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
United States Senate* Washington* D. C., 83rd Congress* (1953)j 
pp. 824-827.
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the major exception to the generalization that American agricultural 
exports will need to substitute capital for labor in order to remain 
competitive in world markets.
Summary
By way of a recapitulation of the major generalizations to be de­
rived from this chapter are four statements which might be made to serve 
as guides to policy affecting foreign trade in agricultural products.
(1) Leading export crops tend to be more efficiently produced than 
most crops, if agricultural efficiency, like industrial efficiency, can 
be measured in terms of man-hour returns.^ Since costs are determined 
to such a large extent by the relative scarceness of the factors of 
production, efficiency in American agriculture is generally higher in 
the production of those commodities which are adaptable to the condi­
tions of the land on which they are grown, and which are readily pro­
duced with a high degree of mechanization. Tobacco production affords 
one of the most notable exceptions to this general rule.
(2) Internal price support programs act as a deterrent to exports 
when the price floor is above world price levels. Once established, a 
price support program through which the government takes ownership and 
has its sales abroad limited to these which can be made at higher than 
world prices eliminates even the most efficient producers from the ex­
port market. When the government is burdened with unsold quantities
-^Professor Kravis in his article "Wages and Foreign Trade," pre­
viously cited, shows the correlation between industrial export items and 
their relatively high man-hour returns based on Bureau of Labor Statis­
tics input-output studies of 1947 and 1952. However, the findings of 
hourly earnings in agricultural commodity production in this same arti­
cle are based upon prices relative to input costs, which would tend to 
show the crops with the highest support price, and which make the great­
est relative use of productive land, due to acreage limitations, as the 
most efficiently produced.
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of commodities, pressure to dump surpluses on foreign markets is ap­
plied. The alternative actions involve the use of marketing quotas or 
acreage restrictions.
(3) Wages paid for any one crop’s production are determined more 
by the worker's alternatives than by any margin of production that could 
be attributed to him. Where wage rates are high relative to output, the 
tendency for the substitution of capital or to shift production to other 
crops is strengthened. Attempts to subsidize hand-intensive export pro­
ducers often leads to dumping. The need of protection for the purpose 
of subsidizing capital-intensive crops is also a burden on the economy.
(4 ) Historically, the exporting of agricultural goods has shown 
an inverse relationship between quantity exported and degree of protec­
tion from imports. The exports lost because of protectionist actions 
are generally the commodities most efficiently produced, or those most 
highly capital-intensive. The loss of exports means increased com­
petition for domestic markets and thus has a depressing effect on do­
mestic price levels. Such a loss also means a loss of production 
efficiency by reason of a shifting to crops less adaptable to the re­
sources which are available.
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CHAPTER V
HAND-INTENSIVE CROPS AND RESTRICTIONS
Some of the hand-intensive crops that will be dealt with in this 
chapter were included among the capital-intensive commodities of the 
preceding chapter. The reason for inclusion of these crops in both 
chapters is that, for one and the same crop, widely different pro­
duction methods are used. Variation in methods is frequently dictat­
ed by differences in sets of circumstances under which production takes 
place.
Domestic Output of Chief Import-Competing Crops 
In this chapter, as in Chapter IV, Table 8 in the article "Wages 
and Foreign Trade" by Professor Kravis will be used as the basis for 
determining major import-competing and major export commodities.^
Man-Hour Returns of Leading Import-Competing Crops
There is very little contrast between the man-hour returns of import-
competing and export commodities, for practically all the major export
commodities are also import-competing. When weighted by their importance
in the trade pattern, however, it can be seen that the leading import-
competing industries do not return as high hourly earnings as do the ex- 
2
port crops. Again, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 
-*-5upra, TableIV, p. 106.
^Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Table 9, p. 30. The work by 
Kravis, as noted on page 124, was based .on Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
input-output studies of 1947 and 1952, as far as industrial efficiency 
was concerned. The efficiency findings, as far as agricultural commod­
ities are concerned, were originated by Kravis who used raw data fur­
nished by the U.S.D.A. This, of course, would tend to show a high degree 
of correlation between crops with a high support price and efficiency.
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inability of freedom of market price to operate as a determinant of 
production may be as much a causal factor in determining hourly earn­
ings as is efficient use of resources.
Inefficient producers are those -who are unable to make use of the 
given factors in a combination which would allow them to enjoy a compara­
tive advantage in competition with other producers. Comparative advan­
tage, according to Humphrey, lies increasingly in capital-intensive 
industries, which are also the growth industries. Our comparative 
disadvantage, on the other hand, is increasingly concentrated in the 
labor-intensive branches of agriculture which suffer from relatively 
stagnant markets. The same writer insists that America's import prob­
lem may be attributed to under-employment, especially in southern 
agriculture. In spite of some alleviation of under-employment in that 
area, agriculture is not yet able to absorb the workers who would be
•3
displaced by increased imports.^
As for the effects that foreign trade would have on the effective 
use of manpower if restrictions are eased, Johnson points out the 
following. Freeing trade would have little or no direct effect on the 
number of job opportunities in agriculture. However, shifts would 
occur within agriculture Twith losses in some import-competing crop pro­
duction and some gains in the export commodities. Estimates show that 
protected products account for about 15 per cent of labor requirements 
in farming while export branches account for 30 per c e n t A s  the ex­
port commodities have been shown to have a higher per man-hour return
•^ Humphrey, "Forces of Disequilibrium and World Disorder", pp. 553-
554.
^D. Gale Johnson, Trade and Agriculture (New York: John Wiley and
sons, 1950), pp. 52-53.
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than those receiving protection, agriculture, as a whole, would be 
better off even if jobs did not increase in numbers in response to the 
easing of trade restrictions.
Any shift due to easing of trade restrictions, however, could be 
toward increased sales of industrial prodiicts to foreign countries in 
order to balance increased imports, and not toward an increase in sales 
of agricultural exports. If such were to happen, agricultural unemploy­
ment would increase and thus make farming an even less favorable compet­
itor of industry for capital and labor utilization. Because the labor 
used in rural areas seems, to be slow in moving to industrial employment, 
the areas most affected by increasing imports of competitive, hand­
intensive commodities would suffer increasing unemployment, and indus­
tries producing for the enlarged export market would make greater 
demands on a limited supply of industrial employees.
If it were possible to shift workers off the farm as fast as their 
crop could be displaced by cheaper imports of competing commodities, it 
would make possible an increase in non-farm employment and general liv­
ing standards.^ With less labor called for, increased adjustments in 
capital use, larger farm units, and. less pressure on land prices, farms 
would strongly tend to become efficient in resource utilization at a 
much accelerated rate, or cease to exist as farms. Table XI shows the 
shift away from Glass IV, V, and VI farms and the increase in Class I, 
II, and III farms.
^Don D. Humphrey, American Imports (New York: The Twentieth Cen­
tury Fund, 1955), p. 254o
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TABLE XI
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL FARMS BY ECONOMIC CLASS, 
UNITED STATES, SPECIFIED YEARS 1929-1954
Economic Class 
of Farm-*-
Number
1930
of Farms in 
1940
Thousands
1945 1950 1954
Class I 47 60 91 103 134
Class II 205 252 347 381 449
Class III 560 535 723 721 707
Class IV 1,073 1,015 976 882 811
Class V2 1,274 1,070 367 661 536
Class VI2 1,559 1,233 937 717 463
All Commercial 
Farms 4,723 4,265 3,941 3,465 3,100
Classification of farms by value of sale based on 1954 prices. 
o
""Excludes farms whose operators worked off the farm as much as 100 days 
or those with other income (of operators and family members) greater 
than sales from farm commodities.
SOURCE: Family Farms in a Changing Economy. Agricultural Research Ser­
vice, USDA (Washington, D. C., March 1957), p. 48.
The operators of the larger farms have generally adopted new tech­
niques before the average farm operator. The time lag between invention 
and utilization tends to be fairly short on larger farms which show more 
adaptability to production conditions,^
Assuming that the trend to larger farms is caused by increased pro­
ductivity, and that most of the import-competing commodities have 
producers in all six commercial farm categories, the effect of any in­
crease in imports will be felt most by the Class IF, V, and VI commercial
^Family Farms in a Changing Economy, Agricultural Research Service, 
USDA, op. cit.. p. 48.
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farms. The gains from protection that accrue to the larger, more 
efficient producers will be capitalized into land values. That is 
to say, land will be valued in accordance with artificially maintain­
ed domestic prices and not according to world prices. Land value is 
the result of price-cost relationships. The costs of labor-capital 
inputs relative to price of commodities determine rent and estimations 
of future rents. The expectations of rent, when capitalized, determine 
the value of the land.?
Land use in commercial agriculture where landlord-tenant relation­
ships exist will produce a contract rent whether paid in cash or on 
shares. This rent is a direct payment for the use of land and is often 
determined by the bargaining power of landlords and tenants. Where in­
tense competition arises for tte privilege of using the land, rents will 
be so high that the renter must take reduced wages. This gives the rent­
er a lower standard of living, and the "windfall" rents of landowners 
become converted into land value,0
The statement on land value, as given above, is not amplified to the 
point of taking into account what would arise if the element of absentee 
ownership were not present and an arbitrary division were necessary to 
determine rent and wage returns. Over a period of time this problem 
would be ironed out of itself, as new farmers would buy farms from 
estates and from retiring farmers. Experiences connected both with 
World War I and World War II tended to show that the time period for 
land values to appreciate was relatively short. Table XU shows the lag
7
'Ely and Wehrwein, oj). cit., p. 121. 
®Ibid., pp. 132-133*
of land value changes behind the change in commodity prices between 1940 
and 1956. From 1940 to March 1943, for example, the index of land values 
rose from 82 to 167. During the same interval, the commodity price index 
rose from 101 to 296.
In Table XL1 the land value index shows very little change from 1952 
to 1955 during the period that the commodity price index shows a decline 
of 50 points from 300 to less than 250. With a poorer relationship be­
tween rentals, or returns on land, and commodity ;rices, farmers were 
faced with the problem of increasing output or facing a lower level of 
living. This was especially so fortenants who were farming in an area 
of underemployment of agricultural production factors. With increasing 
disparity between land value and commodity prices, the competition of 
share croppers or renters for land to work would force the major share 
of the loss onto the shoulders of the renter. Under such conditions; 
and with a very high level of industrial employment, the normal reaction 
to expect would be an increase in the movement from farms to industry. 
Table XL1 shows that this movement was under way when the last census of 
agriculture was taken. The less efficient farms were being consolidated, 
and capital was supplanting labor which was shifting into industry.
Protection from foreign production, along with support prices at 
admittedly stimulatory levels since World War II, have tended to retard 
the shifting of resources to more effective utilization.' Economically, 
this action seems as ill-conceived as an attempt to support industry by
9
Present price support levels are considered as being stimulating 
if the AAA levels of 52 to 75 per cent of parity were adequate to re­
store farm incomes to the proper ratio with other income groups as it 
was deemed to be by the administration and Congress in 1933 •
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TABLE XII
INDEX NUMBERS OF LAND VALUES AND COMMODITY PRICES
Year
and
Month
Commodity
Prices-1-
Land
Values2
Year
and
Month
Commodity
Prices
Land
Values
1940 101 82 1949
1941 105 33 March 265 172
1942 July 256 170
March 144 90 Nov. 244 167
July 153 89 1950
Nov. 162 91 March 237 168
1943 July 246 171
March 179 98 Nov. 268 179
July 194 100 1951
Nov. 194 103 March 295 193
1944 July 307 201
March 198 112 Nov. 294 205
July 198“ 115 1952
Nov. 194 117 March 300 211
1945 July 291 213
March 202 124 Nov. 289 212
July 207 128 1953
Nov, 206 130 March 270 209
1946 July 261 207
March 212. 140 Nov. 255 201
July 218 144 1954
Nov. 252 148 March 255 201
1947 July 255 202
March 260 155 Nov. 246 204
July 271 158 1955
Nov. 280 160 March 243 206
1948 July 244 213
March 296 167
July 290 171
Nov. 288 174
Index of prices received by United States farmers, (1910-1914 - 100). 
Indexes shown are an average of the four previous monthly indexes. Cur­
rent data published in monthly price report, agricultural prices (AMS).
21912-1914 - 100, Indexes for 1940 and 1941 are as of March 1. Indexes 
for 1942 and later years are as of March 1, July 1, and November 1.
Data published three times a year in Current Developments in The Farm 
Real Estate Market (ARS).
SOURCE: Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit.. Table 17, p. 64.
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continuing to purchase tanks, guns, shells, battleships, and uniforms at 
the same rate now as during the height of World War II but at prices that 
would give satisfactory incomes to the inefficient manufacturer. This 
protection could have been provided, but what would have happened to 
the shift of resources into production of goods and services that con­
sumers desired? Such a shift would probably never have been made be­
cause the government was in a position to bid up prices for guns and 
tanks. The same is true as far as agricultural production is concern­
ed.
Comparative Wages Paid by Import-Competing Producers
It must be pointed out here, as it was in Chapter IV, that wages 
are not necessarily determined by the effectiveness of the use of labor. 
The scarcity of or abundance of manpower in an area is apt to be more of 
a wage determinant than the relative efficiency of the use of the labor.
A farm that produces 10,000 bushels of wheat and is ranked highest in 
efficiency of resource use would have to pay the same wage to hired help 
who produce hay on the area not allocated to wheat production; yet hay 
is the least productive of the users of productive factors among the 
major import-export agricultural commodities,^ Total wages, because 
of any lessening of domestic production of import-competing crops and 
any increasing of export commodity production, may be less than it was 
before the change was made. This is true because, with mere efficient 
use of factors, less labor and more capital will be used. When less 
labor is used and wages tend to be affected by alternative uses, the 
distribution will give more to capital and less to labor, although 
possibly wage rates will rise a little. The landowners and capital
1QSupra. Table IV, p. 51.
13^
holders will be better off but labor may be hurt. If, however, there is 
full employment, labor would have nothing to fear from imports produced 
in low-wage countries.
Trouble may arise, however, from the fact that much of our agricul­
tural help in rural areas is under-employed and incapable of shifting 
into industrial areas of the economy where we often have "over-full 
employment." Over-full employment exists whenever there is a much 
greater number of vacancies than of people looking- for jobs.^ The 
over-full employment status often occurring in some industries and in 
some areas tends to increase the rate of supplementing capital for la­
bor, and by so doing, the increased technological advancement gives a 
competitive advantage to other countries in those industries which are 
not susceptible to mechanization. This pressure from imports of labor- 
intensive commodities causes import-competing blocs to lobby for greater 
protection. Wage level increases, which are dictated by rapidly advanc­
ing productivity in dynamic industries, leave the relatively stagnant 
home industries less able to compete against imports.
The special interest groups do not emphasize the comparative wage 
rates within the United States. These groups with vested interests com­
pare American farm wage rates against foreign wage rates which are lower. 
Import restrictions and export subsidies are asked on the basis of low 
foreign wages and living standards in import-competing and export indus­
tries .
An example of the arguments given for continued aid for an industry 
that is unable to compete in world trade and is accordingly fearful of 
imports is that given before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1956
11Ohlin, The Problem of Employment Stabilization, p. 6,
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by the Assistant Secretary of the National Milk Producers Association.
"Agriculture is the largest segment of the Ameri­
can economy, and dairying is the largest segment 
of American agriculture. The economy of the 
whole country would be impaired by foreign-trade 
policies which resulted in serious dislocation 
for the American dairy industry.
"During the past 20 years, there has been built 
up in this country an economy which in many re­
spects is above the world level, This is partic­
ularly true with respect to wages, living standards, 
and costs of production. In order to keep the 
prices which farmers receive reasonably related 
to the cost of the things that farmers buy, and 
thus maintain the purchasing power of this impor­
tant segment of the economy, the prices of many 
agriculture commodities must be maintained at 
levels substantially above world price levels.
"As long as this condition exists, effective 
import controls will be necessary to prevent the 
dumping of world surpluses on our shores, and 
some form of export price adjustment ’will be need­
ed to permit American agricultural products to 
move in world trade at competitive prices in suf­
ficient volume to retain a fair share of the world 
markets.
This is the type of argument given by most vested interest groups 
that wish to continue using too many resources to produce too few con­
sumer goods relative to alternative uses for capital and labor. The 
figures which are used in such arguments to prove the plight of the 
producer to be so much below other segments are averages which relate 
to Class IV, V, VI commercial farms, and non-commercial farms. No 
mention is made of the adequate incomes of Class I, II, and III farmers; 
or the under-employment of resources in Class IV, V, and VI; or the liv- 
ing-in-the-country aspect of the million and a half non-commercial rural 
homes listed as "other farms."
12Patrick B. Healy, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit­
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF 
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, House of Repre­
sentatives, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C., {l95^)i P* 508.
136
First, it should be noted that purchasing power would be higher, 
not lower, for the nation if resources were not under-employed in agri­
cultural pursuits. At the same time that resources have been under­
employed in much agricultural production, there has been over-full 
employment in certain industrial areas.
Secondly, if agricultural prices are above world prices with too 
much of the nation’s resources allotted to agriculture, American con­
sumers must pay higher prices than would otherwise be necessary to buy 
the unwanted quantities which high prices beget. Instead of being 
solved, the problem of uneconomic production will be perpetuated, in 
part, because of a continued plea to stop foreign nations dumping in our 
market and because of a sustained pressure in favor of our dumping in 
their markets. The misdirected use of resources, if continually and 
adequately subsidised, will forever preclude their shift to an economic 
use where productivity would allow high returns to the factors. The 
income problem will not be solved for the marginal producers, yet wind­
fall gains will be had by many.
Historic Pattern of Import-Competing Commodities
Wool was the oldest of the hand-intensive commodities, although 
additionally a land-intensive commodity, to seek and receive import 
restrictions. Sugar producers also were early in their demands for 
protection, and when protection was first sought, cane production m s  
hand-intensive. Now, however, domestic cane sugar producers have shift­
ed to machines to replace labor which has become relatively more 
expensive.
Imports of wool made up about one-third of the amount used by 
domestic processors in 1910. This share increased to about three-
13?
fifths in 191S but dropped to about one-eighth in 1932. After 1939 im­
ports increased to about three-fourths of that used during the last
13years of World War II* Since the end of the war, quotas and tariff 
restrictions have not been able to materially stimulate sheep growing 
and wool production. Western grazing lands have been too profitably 
engaged in cattle production to return to sheep grazing, although 
imports of wool carry a tariff rate of 25 l/2 cents per clean pound, 
"More than half of domestic wool production has been displaced by im­
ports without injury because cattle raising, dairying, and other types 
of farming offered profitable alternatives."^ Figure V shows the re­
lationship between wool imports and wool prices. When wool prices went 
down, imports declined, and when prices went up, imports were generally 
increased. From this information it may be deduced that price declines 
were not caused by imports.
Tobacco cannot properly be included in this section on import- 
competing commodities, because tobacco which enters United States 
markets from foreign sources is not import-competing but is made up of 
specialty types that the United States does not produce.
Palm oil and coconut oil compete with domestically produced oils. 
Although the palm and coconut oil imports are hand-intensive, they are 
for the most part competing with capital-intensive domestic oils from 
sources other than palm and coconut trees. Coupled with increasing 
productivity in soybean, peanut, and cottonseed oil production, there 
has been a change in demand from soap to detergents within the United
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o£. cit., 
Table 2<5o~ p. 229.
"^Humphrey, American Imports. p. 47S.
FIGURE V
WOOL IMPORTS, PRICE OF WOOL IN CENTS
IMPORTS MIL. POUNDS 
1000
750
500
250
T / _ji t y // i /
PRICE PER POUND 
50*
Imports 
\
s / \
1925 1930 1935 1940 19^ 5 1950 1955
40*
30*
20*
10*
Sources; Wool prices furnished by the United States Department of Agriculture as presented in the 1953 
Senate Hearings FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.p. 513- The price went to $3.86 a pound 
for cleaned wool in March 1951.
Wool imports were obtained from FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRAuE, Statistical Handbook, USDA, table 
260, p. 229.
139
States, and this has lessened the demand for tallow and grease. While 
the United States yearly exports in fats, oils, and oilseeds have in­
creased from 41*000 tons in 1935-1939 to 638,000 tons in 1954* the total 
world trade excepting that of the United States decreased by 540,000 tons. 
The United States percentage of total world exports increased from 2 per 
cent to 26 per cent in a period of just under twenty years. Imports of 
copra were about one-third higher in 1955 than in 1925-1939; coconut oil
and palm oil imports declined about 50 per cent and 80 per cent respec-
15tively in the same period. Table XIHshows how the United States has 
increased Its exports of oils, fats, and oilseeds as compared with the 
total world exports.
In spite of the optimistic outlook for oils and fats in general, 
tung oil producers asked for protection in 1953 and received it in 1954.^
Imports and Restrictions Placed Thereon 
Special restrictions on imports of agricultural commodities have 
proved embarrassing in many instances where America has attempted to 
assert leadership in international affairs. Quotas and embargoes that 
have provided minimal benefits to farmers have handicapped American lead­
ership. On the other hand, import quotas on commodities that normally 
are leading export crops, such as wheat, make little distortion in nor­
mal trade channels.
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA, o j d . cit., 
Table 219, p. 179- The exports of fats and oils increased markedly in 
1955 and again in 1956. See The Economic Almanac 1958, p. 45.
16Th~irty-Ninth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission 
1955 (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 19."
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TABLE XIII
UNITED STATES AND TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS 
OF FATS, OILS, AND OILSEEDS
Commodity Average Annual in 1,000 Tons
1935-39 1945-49 1950 1952 1954
Edible Vegetable
Oils 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
World Total 1,753 850 1,430 1,210 1,810
United States Total 41 174 352 293 636
Animal Fats
World Total 885 765 1,150 1,250 1,465
United States Total 97 312 520 709 654
Grand Total
World 6,561 4,042 6,201 5,672 7,268
United States 140 509 957 1,053 1,880
United States 
per cent 2 13 15 18 26
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, USDA,
^Washington, D. C., 195&T7 Table 219, p. 179*
Import duties are less offensive to foreign exporters than the 
other protective devices employed to protect domestic producers. The 
tariff, although obstructing imports by making them expensive to Ameri­
can buyers, is non-discriminatory to the export nations. On the other 
hand, allotting import quotas to supplying countries is at best an 
arbitrary action and may prove very discriminatory to certain suppliers. 
This discrimination by arbitrary allotments may be especially distaste­
ful if quotas are based on past import quantities and a certain country 
should wish to enter the market as a newcomer. Argentina has repeat­
edly protested the 1930 sanitary regulations act since it is obvious 
that exclusion of Argentine meat under this act is more than a biolog­
ical measure] and since the application of the act is nationwide, it
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thus includes the disease-free regions as well as areas that have traces 
of certain diseases such as the hoof and mouth affliction.^
Effects on the Status of Protected Producers
In the case of domestic support programs for particular commodities 
■which are normally import-competing, quotas limiting domestic output 
must be coupled with import restrictions. Without such limitations, 
consumers will buy imports to use and pay taxes for government pur­
chases of domestic production.
And in addition, as long as the lower income group of commercial 
farms and other farms are included with the upper income group of farms 
producing a particular commodity, the average income levels are apt to 
indicate a need for protection. With the use of averages based on all 
producers it is difficult to determine if the farms which are efficient 
actually need protection from imports.
With many United States exports categorised as luxury and semi­
luxury items and with basic or primary products making up a smaller 
portion of the American export pattern, tariffs are apt to be more ef­
fective than when primary products made up the bulk of exports. As 
long as American exports are of such a nature that they must be had re­
gardless of the price, tariffs are apt to be lees effective. Of course 
absolute quotas or quarantine will prove protective regardless of the 
highly inelastic demand for American exports. A nation desperately 
desirous of certain goods that the United States produces is going to 
obtain those goods even if it necessitates subsidizing exports of com­
modities to offset the effect of protective tariffs on like American
^Hickman, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
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products. Or if that nation is not permitted to sell its exports in 
the American market, it may be farced to curtail its American imports.
An illustration of this is found in the case of Cuba.
Cuba exports a great deal of sugar to the United States; in fact 
her position is that of residual supplier. In addition to being given 
a rigid quota Cuba is permitted to make up 90 per cent of the deficit 
in American quotas which may be unfilled. Congressional action affords 
protection for the American sugar industry by means of a quantity limi­
tation on Cuban imports. During the past few years the shortage of 
dollar earnings that has resulted from such limitations on Cuba’s chief 
crop has caused that country to save scarce dollars whenever possible.
On land that could profitably be planted to sugar, if the market 
warranted, Cuba is now producing rice. Mr. Reid, President of the Rice 
Millers Association, which represents over 75 per cent of America's rice 
producers, confronted a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Commit­
tee, investigating customs and tariff laws, with the information that 
American rice producers were losing the Cuban market. This market has 
been developing for American suppliers since the war clouds began gath­
ering in the Orient in 1937* The peak was reached in 1951. Although 
Cuba cannot normally compete with United States producers, rice produc­
tion was introduced in the late 1940's. A tax of 6 per cent was imposed 
on imports from the United States, which nullifies the preferential treat­
ment Cuba had given in 1947 under General Agreement on Tariff and Trade,
In addition to the import duty, Cuba set quotas on imports and required 
import licenses. In 1955 Cuba placed quality limitations on rice im­
ports, and in July 1956 raised these quality standards. Reid further 
stated that since that date only the highest quality and most expensive
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rice has been allowed into Cuba, thus pricing much United States rice out 
of the market. The exports of American rice to Cuba fell rapidly from 
1950-1951 to 1955-1956, with total exports to Cuba declining more than 
half, from 6,959*703 bags to 3,037*614 bags.^ This decline of exports 
definitely is a blow to the American Rice IndustryA for Cuba has consist­
ently been America's most important export market with over half of the
19total exports going to Cuba during several years. 7
It appears that one special interest group is being discriminated 
against in favor of another when sugar is protected. Our limited im­
ports of sugar, if expanded, might furnish the foreign exchange needed 
by Cuba to pay far American rice which our domestic rice producers are 
eager to sell. American rice producers have as yet not been proven, 
under normal trading conditions, capable of competing with other sup­
pliers in the world market, but the case of sugar is clear. American 
sugar admittedly is unable to compete in world mariets. In this in­
stance government policy appears to discriminate against rice growers 
in favor of sugar producers and apparently assures less efficient use 
of American resources, especially those in one state, Louisiana, which 
is a major producer of both commodities.
American wool offers another example of a supported industry unable 
to stand unassisted against foreign competition. Yet it is protected so
^William M. Reid, A Statement in the hearings before a subcommit­
tee of the Committee on Ways and Means, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF 
CUSTOMS AND TARIFF LAWS AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. House of Re­
presentatives, 34th Congress, Washington, D. C., (l95^)* pp. 391-393.
The statistics used by Reid are almost identical to USDA data as tabu­
lated in Foreign Agricultural Trade, Statistical Handbook, Tables 56 
and 57* pp. 45 and 46•
^ Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, USDA, op. cit,, 
Table 57, p. 46.
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efficiently as to prove detrimental to another domestic industry, that 
of woolen manufacturing, as well as harmful to the exporters of other 
American goods.
Argentina and Uruguay are two Latin-American nations that depend on 
exports of meat, hides, grain, and wool for the exchange necessary to 
purchase the finished commodities they desire for a higher standard of 
living. According to Willoughby both o-f these nations use multiple ex­
change rates as a means of subsidizing wool exports to the United States 
in order to obtain dollar exchange. In 1953 the official exchange in 
Argentina was 5 pesos for an American dollar, yet 7 l/2 pesos was given 
for each dollar obtained from the sale of wool. This then was a sub­
sidy of 50 per cent paid to Argentine wool growers. Uruguay had an
official exchange rate for its peso of 1.519 per American dollar, yet
20gave 2.35 pesos for each American dollar obtained by selling wool. u 
Uruguay was thus paying a subsidy of 54.7 per cent to wool growers.
These subsidies paid to obtain dollars no doubt meant that the goods 
and services which these nations could obtain in any other market would 
be lost, as exports, by American suppliers.
Wool consuming industries have been confronted with a 66 per cent 
tariff decrease on wool textile imports since 1939, while duties on
20Ray W, Willoughby, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit­
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 
United States Senate, 83rd Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953)s pp. 470- 
471. See also, Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange in the Postwar 
World, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1954)» p. £>30 and p. 641.
The official buying rate in 1953 for Argentina was 5 pesos for one dollar. 
50 per cent of dollar exchange from wool sales to the United States was 
at this rate ani 50 per cent at 7.5. Uruguay paid 1.519 pesos for 35 per 
cent of dollar exchange from sale of wool to the United States and 2.35 
for the remaining 65 per cent.
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21apparel wool have been reduced 25 per cent. According to Senator 
Kennedy the woolen textile industry has been declining rapidly. Be­
tween 1949 and 1953 nearly 100 woolen and worsted mills with around 
40,000 employees ceased operation. In addition, many other mills had 
partially or fully suspended operations. The wool growers in the United 
States depend upon domestic producers of woolen goods, since wool is 
not exported. The high domestic price of woolens is partially caused 
by a high price of wool. The high price of American woolens invites an 
increased importation of comparatively cheaper woolen textiles, and thus 
places American producers in an increasingly more difficult position.
Allegedly, the high costs of wool were caused more by tariff paid on
22imports than by payments to American wool producers. There are, how­
ever, no available statistical means of proving or disproving the valid­
ity of this statement.
Wool production is a joint undertaking with that of raising lamb. 
Even an increase in price for lamb and wool was incapable of increasing 
production between 1940 and 1949* As prices went up from $15 to $44 
per hundred pounds for lamb during that period, output declined from 
over 4 million pounds of wool to about 2. l/2 million pounds. Had it not
nyiost American woolen textiles- are produced from wool finer than 
grade 44.
22John F. Kennedy, A Statement in the hearings before the Commit­
tee on Agriculture and Forestry, FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 
United States Senate, 83**d Congress, Washington, D. C., (1953), pp. 529- 
539, See also Business Statistics 1955. United States Department of 
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. IBB. The output of apparel wool 
in 1951 was higher than it had been in the period before World War II, 
During the war output had nearly doubled. Senator Kennedy was refers 
ring to the loss of wool textile production occasioned from the loss 
of war markets, but there has been a steady decline since 1951.
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been for the break in the cattle price in 1952, wool production would 
probably have declined further. The decline in sheep production is 
traceable to the refusal of farmers to produce sheep when there are more 
profitable outlets for them than in sheep production. Dairying in the 
East, cattle raising in the West, and cash crops where possible have 
been expanded to take the place of sheep raising,^ Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between wool price and domestic production. It can be 
seen from this relationship that production has not adjusted to price 
changes.
With wool, growers attempting to restore tariff rates or impose quo­
tas on imports and textile manufacturers asking for relief, the wool 
program was changed to one of incentive payments under the Eisenhower 
Administration. The Brannan Plan had earlier been condemned by the 
same administration while it was seeking election.
Production of such tree crops as almonds and filberts grew with the 
aid of import fees and producers of these nuts probably need continued 
protection if production is to continue at anywhere near the present 
level. These commodities are relatively hand-intensive but need a long 
growing period of several years before production starts. Any tariff 
reduction would probably result in increased imports and would conflict 
with domestic price programs.
Cotton, basically an export crop, enters this country in the form 
of extra long staple which is free of quota limitations. Short staple
^Humphrey, American Imports, pp. 84-S6.
^Farm Policy Dictionary, og. cit., p. 9. Incentive payments is a 
form of compensatory payment in which supports are set high enough to 
encourage production of a commodity at a desired level.
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and medium long staple are subject to quota. Cotton,, one of the basic 
crops that is under a price support program,is one of the commodities 
that is produced by both hand and capital-intensive methods. Cotton 
of short and medium long staple could be import-competing, if there 
were no import restrictions, although historically it has been our lead­
ing export commodity.
The domestic price support programs on import-competing commodities 
appear to necessitate import curbs if the programs are to survive. Thus 
the price support program, while not itself a curb on trade, proves to 
be restrictive to trade because a support program cannot be maintained 
if imports are freely permitted. Once a support program is instituted 
at above world price levels it seems to be self perpetuating. If the 
price support program is to be a permanent feature of agricultural poli­
cy, protection against imports must also be maintained.
Utilization of Resources When Trade Restrictions Protect Import-Competing 
Commodities.
Protection, which appears to be part and parcel of domestic support 
programs, has the same effect on resource use as do price support pro­
grams. Any text in the principles of economics has a chapter devoted 
to the agricultural problem. The consensus seems to be that agriculture 
has too many resources producing more commodities than consumers will 
take at the prices the producers desire in order to maintain a standard 
of living comparable to that which comes from other resource uses. The 
economist's answer to such a problem would be, "let economic forces re­
allocate the resources." However, the problem is not solved as simply 
as it may seem and it is likely to remain unsolved for a good many years.
Protection to make price support programs tenable in order to raise 
farm incomes limits imports and often forces consumers to pay higher
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prices than would otherwise be necessary. Production under protection 
and support programs normally leads to acreage allotment and marl® ting 
quotas. Marginal operators are given quotas proportional to the most 
efficient; this stifling of efficiency, in turn, keeps marginal produc­
ers farming when under a competitive situation they might shift to other 
employment. Stimulation of prices of protected commodities is aimed at 
paying the productive factors, inefficiently used, as much as the re­
turns would be if such factors were more efficiently used. As efficient 
use of resources increases in the dynamic industries, less progressive 
import-competing producers will be faced by higher costs which are not 
matched by higher productivity.2-*
Coffee and rubber alone have accounted for over 40 PQr cent of 
American agricultural imports in recent years. Cocoa, tea, and bananas, 
like coffee and rubber, are not import-competing. Less than half of 
our agricultural imports are of such a nature that they compete with 
domestic production. In the group of imports that are domestically 
produced, many such as wool, sugar, olives, tung nuts, and filberts are 
not produced in the quantity that is required to satisfy American con­
sumers. The first group of commodities has no reason to expect restric­
tions on their import as they are complementary to American agricultural 
crops. The second group is of such a nature that protection through 
high tariff or quota restrictions is apt to be very costly for American 
consumers and not necessarily too beneficial for those that are pro­
tected. Wool producers, even with high protective tariffs and war- 
stimulated price increases, suffered a major decrease in output. Of 
the total agricultural output less than 2 per cent is by import-ccmpeti-ng
^Humphrey, American Imports, pp. 4&0-461.
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producers in this category of producers ’’needing protection." Yet, pro­
tected as they are, they have not been able to satisfy demand.
Another group of commodities imported in direct competition with 
American crops is one in which domestic producers are capable of satis­
fying total American demand. Dairy products, butter and cheese, are 
the major commodities in this category. Yet it js not our imports of 
butter that hurt dairymen most; it is domestically produced margarine. 
Most other agricultural crops are ones that sell at world prices without 
protection or else are selling above world price because of domestic 
support programs.'" According to Trenton,
"... less than ten per cent of farm income is 
earned with products in need of protection 
against competing or supplementary imports.
More than half our farm population depends on 
exports. Their real interests ride with the 
advance of free trade abroad and the abolish­
ing of quota restrictions discriminating against 
our agricultural products. But their policy 
statements have favored protection born from 
fear of the repercussions free trade might 
ert on our domestic price support program."'''
It appears that import restrictions are a product, for the most 
part, of the domestic support programs. This relationship means that 
inefficiencies shielded by, protection can be traced to the need of pro­
tecting the support programs more often than to the need of protecting 
domestic producers from importers.
2 *^R. W. Trenton, "The Farmer's Stake in our Foreign Policy," The 
Southern Economic Journal. XX (April 1954), pp* 335-33B. See also, 
Halcraw, 0£. cit., pp. 236-239> his coverage of the problem is not as 
detailed as Trenton's but the findings are similar.
27Ibid., p. 339.
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Exports of Hand-Intensive Commodities 
Tobacco, one of the heaviest users of hand labor, is and has histor­
ically been one of America's major exports. The government price support 
level is the price determining factor since tobacco growers must sell to 
buyers from an oligopsonized industry. Tobacco buyers for the large 
tobacco firms usually have from two to three years' supply on hand, 
and this puts the tobacco producer in an unfavorable bargaining position. 
Since the institution of the tobacco support program, producers have had 
the choice of selling to a bidder at the auction or turning it over to 
the government under loan. The loan rate is fixed at 90 per cent of par­
ity for most tobacco.
Tobacco is a commodity with an efficiency of production that is 
difficult to compare by using productive factor cost structures be­
tween nations. Although tobacco production in the United States uses 
as much hand labor as in any other nation, there is no ground for com­
parison based on capital-labor efficiency. It seems that tobacco quality 
depends much upon soil and climatic conditions. Thigpen maintains that 
the comparative advantage for various differing types of tobacco is de­
pendent not upon the economic use of labor or capital but upon soil,
28climate, and physical conditions affecting the tobacco plant. "Move­
ment of United States tobacco into foreign markets since colonial days 
reflects a definite comparative advantage in terms of soil and climate,
,.. This Comparative advantage differs among the classes and types of 
29tobacco."
2 <^J. E. Thigpen, ojd .  cit., pp. 818-819. 
29Ibid., p. 819.
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The export market for tobacco seems to be controlled more by the 
ability of buying nations to obtain dollar exchange than by ability of 
other areas to produce an acceptable or competitive substitute. The 
soil and climatic conditions are held to be the dominating factor in 
the production of tobacco. If they were allowed to be the dominating 
factor, American production of this crop, which makes such large de­
mands upon scarce labor, would not be penalized. However, the labor 
problem of the producers of tobacco is not presently acute, because 
tobacco is produced in areas where there is now a great deal of under­
employment of labor. The problem to be solved in order to increase 
exports seems to be that of getting more dollar exchange into the 
hands of would-be foreign consumers.
The consumer demand for American tobacco in foreign countries has 
led to black-market operations when dollars were hard to obtain. Govern­
ments generally allocate foreign exchange for tobacco because of the
30great demand for American tobacco and the ease of taxing tobacco sales. 
Total export has been consistently high since World War II despite the 
loss of Oriental markets, despite the demand for production machinery 
and the short supply of dollars in many would-be import nations. The 
British have been reluctant to purchase as much tobacco as they ’would 
like because of the restriction that at least 50 per cent must be ship- 
ed in United States bottoms as required by Public Law 480 for govern-
30Edwin D, White, Deputy Director, Office of Food and Agriculture, 
Foreign Operations Administration, A Statement in the hearings before 
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL 
SURPLUSES, United States Senate, 84th Congress, Washington, D. C., 
(1955), p. 310.
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31ment-owned commodities that are declared surplus.
France in the early post-war years, although favoring United States
tobacco, liras forced to limit purchases of American tobacco, which was
less costly than French tobacco. The reason for such curtailment was 
32lack of dollars. France produces several items used in the United
States that, in 1953, carried relatively high duties. Ethyl alcohol
had a duty of 7 1/2 cents per gallon. Earthenware and chinaware had
an ad valorem rate of 67 per cent on lower-priced ware. Automobiles
had a 10 per cent ad valorem duty, wines had duties of 24 per cent for
champagne, and 15 per cent for still wines. Woolens and worsteds had
an ad valorem equivalent rate of 33 per cent; rayon yarn, 29 per cent;
and leather gloves, from 25 to 74 per cent. These imports among others
from France are items that would have increased from moderately to sub-
33stantially if the protective tariff were to have been removed."' 
Earthenware, wines, woolens, and leather gloves, as produced in France, 
are hand-intensive. The United States is not capable of producing such 
commodities as efficiently as does France by hand-intensive methods.
This results from the more productive uses for labor in the capital- 
intensive industries. Yet the high level of duties on the commodities 
mentioned prevented needed dollar exchange going to France. American 
consumers were forced to purchase a domestic product or pay a higher 
price if they insisted on the import.
-^Gustave Burmeister, Assistant Administrator for Market Development, 
United States Department of Agriculture, A Statement in the hearings’ 
before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL 
SURPLUSES, United States Senate, £4th Congress, Washington, D. C,, (1955), 
pp. 352-353.
"^Thigpen, og. cit., p. S22.
-^Piquet, 0£. cit.. passim.
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During the period when Americans were prevented from buying French 
imports of hand-intensive commodities that they as consumers wanted, 
France was unable to obtain the dollar exchange that she needed in order 
to make purchases of tobacco.
Before the exclusion of free entry into world markets a . a com­
petitive level United States cotton production had captured most of the 
world's cotton market. After the Civil War, hand-intensive cultivation 
appears to have been efficient in the South, which had become a back­
ward area. Cotton production under the plantation system used only one 
white to each eight colored workers. By 1867, 40 per cent of the pro­
duction was by white field hands. The desire of whites who had been 
unable to own land under the slave plantation system, and of ex-slaves 
to own their own farms led to the creation of many new small farms.
With little atlernative to producing the cash crop of cotton, mono­
culture continued with an increase in small family operated farms. It 
was not until underemployment began to be affected by war shortages 
for labor and the increasing industrialization in the South that the 
small hand-intensive farms began to feel the competition of mechanized 
cotton production. With continued mechanization, labor saving produc­
tion methods, and alternative outlets for use of labor, hand-intensive 
cotton culture will undoubtedly continue to decrease relative to mecha­
nized production.
Fruit exports are much smaller now than before World War II, al­
though in Table V vegetables and fruit are revealed as being among 
those industries with high returns. Citrus fruits have been the cen­
ter of controversy, and the problems faced by grapefruit growers were
■^Street, o£. cit., pp. 18-19.
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brought to the attention of Congress. The plight of grapefruit grow­
ers was pointed out as the need fa- special aid. Some of the reasons 
for the loss of grapefruit exports were discussed at the recent Senate 
Committee hearings on Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses.
In the recent hearings Senator Holland of Florida points out that 
grapefruit has not been declared surplus and therefore is not eligible 
for government aid under Public Law 480, which deals with the disposal 
of "surpluses". He further shows the "absurdity" of the British po­
sition of protecting Jamaican grapefruit production by other than
incentive methods when Jamaica is able to furnish only a small fraction
35of Britian’s n e e d s . H e  also points out that Israeli citrus pro­
ducers are selling grapefruit to European marteting organisations on 
a consignment basis with no assurance of pay, if those receiving 
Israeli fruit agree not to trade in American grapefruit. This the 
Senator intimates is unfair competition especially in the light of 
the fact that Israel is receiving American aid,'
The Jamaican grapefruit industry was fostered by the British to 
save badly needed dollar exchange during and shortly after World War 
II, and today the position of grapefruit production in Jamaica is 
vulnerable to competition from American producers. Jamaica furnishes 
about one-fourth as much canned,aid about the same amount of fresh 
grapefruit to England that the United States furnished before the war.
35The Senator is condemning the British for a program which is very 
similar to the.one our wool producers had demanded in this country be­
fore incentive payments were used.
Senator S. L. Holland, Hearings before the Committee on Agricul­
ture and Forestry, DISPOSAL OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES, United States 
Senate, £4th Congress, Washington, D. C., (1955), p. 298-299.
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The Foreign Operations Administration offered Britain loans for pur­
chase of American citrus fruit; yet the British refused to purchase the 
fruit, although earlier shipments had been made under FOA and the Mutual 
Security Act. The British have felt that loans should be used for 
commodities and goods more beneficial to their economic recovery than 
fruit, which they consider as a luxury item.^?
The imports of apples, prunes, pears, cherries, and other fruit are 
considered as luxury items by nations that are attempting to recover 
from the war and increase their productive capacity. Although these 
crops appear able to compete favorably with other users of resources 
in productivity returns, nations with shortages of dollars are apt to 
allocate what they have for items they do not consider to be in the 
luxury category. The difference between the export positions of fruit, 
and tobacco would appear to be in the demand elasticity of the import­
ing nations. Tobacco seems to be an item which many nations refuse to 
do without, while fruit often will not be allowed to command dollars 
that are in short supply. The way to increase exports of "so called" 
luxury items would appear to be in the direction of an increase of 
dollar exchange in the hands of potential importers.
As the use of capital-intensive production methods in the United 
States increases, making hand-intensive commodities less attractive in 
the export pattern, there is the likelihood of an increased competition 
for markets once held by American producers of many types of fruit. 
Senator Holland emphasized that point when he referred to the inroads 
that Israel has made in the European grapefruit market. Much of the
37lbj_d,, pp. 296-307. Edwin D. White of the Office of Food and 
Agriculture, Foreign Operations Administration, answers to Senator 
S. L. Holland,
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fruit production in the United States takes place in areas which have 
often experienced over-full employment. For this reason alternative 
uses for labor very often necessitate higher agricultural costs. In 
the Pacific Northwest many orchards have been abandoned and owners have 
gone to work in lumbering and other basic industries, using their fruit 
and vegetable farms as merely a rural residence or as a means of supple­
menting industrial incomes.
Alternatives for Hand-Intensive Producers 
If hand-intensive commodities are to find themselves excluded from 
export markets or displaced by imports, a question of alternative uses 
for their resources will arise. The first step in a solution of this 
problem, as in the solution of any part of the farm problem, is to main­
tain a high national level of inc ome and employment so that alternative 
uses will be available for resources no longer needed when exports are 
lost or when imports replace domestic production. Next would be the 
need for aiding marginal producers in the reorientation of their fac­
tors of production. This reorientation would include such alternatives 
as labor entering industry, land going into more economical size units 
for capital utilization, placing land into range, forestry or recrea­
tional pursuits, or "mothballing" land for emergency uses.
Industrial Employment: Possibilities and Limitations
To aid industry help rid a gricultural pursuits of under-employment 
by continued operation at near full employment trade barriers could be 
reduced during a period, such as 1956-1957* when many industries were 
suffering from over-full employment. There would be a much better 
chance of displaced agricultural labor finding employment in industry
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during periods of high industrial activity. If trade barriers are to 
be reduced on imports at a time of general economic disorder, the pro­
ducers of protected crops will find themselves worse off with little 
or no alternative employment possibility.
Although labor tends to be immobile because of the lack of certain 
needed skills in certain productive processes, location factors, inade­
quate knowledge of job opportunities and other reasons, there will be 
a greater inclination on the part of industrial employers to hire un­
skilled labor when there is a labor shortage. The most rapid exodus 
from farming takes place during periods of prosperity, although the 
differences between farm income and industrial income are greater in 
depressed periods than in periods of prosperity,^ In 1910, when 
total population was 92 million, our farm population was 32 million.
This dropped to 31 million during the prosperity period of the 1920*5, 
but it increased to 32 million during the depression of the 1930's. By 
1954* during the post-war period of prosperity, the farm population had 
dropped to 22 million, while total population had grown to 162 million. 
The farm population in 1954 was considered to be 13.5 per cent of total 
population.-^ Table XI7 shows the relationship of total population to 
farm population for selected years. According to Black, this trend away 
from tie farm is apt to continue for a number of years. He foresees a 
farm labor force of around 5 million by 1975* This is considerably less 
than the 6.6 million figure for 1955. ^
^Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit., Tables 102, 103, p. 86.
3Q'Family Farms in a Changing Economy, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
^Black, "Agriculture in the Nation's Economy," og.- cit., p. 17.
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TABLE XIV
UNITED STATES TOTAL POPULATION; 
FARM POPULATION SELECTED YEARS
Year Total
Population
Millions Farm
Farm as 
per cent 
of Total
1910 92 32 34.8
1920 107 32 29.9
1925 115 31 26.9
1930 123 31 23.6
1935 127 32 25 .2
1940 132 31 23.5
1945 140 25 17.8
1950 152 25 16.4
1954 162 22 13.5
SOURCE: Family Farms in a Changing Economy, Agricultural Research
Service, USDA (Washington, D. C., March 1957), Table 1, 
page 8, from Statistical data compiled by the Bureau of 
the Census.
The period of rapid farm-to-city movement following World War II, 
as shown in Table XIVr has taken place in spite of protection for do­
mestic producers against imports, along with the use of export subsidies, 
and with domestic price support programs designed to help solve the low 
farm-income problem. Instead of measures which announce as their intent 
a fair share of the nation's wealth to farmers so that farmers' income 
will be adequate, policy would probably be more compatible with higher 
national living standards if the over-full employment conditions with 
which industry is often faced were eased with the under-employed fac­
tors in agriculture. Resources remaining in agriculture would then have 
fewer claimants for the returns from agricultural produce which so fre­
quently faces a relatively inelastic demand situation. Resources 
leaving agriculture would generally be more productive in industry.
The over-supply of farm labor has not been adequately encouraged in,
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an attempt to transfer to industry. Emphasis by policy makers has 
been placed on supporting prices and restricting imports rather than 
on subsidizing a transfer from agriculture. It seems that such trans­
fers of the factors could be encouraged, as an agricultural objective, 
as easily as any other objective of an agricultural program although 
opposition may arise from sources such as labor unions.
An alternative solution, for farmers who are wider-employed, to that 
of giving up their homestead and their inadequate income in order to 
pursue industrial employment in a city, is to have them take industrial 
jobs within commuting distance. This trend actually is increasing, 
particularly in the South, because of the increasing industrial activ­
ity in that area. In this manner many under-employed farmers hove 
become full-time industrial workers and part-time farmers. Reluctance 
to leave land that is owned is not encountered when it is possible to 
live on the land and commute to one's work.
Specialization in Forest. Range. Recreation, and Capital-Intensive Crops
Other possible objectives of a continued protection of hand-intensive 
industry— at least as far as the under-employed farmer is concerned— may 
be found in reorienting the land to other crops or to other than hand­
intensive uses. If reallocation is not too greatly hindered by govern­
ment policy in the form of price supports and acreage quotas, land and 
labor can often become more productive in other pursuits. Grazing and 
forestry, for instance, are alternatives to cotton culture in much of 
the South. The Yazoo-Little Tallahatchie flood prevention project, 
cited earlier, is an 'example of government policy oriented toward so­
lution of malallocation of resources rather than a perpetuation of those
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conditions,^" It would appear that tax money is more productively em­
ployed in such a project than in purchasing "surplus" commodities at 
stimulating price levels and dumping these commodities into foreign 
markets.
Watershed improvement and recreation areas may be an alternative 
use for submarginal farming enterprises if the ocst is borne by society. 
This method of conservation and shifting of resources is held to be one 
which depends upon government aid, since farmers cannot, by themselves, 
give up cash crop production in order to rehabilitate a watershed.^
Substitution of capital-intensive methods of production or a shift 
to the production of an alternative commodity may mean that a once hand­
intensive commodity can become competitive with imports, or that re­
sources will be shifted to a mare productive commodity. A shift to 
capital-using productive methods normally demands larger farmsteads.
A logical approach to the elimination of farms so small that for pur­
poses of mechanization they are uneconomical, is to aid in consolidation. 
To consolidate small units into units large enough to mechanize profit­
ably demands readily available sources of capital. An agency such as the 
Farm Credit Administration might be called upon for funds to aid in the 
consolidation and mechanization of units that are too small to mechanize 
singly and which lack the necessary funds.
Measures Looking Toward the Elimination of Inefficiency^
A large part of present farm protection is pointed toward the con-
^ Supra. p. 55.
^Rainer Schichele, Agricultural Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1954)> pp. 127-133*
^Here, as throughout this paper, inefficiency is considered to be 
the use of resources to produce goods whose total costs are more than 
costs would be for producing a given commodity by a different factor 
combination.
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tinuation of inefficiency. The provisions of most price-support pro­
grams, import restrictions fee* protecting American producers, and 
export subsidies are, from the point of view of the analysis contained 
in this study, attempts to subsidize inefficiency through price mani­
pulation.
Production and import control, commodity loan plans designed to 
increase prices, and surplus disposal operations must be discarded if 
comparative advantage is to be the directing fcrce in the elimination 
of inefficiency. Agricultural programs which involve subsidised farm­
ing should be allowed to have only a minimum of influence on market 
price. In order to maximize efficiency in resource use and to allow 
the comparative advantage benefits to accrue from, international trade, 
farm subsidy payments should be in the form of transfer payments out­
side of the price structure. Imports and exports should be free to 
move in accordance with those productive factor combinations which give 
producers an advantage in relationship to alternative uses.
To pave the way to an acceptable program for supporting incomes, 
not prices, consumers as well as farmers and their spokesmen should 
first be made to realize that price supporting actions are every bit 
as much of a subsidy payment from the government as would be a direct 
payment from the treasury for the difference between price times quan­
tity sold, and the desired income support level.^
Any over-expansion of agricultural production because of war needs 
which has induced an uneconomic use of resources is a problem of such 
broad scope as to forbid its being treated as a farm problem. Farm 
spokesmen should not be permitted to dictate its solution. Instead, 
society should consider such over-expandion as a cost of the war and
^Johnson, "Reconciling Agricultural and Foreign Trade Policies," 
pp. 570-571.
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accept the responsibility of reallocating the resources to other uses. 
If wartime industrial investments deserve special consideration by the 
government, it seems only fair that agriculture should be equally well 
treated.
Summary
The returns from production of hand-intensive commodities, which . 
must compete with imports from nations having abundant labor reserves, 
are generally too low for the level of living that Americans desire.
The chief reason for such low returns is to be found in the relative 
scarcity of labor and its low rate of productivity as compared with the 
productivity of labor supplemented by capital. The opportunity costs 
for labor are so high in the American economy that production of hand­
intensive commodities, which are capable of being produced in areas of 
abundant labor resources, must depend upon protection or see imports 
undersell them in the American market.
If the production of a commodity is inefficient because of its de­
mands for large amounts of labor, it may yet be permitted to continue, 
if imports are excluded. When an efficient method is discovered for 
producing such a commodity and when part.of the production becomes ef­
ficient, the returns will continue at the same protected level because 
of the single price aspect of marketing, and because the land will re­
ceive the increased returns through capitalization. Once land is so 
capitalized at the protected price level, the gains of efficiency are 
lost and protection must continue.
Labor returns are often more likely to be determined by institu­
tionalized or acceptable levels of living rather than by productivity. 
If imports of hand-intensive commodities are allowed to increase, those
I6h
receiving dollar exchange would be capable of purchasing more American 
exports. Most Americanexports are capital-intensive and therefore 
more productive in man-hour returns than imports. Labor in rural areas 
will suffer lower returns because of the loss of the import-competing 
crops sales. Industrial production will tend to become more fully or 
over-fully employed and will accordingly reap higher returns. With 
greater demand for workers in industry, wage levels tend to rise. Yet, 
even though manpower is marked by great immobility, the unemployed and 
under-employed rural workers tend to shift to better-paying industrial 
jobs when such jobs are available. And those jobs are being made in­
creasingly available to the "commuter" type of worker who continues to 
maintain his residence on a farm.
The wage-rate argument for the protection of import-competing com­
modities is unsound. American producers are not competing with low wage 
rates paid in foreign nations; rather, they are competing against more 
efficient uses of labor in America. Protection does not raise the level 
of living; instead, by misallocating resources to less productive pur­
suits, it actually lowers the amount of total goods and services avail­
able for consumers.
Most hand-intensive import-competing commodities have met with in­
creasing foreign competition or have had to depend upon trade restrictions 
to forestall such'competition. Tobacco is an exception, but actually it 
is not an import-competing commodity. Tobacco imports are in the nature 
of specialty products not produced in this country. They supplement rath­
er than compete with domestic production.
Only a small portion of farm production, about 10 per cent, needs
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protection from foreign competition in order to retain its domestic 
market. Protection is demanded, however, for the purpose of making
domestic price support programs tenable.
Our continued exports of hand-intensive commodities will depend con­
siderably upon the importance foreign importers place upon them. As the 
relative cost of such hand-intensive production methods increases be­
cause of technological advances in competing industries, these commodities 
will increasingly become a. poorer buy. Tobacco seems assured of con­
tinued quantities of exports because of an inelastic demand for the 
American product. Our fruit exports, however, seem to depend on in­
creases in the amount of dollar exchange in the hands of other countries. 
The longer the "dollar shortage" continues, the greater wall be the in­
roads of competitive sources for this market.
It seems reasonable to maintain that dependence should be put on 
finding other uses for labor rather than on more protection aiming at a
continuation of misuse of labor resources. Full employment should be
maintained, if possible, for the purpose of stimulating movements of 
labor from areas of under-employment to more productive pursuits. Such 
movements of under-employed resources should be fostered rather than 
hindered. Much of present agricultural policy, however, appears to con­
template a continuation of the malallocation of resources. If farm 
incomes are to be bolstered, the procedures looking toward that objective 
should take place outside of the pricing mechanism. Tampering with 
prices upsets normal trade relations and perpetuates rather than miti­
gates the over-allocation of resources to agriculture.
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CHAPTER VI
EXAMINATION OF PROPOSED POLICY AS TO TRADE REGULATIONS 
AFFECTING AGRICULTURE
This chapter proposes that many of the factors of production used 
in agriculture should be re-oriented within agriculture and other factors 
transfers! from agricultural pursuits if agricultural production is to 
receive returns generally comparable with the returns to other indus­
tries. The need to permit increases of imports, including those that 
compete with agricultural commodities produced .domestically, is also 
asserted. It is further proposed that society, which would benefit 
from the above changes, should furnish assistance to those financially 
unable to make the needed shifts. In addition, this chapter includes a 
discussion of price support programs, as some students of the subject 
declare present price support administration to be one of the factors ■ 
necessitating import restrictions. Furthermore, price support legis­
lation is often alleged to be a factor that could lead to dumping.
Before examining any proposals, and lest the reader is to assume 
that the writer is postulating the tenets of classicism, it is necessary, 
at this point, to indicate some of the difficulties that must be faced 
in any attempt to use policy as a means of better utilizing scarce re­
sources. The various hearings, before both the House and the Senate, 
that have dealt with agriculture and trade in the past few years, have 
all been confronted with numerous spokesmen presenting evidence of the 
lack of freedom of price determination in the world markets. The USDA 
has recently compiled a digest of agricultural policies of foreign gov­
ernments which includes trade policies affecting agriculture. A cursory
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study of this pamphlet leads one to suspect that the commodity entering 
world trade is rare indeed, if it does not come under some sort of reg­
ulation. And this regulation generally emits from "both the shipping 
nation as well as the one receiving the commodity.^
With all other nations practicing regulation, is it not therefore 
mandatory that the United States also maintain tight reigns on such 
agricultural commodities as enter or leave this nation? This is a 
persuasive argument which is often used, and it is an argument that ap­
pears to have merit when one considers the doctrine of "an eye for an 
eye." However, when one examines the reasons for such regulations on 
the part of foreign nabions, and the reasons for United States regula­
tions, as well as the effects that such regulations have, perhaps it 
would be better to forego retaliation.
Most of the under-developed nations of the world, which largely 
produce primary products, stress increased agricultural production in 
order to better their diet, to provide raw material for whatever in­
dustry they have, and to increase exports.^ They generally have a very 
limited number of export items with which to pay for desired capital goods. 
They do have, in most instances, some agricultural commodities that they can
1
. Agricultural Handbook No. 132, Agricultural Policies of Foreign 
Governments. USDA op. cit. This Pamphlet is the latest in a series that 
have been published, starting in 1932, and dealing with this subject. 
Government intervention in agriculture is seemingly standard practice 
throughout the world. Foreign trade regulation with the use of internal 
market regulations is a common policy tool of most nations. There is 
little doubt that these regulations seriously curtail the operation of 
the law of supply and demand, and, thereby, greatly influence the allo­
cation of resources.
^Ibid., p. 1.
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sell to obtain needed foreign exchange. In addition, they usually are 
able to furnish enough food for their ovm use. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that most underdeveloped nations, with a factor combination 
of relative abundant labor and land as most such nations have, subsidise 
exports of agricultural commodities and restrict such imports.
On the other hand, higher income, industrialised countries, mainly 
those of Western Europe, attempt basically to increase the relatively 
lew income level of their farm population which has no industrial al­
ternative comparable to America. Another reason for regulation is to 
maintain food production as a national security goal. Thus, the social 
goal of maintaining prosperous, or, at least, less miserable small farm­
steads, that prompts regulation in industrialized countries is not 
primarily an attempt to expand farming, but an attempt to stabilize the 
rural society at a level of living that somewhere nearly approaches the 
industrial standard. This is the reason most often given for such reg­
ulation in the United States. The differences in factor combinations, 
economically speaking, are a reason why actions that may be permissible 
in one nation make economic nonsense in another. The United States, at 
the present time, is the major nation having a relatively hard money 
which is desperately in demand by nearly all other nations. The impli­
cation is, of course, that all nations want more United States goods than 
the United States wants of other rations. And were this demand to be 
satisfied, more productive capacity than the United States has would be 
needed to fill the wants. This would call for the shifting of more re­
sources into export production. Perhaps then, the. United States, at 
this time, is the lone major nation capable of reducing regulation, or,
^Ibid., pp. 1-2.
at least, is in the bast position to continue the sustained effort to­
ward increased multilateralism.^
Proposed Measures for Supporting the 
American Scale of Living
If the United States is to maintain a large export trade, and if 
the agricultural segment of our economy is to continue as an important 
beneficiary of our agricultural exports, there are two major alternative 
courses open, //e can continue to export commodities to foreign areas and 
pay for the exports with federal appropriations, or we can export the 
commodities others want and make it easier for them to pay. In this in­
stance, to pay means allowing imports of products into the United States. 
The latter choice would be less costly to taxpayers and would permit a 
higher standard of living manifest by more goods and services for the 
consumers.''
Any attempt to make it easier for other nations to pay the United 
States entails a trade program which will encourage imports. There has 
been a sustained effort since 1934 on the part of the national administra 
tion under both Democrats and Republicans to lower trade barriers. Never 
theless, there still remain sizeable hurdles to importation of many items 
such as industrial, manufactured, and farm products. The importer con­
tinues to be plagued by tariffs, quotas, and standard trade restrictions. 
In addition, among the most effective barriers to payment for United 
States exports is the confusion that archaic tariff regulations and red 
tape pose for would-be importers. These regulations entail the u?e of 
complicated nonstandardized forms, haphazard procedures, arbitrary
V .  V. Meyer, "Complementarity and the Lowering of Tariffs," The 
American Economic Review, XLVI (June 1956), pp. 323-335.
^Halcraw, op. cit.. pp. 237> 252-253.
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valuations, delays, special taxes, confusing classification methods, 
and other nuisances, and these trade restrictions often multiply the 
protective effects of tariff duties. Student in the field refer to this 
sort of protection as the invisible tariff.
Any policy that is instituted by society in order to support a high 
standard of living must be considered in the light of such policy's ef­
fect upon all facets of society. Any such policy that increases the 
standing of a certain group at the expense of other groups is not aiding 
society as a whole, if the total of goods and services remains the same. 
Such policy, if it increases the standing of a certain group, while 
hurting other groups and indeed lowering the total of goods .and ser­
vices, is by no means an economically acceptable policy. Furthermore, 
any policy instituted to help a specific group, but which has been 
shown to offer very little aid to most of that group, is reprehensible. 
It is all too likely to throw the burden of support of that policy upon 
society as a whole and to result in a demonstrably lowered standard of 
living than otherwise could be obtained. Because any support measures 
for agricultural groups are bound to affect society as a whole, such 
policy must be considered in the light of its totality.
According to Black, and based upon his use of USDA and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data of 1954* agriculture engages approximately 6 per 
cent of the labor force, uses 12 per cent of the tangible productive 
assets, yet turns out only 4 per cent of the nation's gross national 
product.^1 Since 1910, the index of farm output has roughly kept pace 
with population growth. Nevertheless, total farm hours of work have de­
creased by over 30 per cent, and farm population has decreased from
^Black, "Agriculture in the Nation’s Economy," p. 21.
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around 30 per cent of the nation’s total to about 13 per cent.
The absolute position of agriculture, economically speaking, has 
not deteriorated. In fact, on a long-run basis the year of 1?50 showed 
the agriculture growth pattern to be keeping up with population .growth. 
The farm price index in 1950 was 253 compared to 139 for the wholesale 
price index based on the year 1900. However, 1955 does show that farm 
prices had dropped to 205 while wholesale price index had advanced to 
212. During the time that national wealth was increasing from a base of 
100 to 257 (1900 to 1950) total farm assets had grown .from 100 to 270. 
The weighted average of agricultural, manufacturing and mining produc­
tion and construction had risen to 230, or a full 40 points below agri­
culture . ®
This national income analysis as well as the individual farmstead 
and farm class information provided by the census of agriculture indi­
cate that agriculture as such is now in no more need of special con­
sideration than it was in 1900. Notice, however, must be taken of the 
case of seasonal crop variation due to weather uncertainties over which 
the farmer has no control. Also, it must be remembered that farm in­
comes, although maintaining their relative income ranking, started at a 
level much lower than the remainder of the economy. This lower relative 
income position is a reflection of excess resources dedicated to agri­
culture .
Agricultural and trade policy should be reoriented in such a
^Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, op. cit., passim.
Aryness Joy Wickens, "Changing Prices and Values in the First 
half of the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, XLVI No. 2 (May 195^), 70-75, Table 1, 72.
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manner that agricultural exports capable of selling competitively in 
the world markets will not be hampered. In addition, imports of com­
modities should not be excluded to maintain production of very high cost 
hand-intensive crops. The commitment of 12 per cent of the tangible 
assets and 6 per cent of the nation's labor force to the production of 
4 per cent of the nation's gross national product would seem to indicate 
the need for major resource reallocation. The chronic income disparity 
within agriculture further indicates a need for policy reorientation.
To this it should be added that society, because it will benefit 
thereby in the long run, should incur the immediate costs of reorien­
tation. The low income group of farmers, who are not contributing 
their share to the economy's growth and who have no possibility of so 
doing if they remain in agriculture, pose a problem which should be 
solved by society. The educational and training levels of low-income 
farm .groups are such that those groups are unable to return adequate in­
come levels on the farm. In addition, without further training their
q
income level potential will also be low in industry.' borne of the vari­
ous roads that policy could take in order to support the society's 
level of living will be presented in the following sections.
Allow an Increase of Imports Whenever Demand Increases for Supported Crops
It is not easy to convince any group that society will be better off 
by any proposed lessening of import restrictions that will not benefit 
them. Or, if such a group is cognisant of such knowledge, they, as in-
Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Agricultural Price and Income Policy (Third 
Edition, Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press, 1952), Ch. 19, Agri­
cultural Incomes Gan Be Made Comparable With Incomes For Equal Ability 
In Other Lines, pp. 266-275*
dividuals, are more interested in their own loss than in any gain to 
society. Any proposal to ease import restrictions mil immediately 
bring forth the wrath of a few, very vocal, very persistent groups with 
vested interests in the continuation of present controls. In retrospect, 
Milton, during the later l600's in his work Areopagitica, and John 
Stuart Mill, in 1359 in the On Liberty, both noted the influence a 
small vocal group could have on society under a democratic political 
system.Usually when a few are loud enough and persistent enough 
they inflict their wills on the majority who are generally passive and 
take little personal interest. With this in mind, opposition to any 
policy advocating increases in imports must be anticipated, and the 
benefits to society that mil accrue from such policy must be spelled 
out and presented as the need for adopting such policy. The long-run 
benefits for those under-employed resources in agriculture, after re­
allocation, should also be noted. Agricultural policy has been and is 
oriented toward the goal of isolating domestic prices from world prices. 
With this in mind, one ’way to start reversing the trend of protection 
for commodities that are unable to compete against foreign imports would 
be to allow increased amounts to be imported whenever domestic demand 
is increased. Whenever the domestic consumption trend is increasing, 
the added demand should be satisfied with imports. This would not solve 
the problem of present misuse of resources, but it would prevent any 
additional resources entering the production of a crop which is unable 
to compete on its own merits.
10Paul Robert Lieder et. al. editors, British Poetry and Prose. 
Revised Edition Vol. two (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933), PP. 475-
477.
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If such a policy were instituted so as to permit the satisfaction 
of increased demands from imports, there would be a gradual increase in 
foreign exchange available to these nations that took advantage of this 
expanding market for imoorts. As the foreign exchange derived from this 
expanded market became available to make purchases of goods and services 
produced in and by the United States, there -would be a natural shift of 
productive factors to export production.'*''''
One merit of this gradual increase of imports is that there would 
be no sudden increase of unabsorbable factors, mainly labor, thrown upon 
society. Many of the lower Income, marginal operators that would be 
eliminated from crop production would, under this plan, have time to be 
trained for assimulation into other economic pursuits. Domestic con­
sumption levels would gradually rise as under utilized resources, now
in agriculture, shift to other uses. If the labor and capital that
12Black indicates Is unproductively employed in agriculture were to 
produce as much as in non-agricultural pursuits it would mean between 
$8 and £12 billion added to G. N. P. at 1957 price levels. This is 
over twice the amount given as U.S. foreign aid in 1957. In addition, 
the factors remaining in agriculture would each receive a large portion 
of agriculture's share of G. N . P . This total share might even be larger 
with Increased national productivity and increased consumption due to the 
addition of resources In non-agricultural pursuits.
^Lorie Tarshis, Introduction to International Trade and Finance 
(New York: John fJiley and Sons, Inc., 1955)> pp. 525-527.
•^Black, "Agriculture in the Nations Uconomy," p. 21.
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Gradual Reduction of Restrictions as Industry Absorbs Farm Resources
This would be much like the above proposal. The difference would 
be that a set period of time would be announced in which a gradual de­
creasing of trade restrictions would eventually eliminate such restraints, 
With a long range program of restriction elimination, assurances of near­
full employment would be required. A schedule of restriction reductions 
would, during times of recession, force factors from agriculture vrhen 
society offered no alternative. Here, as in the first proposal, society 
would benefit. Accordingly, the costs of reorienting resources should 
be borne by society. Workers must be trained or they will be little 
better off in non-agricultural pursuits than if they had remained in 
agriculture.
Texts in the principles of economics often define full employment 
somewhat like this: A nation has reached full employment when it is satis­
fied with the performance of the economy, and those factors are employed
1Rwhich are seeking employment at the socially acceptable level of return. ' 
Such an ambiguous-definition does not bake into consideration the vary­
ing degrees of employment in the different economic endeavors. While 
some segments are under-utilizing resources, others find it hard to ob­
tain enough resources to satisfy their demand . For this reason, a 
sustained effort to maintain a semblance of full employment and continued 
aid in transferring to other vocations those desiring to leave agricul­
ture, the under-employed segment of the economy, would be the best method 
of solving the problem of too many resources allocated to agricultural 
production. In addition to needing full employment, the artificiality
T O
' David McCord Wrig’ " ‘" 1 ‘ Modern .Economics (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1954., .
of prices under support plans would have to be remedied to allow either 
of these two plans to work. Any price support plan, as has been shown 
earlier in this paper, encompassing support at above the world price, 
needs import restrictions in addition to marketing controls and acreage 
restrictions. If domestic producers are to be subsidized, they should 
be forced to receive such subsidy outside of the market pricing mecha­
nism. Whatever subsidies are maintained, should be for programs such 
as disaster relief, crop failure, agricultural financing, and for train­
ing and assistance to those leaving agriculture.
Give Assurances to Importers and Lessen Import "red tape"
The "red tape" items of United States Customs Operation are probably 
as effective at restricting imports as are tariffs, licensing and quotas. 
Any study into ways of increasing dollar earnings of would-be customers 
of America's farm producers must go beyond the tariff. A recent survey 
■was made of 336 United States’ firms and the impediments to their pri­
vate foreign investments. In many instances the impediments were of the 
same sort that domestic exporters of agricultural crops would be faced 
with, including prominently those connected with "invisible tariffs". 
Trade barriers other than tariffs that were specifically mentioned by 
one or more firms are: import quotas, customs policies and administra­
tion, the Buy American Act, the requirement for shipping in American 
vessels, price controls or "any artificial control," international ma­
terials control plan, and United States immigration laws and restrictions.
The administrations have, since 1934, attempted to reduce for the 
most P^rt, restrictions to foreign trade by such programs as the recip-
^Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Factors Limiting United States In­
vestment Abroad, Fart 2, Business Views on the United States Government’s 
Role, United States Department of Commerce (Washington, D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1954)> PP- 12-13.
rocal trade agreements and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Often such effort has been confronted by strong sentiment on the part 
of pressure blocs attempting to influence certain elements of Congress 
to thwart such programs. Also, when an attempt was made in Iff6 to sim­
plify the customs reg’ilations, there was such strong opposition that a 
modified compromise was finally accepted. During the period that the 
Senate Finance Committee was doing research for the formulation of this 
legislation, spokesmen for numerous firms and many consultants were 
questioned in the committee hearings. When the finished product of 
these hearings, known as the' Customs Simplification bill, was signed 
in August 1956, it had lost much of its meaning through compromises.
The original purpose was to formulate a single base for tariff on im­
ports. That is, instead of using the wholesale price in the exporting
nation or the import wholesale price, whichever was higher, this bill 
would have made the import wholesale price the tariff base. This act 
would have given foreign exporters a good deal more assurance in the 
way of tariff rates to be expected, eliminating the difficulty of basing 
the rate on foreign market values calculated in terms of a multitude of 
exchange rates. Finally, a compromise three-year trial plan was con­
sidered, with both standards to be used, thus postponing a decision for 
three years. The bill, as finally passed, xvas signed into law August 
2, 1956, but it would be permitted to apply only if the tariff on the
import value was such as to show less than a 5 per cent decrease in
19tariff rates.
The compromise, which was an attempt to end delays entailed by long 
investigations to determine foreign value or export value, so complicated
^ The New York Times, August 3> 1956, p. 22, column 1.
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the immediate procedure that little benefit was obtained. The three- 
year trial period was dropped, but the treasury was required to determine 
average value for 1954* placing on a new preliminary list items that 
would show a 5 or more per cent higher appraisal than they would have 
shown under the new system. Items on this preliminary list, when 
finalized, would continue to be a upraised under the old system and 
other items would be appraised under the new and simpler system.^
Eventually this compromise bill will aid in the simplification of 
tariff rate understanding. However, during the years of needed research, 
uncertainties will exist and the treasury department will be forced to 
spend time and money in determining ’which items will be simplified and 
which will continue under the old system. Even when this job is com­
pleted, only a fraction of. the "invisible tariff" will have been dealt 
with. Any further attempt to simplify any one of the many remaining barri­
ers vrill be confronted with a very determined effort to prevent such 
changes.
As American tariff law grew through the various acts which culmi­
nated in the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930, American protection grew multifold 
through growth of the "invisible tariff." The reciprocal trade acts have 
reduced visible restrictions to trade, but attempts to eliminate the ad­
ministrative red tape has not met with the same success. Although cus­
toms administrative laws and decisions are usually not deliberately 
formulated to discourage imports, they often have that result. A customs 
lawyer is often as necessary for the importer as the ship to transport 
the goods. Some of the costs that an importer often must bear are: cus­
toms lawyer’s fees, premiums on bonds, litigation costs, and costs which
* i z
The Mew York Times. August 12, 1956, Section 3* p. 1* column 1
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17result from delay in appraisement for duty, ‘
The urvwillingness of Congress to face up to the responsibility of 
formulating positive control over imports has done much to bring about 
the transfer of tariff-making powers to the executive. Thus the tariff 
commission has gained authority through Congressional default, and the 
President is able to use the commission as a fact-finding board on which 
he bases his rate-making and tariff-bargaining powers. These powers 
were granted in 1922 when Congress conferred on the President rate- 
making authority, and in 1934 the trade agreements act gave him tariff-
^  • • isbargaxnmg power.
Protected interests continue to appeal to congressmen to amend or 
repeal or allow the trade agreements acts to expire. Economic sanctions 
and the placating of interest groups are easily accomplished by the 
administrative action which can be incorporated in tariff acts. Much of 
the President's rate—making and tariff bargaining ability are lost by 
such actions. In addition, the fear of sudden import policy reversal, 
such as ending the trade agreements or by escape clause action, tends 
to weaken the desire of many foreign export producers to develop American 
markets. The refusal of Congress to extend the trade agreement legis­
lation, which they must do periodically, would prove to be a catastrophic 
blow to many foreign firms selling in the American market.
■^Percy W. Bidwell, The Invisible Tariff (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1939 ).» pp. 2-S. Bidwell states that administrative 
measures are far more comprehensive than visible tariff, since they af­
fect goods on the free list as well as goods which are dutiable. He 
further states that the complexity of tariff schedules grew out of at­
tempts to stop seepage of illegal imports and some regulations appear 
to be devised to make it as difficult as possible for importers.
^Ibid., pp. 12-13.
It would aopear that Congress, which has refused to accept re­
sponsibility for tariff administration, is unwilling to allow the 
executive branch to which they have defaulted, a free hand. Without 
the ability needed to assure a continuous import policy, the adminis­
tration is seriously hampered in any attempt to increase imports. Free 
world marketing and production patterns in many countries are based 
much less on a mass market concept than they are in America. No firm, 
which is unsure that it will be allowed to remain in a market that it 
could deve,lop by changing production and marketing methods, is apt to 
gamble millions of dollars which would be a total loss if that market 
were closod. As long as customs regulations remain on an uncertain 
basis from year to year, there will continue to be reluctance on the 
part of foreign firms to gear production fully for the American market. 
Imports will, in many instances, be an adjunct to domestic production 
In the export nation. Thus, the malallocation of resources needed to 
produce hand-intensive products in America is not permitted to readjust 
smoothly. Producers in foreign nations are not secure in any attempt 
to gear their operations toward securing the dollar exchange their coun­
tries so sorely need.
In order to secure more hand-intensive imports in exchange for 
American capital and land-intensive exports, it is imperative that 
American customs procedures be simplified and made into a more stable 
instrument of United States international relations and policy. If
domestic pressure groups are capable of drastically curtailing imports, 
the cost in level of living that such actions entail should be clearly 
pointed out to domestic consumers and taxpayers.
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Wet hods of Minimizing or Eliminating 
Harm to United States Agriculture
Any attempt to solve poor allocation of resources within agricul­
ture in order to increase the American scale of living should minimise 
any loss to those in agriculture who will be affected. Such policy 
should take into account both the short-run as well as the long-run 
effects. Several of the policy suggestions for aiding agriculture are 
largely outside the scope of this study, but they should be mentioned 
at this point. Johnson suggests a national food and fiber program to 
expand and stabilise the demand for agricultural products, forward 
pricing, and a storage program; all attempts to increase income sta­
bility. In addition, he mentions compensatory payments in a disaster
relief rcle and a conversion program to ease the needed shift from
1 c
agricultural product ion.“'
An attempt to readjust the productive factors must take into ac­
count the under-employment in agriculture, particularly Southern 
agriculture. Unless an acceleration of resource shifting is accomplish­
ed, any increase of import competition will only increase the disparity 
in factor prices. At the present time under-employment of productive 
factors, which is greatest in the South, is attracting industry to that 
area. V/ith an increase in imports there should come an even greater 
impetus for industry to move to such areas as the South, to furnish
IP
Johnson, Trade and Agriculture, op. cit., pp. 137-18S, 95-109.
See also J. K. Galbraith, "Economic Preconceptions and Farm Folicy,"
The American Economic Heview XLI7 (March 1954), pp. 40-43. Galbraith 
emphasizes the failure of present programs to help those it was designed 
to aid. He indicates that price policy does not appear to aid in better 
resource allocation and is oriented toward economic nationalism.
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20greater employment opportunities for under-employed resources.”
Some of the methods of assisting the shift of under-employed re­
sources from import-competing crop production to export crop production 
or non-agricultural pursuits will be presented in the following sections.
“Base out’1 Social Assistance Payments and Training to Rehabilitate 
Inefficient Producers*-1-
Because society gains when the factors are producing maximum re­
turns, public assistance in a more efficient allocation would have 
positive income effects. Marginal and submarginal use of productive 
factors in certain agricultural pursuits gives such low returns that 
these factors are of themselves unable to leave a. given agricultural use 
and migrate to other crops or to non-agricultural utilization. Economi- 
cally speaking, costly reallocation of resources is socially desirable,
It has been shown that, in most instances, hand-intensive production 
gives the lowest return to the combined factors. Public policy should 
therefore generally be oriented toward shifting resources into capital- 
intensive pursuits and away from production of hand-intensive crops.
Many of the low-income small-sized farmsteads should be made eligible for 
a “social assistance" rehabilitation program. Such a program might take 
the form of the Labor-Mobility-Assistance Loan program that was proposed
^Gottfried Haberler, "The Theory of International Trade in a World 
of Trade Barriers and Controls and of Variegated National Economic Sy­
stems," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. XLIV No. 2,
May 1?54, 556-557.
^Again the term "inefficient" is used to denote producers capable 
of greater returns if productive effort ware used in different pursuits.
22see T. W. Schultz, Redirecting Farm Policy, Chapter 4> "Resources 
and Income," (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943). Schultz shows
that the farm income problem is more than one of farmers' income levels. 
The resource problem and effects to society occasioned by administrative 
decisions are of greater importance. In peacetime, distribution is of 
greater significance than production which receives most attention.
for Federal Housing Authority administration as a means of removing more
?3than a million farm families from agriculture. -
In some instances the movement of factors from agriculture might wel 
be coupled with farm consolidation, and in other instances with total 
abandonment of farm production. The Committee for Economic Development 
recommends a complete reorientation in the farm land retirement program. 
Whereas the soil bank permitted farmers to take land out of production 
in an attempt to reduce "surpluses," it did little actual good where aid 
v.ras needed most. The small uneconomic, often submarginal farm received 
little or no assistance. The Committee for Economic Development pro­
poses that entire farmsteads be taken into the program. It would retire 
an entire farm, not a portion of a farm, in the case of those farming 
in the lowest income brackets.^ This actually would take little of 
the better land out of production, but it would make much labor avail­
able for non-farm use.
In order to take the less productive land out of production, the 
philosophy, often amplified by elections, of something for everybody 
should be changed to allow selectivity of land to be retired. Only 
that land which is unable to return reasonable, income should be retir­
ed. Again, the farmsteads that such a plan would include would employ 
a large portion of the farm labor force, albeit the lowest income group. 
This kind of land retirement -would make labor available for other use,
'"'■''This proposal was suggested by the Columbia University Seminar 
on Rural Life in 1950 as reported by Leonard H. Schoff, A. National Agri­
culture Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) pp. 47-50, 134-135.
^CED, Toward A Realistic Farm Program, (New York: Committee for
Economic Development, 1958 )", "pp. 32-3o.
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but society would be responsible for preparing this labor to 
be profitably used. The low productivity of many low-income 
farmers would mean that such farmers would be forced onto re­
lief or into low-income non-farm jobs if they were not trained 
to fit a more productive job classification. At the present 
time many of the under^employed southern farm workers drift into 
large northern cities and are not able to find employment in any 
except menial jobs. Even during booming prosperity, untrained, 
unskilled workers often have low incomes while industry is hard- 
pressed to obtain an adequate labor force.
Many of the operators of the million or more farms, that 
probably should be abandoned to land retirement, as well as 
many of the operators on small farms, that need to be consoli­
dated if they are to become profitable, are old and can not be 
trained to take a different type of job. These persons could be 
permitted to remain on those farms earmarked to be retired from 
agricultural production until attrition remedies the situation. 
Younger operators on farms in need of consodidation are a
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different problem. These could be aided in their attempt to expand or 
could be given social security type payments if they retire.
Payment to those retiring their land could be extended over a 
period of years or made in the form of rentals. As for the many who 
are not owners and who would get no land retirement payments, a train­
ing-on-the-job program of assistance like the G. I. training pro,gram 
following World ’War II would certainly make it easier to obtain jobs 
in ncn-agricultural industries. If full employment were maintained 
and the cost of training were not all borne by the employer, many of 
the under-employed agricultural laborers could readjust into far more 
productive positions. Those remaining on the land could improve their 
income status through consolidation and mechanization. Even for these 
persons, aid, to facilitate acquisition of land and machinery, should 
be made available by s octet?/.
Rural Development Program^
The Rural Development Program, as sponsored by the Eisenhower ad­
ministration, is a step in the right direction in relieving some of the 
under-employment in "rural slum areas," So far, pilot projects are be­
ing carried on with 46 operations in 24 states. Cooperation is sought 
with state and local leaders. Emphasis is placed on industry training 
for youth and the enticement of industry to rural areas to make use of 
under-employed labor.
Although this program is being sponsored by the Department of
^ Rural Development Program, USDA, Office of Information, March, 
1958, This information sheet shows how 62 pilot counties are now on a 
demonstration basis. The goal is to develop a program that strikes at 
the basic trouble instead of treating surface symptoms.
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Agriculture, close cooperation is maintained with four other depart­
ments; Commerce; Labor; Health Education and Welfare; and Interior.
The joint cooperation is maintained in order't:o have a balanced pro­
gram which includes trade, industry, and education, in addition to 
better farming practices. The program holds much premise, for in the 
short period of its existence it appears to be working with and not 
against economic forces.
The major objection, economically speaking, to the Rural De­
velopment Program seems to be that not enough emphasis is being 
placed on its progress. Possible mishandling of the project may come 
from very heavy reliance for direction of the prgorams on rural area 
leaders. Solution of problems encountered in the local rural area may 
depend on more than local judgments. In fact, it may demand state or 
even federal guidance. Most of the pilot plans have placed some em­
phasis on industrial opportunities and education, but this has been 
done mainly on the assumption of the local use of non-agricultural 
skills. More emphasis should be on interregional use of under­
employed resources. Employment training and preparation, including 
knowledge of opportunities elsewhere, for industrial and service po­
sitions should be intensified, ^  Major emphasis should be placed on 
the attempt to make qualified labor more mobile.
26Don Paarlberg, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, "Status 
of the National Rural Development Program to Date," Journal of Farm 
Economics. No. 2, XXXIX (May 1957), 261-270.
^Raymond J. Penn, "Discussion: Status of the National Rural
Development to Date," Journal of Farm Economics. No. 2, XXXIX (May 1957), 
278-281.
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Federal Aid to Bural High School Technical Training in Arte and Sciences
Because farm youth has a better chance to gravitate to non-farm 
jobs or to be trained to be profitably employed farmers than those with 
family responsibilities, the rural schools are a focal point for aid in 
any attempt to decrease the number of farmers with inadequate incomes. 
Studies have shown that farm youth have inferior school facilities.
This limits the studentfs opportunity both on the farm- and in com­
petition x-ri.th urban trained youth when seeking a non-farm position.
For these reasons, improvement of educational opportunity becomes a 
fundamental objective of curative agricultural policy. This objective 
will need to be supported by local and state funds as well as federal 
funds.^
Because farm incomes are lower than non-farm incomes, schools in 
rural areas generally have less income to tax, this helps to account 
for less able teachers and poorer facilities. Because students in ru­
ral schools, in many instances, will leave the farm and even the farm­
ing area, and many need to if they are to become as economically pro­
ductive citizens as possible, society as a whole has a stake in their 
education. The farm population reproduction rate is higher than the 
urban rate, and the excess farm population must seek urban employment.
Education, therefore, of rural students is a cost which should be assum-
29ed by society, not just by the rural community.
An informal study which has been continuing for several years, and 
which is being conducted by instructors in the Social Science Depart-
^Halcrow, o£. cit., p. 200,
^Theodore ¥. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945*17 PP* 205-208,
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ment at California State Polytechnic College, shows a biinodal distri­
bution for agricultural students when compared with non-agricultural 
majors. The majority of the agricultural students come from rural 
areas, while the majority of non-agricultural students are from urban 
areas. A possible explanation for the much lower grade distribution 
to the agricultural students is the inferior preparatory training that 
many of the agricultural majors receive in the rural schools. Compari­
son can not be ended on this note, however, as the students that get to 
college level are the outstanding students and1.many rural youths drop 
out of school at a younger age than urban children.
Relative.economic position is usually reflected in school expendi­
tures. The attitude toward support of school facilities is less 
favorable in areas of lovrer income. Since expenditures indirectly 
measure education’s quality,-the low-income rural areas would be ex­
pected to produce persons least prepared to take a productive place 
in the economic and social order.
The Morrill Act’ of 1862, giving aid to land grant colleges for 
agricxxlbural training, could easily be the precedent for federal aid 
to rural elementary and secondary schools. The difference would be 
that training would not be mainly oriented to vocational agriculture 
as today’s programs are in many rural high schools. Rather, the em­
phasis would be on such training as would prepare the graduate from 
such a school to compete favorably with -urban school graduates in ob­
taining non-agricultural positions.
-^Alvin L. Bertrand, ’’The Many Louisianas," 3ulletin Wo. 496, 
Louisiana State University, 1955, p. 9.
Any such braining program for rural youth involves a long range 
policy decision. For this reason, it is exceedingly difficult for a 
low-income area to bear the burden of such a program. First, the 
people of such areas would see no reason why they should bear the bur­
den of training persons to be employed elsewhere. Second, they probably 
could not afford the necessary instructors and facilities to give the 
required education.
Allow Prices to Seek World Market Level with Mon-stimulating Supports
"We must free the farmer from the shackles of acreage controls and 
marketing quotas."''" Turn the farmer loose from the straight jacket he 
is in and let him make adjustments as the free market dictates. These 
ideas, says Hughes, would be possible with an economic, and not a. po­
litical, solution to an economic problem. He further states that when 
a government encourages inefficient farmers by handouts of a few dollars,
it hurts everyone, low-income farmers by continued poverty, and non­
op
farmers by high taxes and prices.
There might be some merit in the striking proposals that Hughes 
has made, particularly since the world’s economy is beset more by food 
shortages than it is plagued with surpluses. In addition, there is the 
animal element to be considered. Whenever feeds become plentiful, 
grains may be used to feed animals to produce eggs, milk, and meat 
products, if grain prices are low enough for such use. Thus, if
11Sari Hughes, "Let's Set the Farmer Free," Readers Digest. March 
195S, pp. 93-94. Mr. Hughes, an agricultural economist, resigned from 
the position of chief custodian of the government's farm surplus board 
in 1956 to retirn to farming. His reason for leaving the position is 
given as wishing bo get out of a hopeless 'situation which, he says, con­
sists of holding a bear by the tail and being afraid to let go.
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certain foods become plentiful in the United States, they could, given
a free market, be traded for products of other nations or be diverted
to other uses.. The variables to be considered in case of exports are
international price, foreign exchange levels of importing nations, and
33ability of importing nations to increase their own production.
Major opposition to any such proposal from farmers ’-nth land valued 
according to the sale of its products under a government support pro­
gram would be partially overcome if society were to shoulder such burden 
of loss. Farmers could be reimbursed through damage payments or tax 
readjustments and write-off as was accorded industry, that also expand­
ed production to satisty war needs
Federal assistance to farmers who were hurt by revision of import 
policy and the end of stimulating price supports would be costly to 
society. This cost, however, would need be borne only once and not 
every year as is the case with present support prices that force an 
annual burden on consumers and taxpayers. As Witt says: "The payments,
properly assessed, would not exceed the gains to the general economy 
in lower prices and increased goods. The nation would gain out of 
better international relations ... The payment to injured producers would 
be paid once and liquidated, ... ,"33 jn addition, foreign suppliers
would have no further fear of erratic and unpredictable changes in
American trade policy. This would permit foreign producers to set up
33Scboff, og. cit.. pp. ?6-77.
3/!fLawrence Witt, "International Programs and Agricultural Policy," 
The Southern Economic Journal, XXI, No. 2, (October 195A), 171.
35Ibid., pp. 171-172.
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permanent distribution organizations and programs in the American mar­
ket .
Under any program that attempts to encourage imports, domestic 
supports must be less than the world price. As he s been shown, price 
supports fail to solve the low-income farm problem. They have no 
justification for continuation if adequate income to low-income far­
mers is the reason for their existence. For this reason, any sort 
of price supporting policy should be aimed at disaster relief rather 
than at supporting an adequate income. A disaster relief program could 
be made compatible with increasing imports, while a price support plan 
avowedly aimed at maintaining adequate incomes could not.
Legislation and Effective Policing of Anti-trust Regulation of the 
Production of Agricultural Equipment and Buyers of Agricultural Crops
Generally speaking, the outbursts of newsmen like Drew Pearson and 
some of the farm organisation spokesmen about monopoly getting the pro­
fits while the farmer does the work are grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless 
there is need to assure that the Federal Trade Commission and the Jus­
tice Department receive ample funds. Effective vigilance will help 
assure that the farmer and consumer are not taken advantage of by il­
legal actions of commodity buyers and farm suppliers. V/ith so few 
firms producing farm implements, cooperation in actions is easy to ef­
fect. Although formal connections between firms are missing, "price 
leadership" does exist among the eight firms' that furnish the bulk of 
all farm machinery in the United States. International Harvester Com­
pany and Deere and Company generally announce their prices before other 
firms
36Purdy, Lindahl, and Carter, o£. crt., pp. 270-275.
192
The meat packers have often come under fire for monopoly practices 
said to be in restraint of trade. This has also been true of cotton and 
tobacco firms as well as many others. The more localized and isolated 
the specific market, or the larger and fewer the firms, the more apt is 
sentiment for control to be voices.
History has shown several revolts against the monopoly power of 
farm suppliers in the markets. The Granger movement encouraged the 
enactment of laws to control railroads, and warehouses. Farmers joined 
labor and other groups to assure passage of the Sherman, Clayton and 
Federal Trade Commission Acts. Attempts to circumvent monopoly power 
in marketing has also taken the path of becoming as strong as those 
with which the farmer must deal. Cooperatives have been fostered in 
this attempt. Legislation has been fostered to aid the farmersr at­
tempt at countering industrial monopoly power in most states and by 
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 which was strengthened by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.-^
Government programs in effect remove much of the monopsonistic 
or oligopsonistic power of large buyers of agricultural products pro­
duced under supports. This might raise a major problem if supports are 
removed for all but disaster relief use. For example cattlemen, who 
are not under a price supporting program, saw the price of their stock 
decline drastically after the cattle price break in 1952. Yet there 
was no corresponding break in meat prices to the consumer.
In Table XV the increased use of some farm implements is shown.
^John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Miff­
lin Company, 1952), pp. 159-170.
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TABLE XV 
MACHINES ON FARMS
Machines 1940
Thousands
1950
Thousands
1955
Thousands
Tractors 1,545 3,609 4,750
Motor Trucks 1,047 2,207 2,750
Milking Machines 175 636 740
Grain Combines 190 714 960
Corn Pickers 110 456 660
SOURCE: Agricultural Outlook Charts 1956, Agricultural Marketing
Service , USD A (Washington, C. C November 1955) > P* 60,
Table 4.
During the period, 1940 to 1955? farmers became more dependent on 
farm implements than ever before. For this reason they are now more 
than ever dependent on oligopolies, industries. And if price supporting 
is lessened and an increased impetus given to imports, there will be 
need of increasing protective vigilance• Farmers will have become more 
vulnerabel to cost squeezing than they have been in the past. However, 
it is possible that increases or threats of increases of imported farm 
implements might prove to be a mitigating factor.
Summary
Policy compatible with public welfare would attempt to wed an in­
creasing standard of living, by allowing accrual of benefits from com­
parative advantage, to a more prosperous agriculture. Continued support 
of inefficient resource utilization should not be tolerated if it is 
economically feasible to shift such resources to areas of increased
194
productivity. Authorities in both the' fields of agricultural economics 
and. foreign trade have advanced proposals that could be joined in such 
a way as to effect the needed shift. Perhaps more emphasis should be 
directed to the examination of such proposals.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, EV ALUAT I ON, AND CONCLUSIONS %
Under the last three administrations some success has been experi­
enced in the effort to lower tariff rates and import restrictions. Many 
agricultural spokesmen, including representatives of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union, have stated that they 
favor increasing foreign trade, imports as well as exports. Hov/ever, 
within agriculture as throughout the entire economy, there are many 
minority groups in favor of continued and increased protection for their 
own commodity.
Problems of Increasing Imports 
of Hand-Intensive Commodities
As this study has shown, those dependent upon protection are well 
aware of the benefits to be gained from a protective policy and the 
knowledge that others might be hurt by the policy will usually not deter 
them from a goal of increasing their own benefits. On the other hand, 
those who stand to suffer because of import restrictions are generally 
unaware that they may be hurt, or they are hurt so little as individ­
uals that they do not voice protest. Change from protective patterns 
may be costly to those capable of production only with the benefit of
protection. Lawmakers, then, will normally receive a great deal of 
persuasion for protection from minority groups. On the other hand, any
organized opposition against maintaining or increasing protection for 
minority interests is seldom of an intense or sustained nature. Recent­
ly the President found it necessary to veto a bill passed by both
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houses of Congress when mail to the Department of Agriculture was 8 to 
1 against the ideas contained in the bill. Yet pressure had been sue- 
cessfully brought to bear, by minority groups, on members of Congress,
The discussion of comparative advantage in Chapter II shows how 
society generally receives greater returns for its factor output when 
trade is not hampered. The argument that low wage rates in low wage 
nations injures labor in a high wage nation that received imports com­
petitive to domestic commodities from such a source was found to lack 
merit. The ability of a nation's products to enter the world market in 
the absence of dumping, state trading and trade restrictions is not de­
termined by high or low wages per se, but by a nation's factor endowment 
and the combination of these factors used in the production of the vari­
ous commodities.
American agriculture is generally more dependent on world markets 
than most other American industries. Although many agricultural com­
modities are imported, most agricultural imports do not compete with 
domestic production. Where, presently, threat of competition from im­
ports would arise wLth an end of restrictive measures, much of the 
threat can be traced to the high price created by domestic support pro­
grams. In the attempt to aid low income domestic producers with price 
supports, imports must be excluded. Unfortunately, price supports, even
Ezra Taft Benson in a speech to the National Press Club, Washing­
ton, Feb. 6, 1958, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of 
the Secretary, 351-58, stated that the results of a poll of farm people 
showed them that less government interference and fewer programs were 
wanted. Only 39 per cent wanted as much or more government participa­
tion. At the same time, 8 out of 9 letterb from all sources, farm as 
well as non-farm, were ih favor of less government interference. Short­
ly thereafter Congress sent a bill to the President that would have 
frozen price supports and quotas at the same levels of 1957*
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when used in conjunction with import restrictions, do not solve the low 
income problem faced by a large number of farmers.
Attempts to secure adequate incomes far low income farmers by the 
use of price supports have often led to very profitable operations for 
a few farmsteads and landholders while many farmers have received little 
aid. A program which increases prices to consumers and provides little 
aid to most farmers, yet a program which forces foreign countries to do 
without desired dollar exchange, appears to need revision. Such a pro­
gram will undoubtedly continue malallocation of productive factors 
longer than an adjustable program which would permit the easing of pres­
sure on the scarcest factors and make greater use of the more abundant 
factors.
A commodity that requires relatively large amounts of a scarce fac­
tor may be protected if imports are excluded. And such protection is 
often advocated by various producer groups. In the United States labor 
is normally the factor in relatively short supply; consequently, it is 
ordinarily a labor-intensive industry which finds itself in need of 
protection from foreign imports. Conversely, the products of American 
industry which enjoy the greatest demand in foreign markets normally re­
quire little hand labor in their production. Since most trading nations 
are plagued with a chronic dollar shortage, imports of hand-intensive 
commodities should be encouraged from dollar-short areas while invest­
ments of a private nature should be encouraged in the same area. Both 
actions would increase the dollar exchange available for purchases of 
American export items which are normally of a more capital oriented na­
ture than are our imports.
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One problem to be faced in a program that would shift underemployed 
factors out of hand-intensive production into the production cjtf capital- 
intensive commodities, goods, and services would be the need of govern­
ment expenditures. The cost would be as high or perhaps higher than the 
amount needed to carry on present price supporting programs. However, 
in contrast to the annual price support payments which do little or 
nothing to solve the low income problem, the cost of shifting production 
factors would be for one time only.
Another major problem to be faced in an attempt to shift produc­
tive factors would be the effect on the nation's security. Part of this 
problem could be resolved with more emphasis on stockpiling from cheap­
er sources and less reliance on the maintenance of high cost defense 
industries.
General Conclusions
The United States is probably in a better position economically 
than any other nation to permit an increase.of imports. Imports should 
be welcomed, and in fact, the goal of policy decisions should be to en­
courage especially those imports that would require hand-intensive 
production methods. The flow of United States investment capital and 
products into the world markets, while not balanced by the smaller flow 
of world goods into the United States, indicates that all imports are 
of a supplementary or complementary nature to the American economy. 
Although a commodity may be directly competitive with an American com­
modity, it is, none of the less, helping to balance the flow of trade. 
The more such imports the United States is able to induce the more goodc 
and services American consumers will have. Any import restriction that
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the United States maintains will mean fewer returns to America's pro- 
2
duction factors.
Since lowering tariffs and curtailment of other trade barriers 
will undoubtedly harm certain sections of the economy, policy should 
include considerations for those who stand to be injured. Within agri­
culture where many would benefit by fewer trade barriers, many areas 
would feel increased competition.
With a democratic type government that is responsive to peoples 
wishes, trade and agricultural policy cannot be dictated by an all- 
powerful policy-making body. Although Congress has defaulted much of 
its authority for making trade policy to the executive branch, the 
framework within which trade is regulated is determined by the legis­
lature. As Congressmen are responsive to constituents, it is possible 
that certain groups may seem to be overly represented. The general 
apathy on the part of most voters makes it easier for minority interest 
groups to seek and obtain Congressional succor at the expense of the 
majority.
Congress, to set or police trade policy in a manner that would 
raise the nation's standard of living should be aware of how the ma­
jority would benefit, and it should not rely predominantly on testi­
mony from special interest minorities for the basis of legislation. 
There has been much written in the news columns about the need for 
foreign trade. Nevertheless, the advisability of continuing the Recip­
rocal Trade Agreements Act has been in question from time to time when 
it is tinder consideration for extension.
2Meyer, op. cit.. pp. 323-335.
The rising level of living enjoyed in America is in part due to 
the rapid technological advances. The motive for protection, however, 
is basically a resistance to change and an attempt to assure the con­
tinued income of those not making a change. The incidence of protec­
tion falls upon other producers and the consumers. Protection thus 
proves costly and permits protected producers to become complacent be­
hind protective walls. Insensitivness to technological change slows 
the shift of productive factors that would be continual were protec­
tion minimized. Legislation should be designed to aid rather than 
hamper factor adjustment. Progress toward freer trade should be 
speeded. Such legislation should be made permanent and not subject 
to extensions every two or three years. Moveover, the full and en­
lightened power of the government should be channeled into an attempt 
to make agricultural policy more compatible with trade policy.
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